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Summary 
Instead of exploring explicit textual or ideological influences of the philosophy 
of F. W. Nietzsche on Modernist literary writers, this thesis analyses the points 
at which works such as James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
and T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets bear an implicit relationship to an aesthetic 
theory for which the notion of representation (artistic or philosophical) and that 
of sacredness must be thought together. Such a theory is to be found most 
explicitly in Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy, although some of his earlier and 
later writings engage with it too. 
Thus, from the points of convergence of the sacred and the aesthetic that 
appear in The Birth of Tragedy, I extract the keys for a theory of representation 
at large, of Nietzschean import, in order to contrast the notion of philosophical 
representation (Vorstellung) with the activities and discourses which philosophy 
has traditionally tried to avoid: rituals and myths. Out of this contrast, the 
conclusion emerges that there is a genealogical progression from ritual 
(specifically sacrifice) to myth, and from this to philosophical and artistic 
representation; that is to say, that only after a myth (whose root was a ritual) has 
lost its religious value, can philosophy and art (and literature in particular) enjoy 
a fully separate existence, as the secularised discourses that characterise our 
Modernityf (here modern science is included as a development and continuation 
1 
of the philosophical discourse). What makes Modernist writers play an essential 
role in this respect is their tacit awareness of this genealogy, which is manifested 
in their aesthetic practice. Two instances of this practice are analysed here, in 
their mythopoeic character (mainly derived from the mythic possibilities of 
Christianity), and their questioning of modern notions (selfhood, identity, 
individuality). They re-enact the original sacred speech previous to our 
secularised modern aesthetics. 
NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS IN QUOTATIONS 
In quotations, the original, non-translated version of a text is supplied in 
footnote only when the passage belongs to F. W. Nietzsche's The Birth of 
Tragedy (the only one of the three primary texts I analyse which was not 
originally written in English: the two others are James Joyce's A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man and T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets) or to passages from other 
works by Nietzsche which bear a significant relationship to the themes of The 
Birth of Tragedy that I discuss. I have also supplied the non-translated text of 
some Classical sources (in Latin and Ancient Greek) because I wanted to show 
some kind of awareness of the problems of interpretation that the long history of 
their translations has posed, due to the fact of having been assigned a privileged 
authoritative status. 
The style guidelines I have follow have been those of the Modern Humanities 
Association Style Book (London, 1996,5th edition), departing from them only in 
small matters, such as my preference for -ise instead of -ize terminations where 
both are possible. 
0. Introduction 
The link between Nietzsche's aesthetic theory and the theoretical self-understanding of 
Modernist liter, writing is not a newly discovered one. There is the acknowledgement 
of explicit textual and ideological borrowings which bears witness to what I claim to be 
an even more pervasive influence of Nietzsche on the Modernist writers. If we recall the 
earthly vitalism of D. H. Lawrence, Thomas Mann's explicit references to Nietzsche's 
early musical concerns, the explicitness of the link begins to be clear. But even at a less 
clear level, in so far as Nietzsche was one of the great critics of Modem society 
(emphasising that the West was living through a spiritual crisis at the time), a few 
decades later, when literature turns upon itself escaping from an unsatisfactory world, 
Nietzsche seemed to be the most appropriate reference point. The literary world of the 
early twentieth-century experiences in a particular manner what has repeatedly been 
announced as the 'disenchantment of the world': the loss of meaning and value in the 
outer world. There had been other thematisations of this idea, of the loss of the divine 
dimension of reality (some of Hölderlin's works are a good instance), but this 
acknowledgement of a spiritual void takes in Modernism a suggestive shape, which 
cannot fully ignore the impact of the world wars and their sequels. Modernism is not 
content with a retreat into the world of the self-reflexivity of signs (Symbolism and 
Imagism could be charged with this isolationist move), but tried to re-enchant the world 
from within the literary work, bestowing the lost sacredness on the outer world from 
what of sacred remained in the literary word. In this respect, the Modernist were the 
continuators of the Romantics, trying to create a new mythology that could instill sacred 
value into a desacralised world. 
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However, it is not in this respect that I will be concerned with the aesthetics of 
literary Modernism and Nietzsche's mingling of aesthetic and religious terms, and it is 
for this reason that I have chosen to focus my attention on texts that at first sight seem 
to be utterly remote from the Nietzschean import of Modernist concerns. Instead of, say, 
Lawrence or Mann, let us focus on Joyce and Eliot; and even then, not on their explicit 
myth-making or myth-re-enacting works, but on A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
and Four Quartets. If we do so, we leave behind the terrain of identifiable textual or 
ideological influences; nevertheless, a different and very subtle link between Nietzsche 
and Modernism comes to the foreground: that which is based on a different notion of 
the articulation of the sacred and the aesthetic: no longer to intentionally create, re- 
create or re-live a mythology, as the Romantics tried, but to install the literary word in 
those interstices where mythology is still alive, and where the sacred and the aesthetic 
are indissolubly tied. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Four Quartets move 
at various levels of mythic resonance, but one central to both is that in which 
Christianity appears indissociable from aesthetic production and enjoyment, not because 
of its being a particular creed, but by its being one of the most important shaping forces 
of our Western history. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Four Quartets 
certainly do not incorporate the kind of disdain for Christianity that we find in the later 
Nietzsche, but pay heed instead to those points of the Christian experience where 
sacredness becomes one with art. I want to argue that Nietzsche was already aware of 
these points of intersection in his early writings, specially in The Birth of Tragedy, and 
even more, that a certain continuity in this respect can be traced through his later 
production, in so far as his thought can be seen as an aesthetic turn in the history of 
philosophy. 
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These privileged meeting points are myth and ritual, and it is in relation to them, 
specially myth, that philosophical discourse has tried to define its own limits. Let us see 
what happens when the philosophical discourse of aesthetic theory has to encounter the 
truth of myth, ritual and sacrifice. Let us see what happens when Nietzsche tries to 
unfold an aesthetic theory in The Birth of Tragedy without renouncing the implications 
of the question of sacredness in ancient Greek religion: could this be an analogous 
challenge to that which Joyce and Eliot face when they engage in an aesthetic practice 
without renouncing the implications of the experience of Christianity for Modernity? 
To see whether there is such an analogy, I will extract out of Nietzsche's 
aesthetic theory a more general theory of representation, in order to see what the 
relationship is between the objectivity of philosophical representation (Vorstellung) 
arising out of an aesthetic context, and the points of intersection of sacredness and the 
aesthetic (ritual and myth, in this order). But even if a relationship is elicited, how can 
the Modernists surpass the secularised character of literature, and how can they 
illuminate the genesis of a philosophical notion (representation) that art continues to 
question at the end of our Modernity? 
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1. The Sacred and the Aesthetic in The Birth of Tragedy 
The Birth of Tragedy is Nietzsche's first published work, and it is also the work 
in which he comes closest to the systematic exposition of an aesthetic theory. 
Here we find primarily an enquiry into the nature of aesthetic experience and 
creation, viewed in their relation to an alleged origin in Greek classical 
antiquity. Ancient Greece as an original moment is within the book more than 
just a historical beginning, in its providing the very terms in which historical 
development is going to unfold. Reference to this past is a recurrent motif in our 
Western self-understanding, including our thinking about art; what makes 
Nietzsche's use of this motif relevant here is the fact that he establishes an 
internal connection between the art of the ancient Greeks and their religion. The 
implications of this link are going to define Nietzsche's approach to classical 
antiquity throughout his works (up to the point of identifying himself with a 
Greek deity), but they will also be extended to his evaluations of modern 
culture. 
Artistic experience is for Nietzsche to be regarded as the all- 
encompassing mode of existence of the ancient Greeks: they are to be seen first 
and foremost as taking delight in the playfulness of beautiful illusions; yet, this 
is only possible as part of a dynamic in which religious experience plays an 
equally important role. The emphasis is not so much on institutionalised 
religion, as on the irreducible forces to which those religious institutions 
4 
respond; what matters for Nietzsche is not Pagan doctrine, but the Greeks' 
confrontation with a whole domain of reality out of which their religion arises: 
the realm of the sacred. It is in relation to the experience of certain aspects of 
reality, singled out as sacred, that a reflection on the nature of art is unfolded 
within The Birth of Tragedy. 
1.1. An Aesthetic Metaphysics 
The theory that Nietzsche presents in The Birth of Tragedy is framed by two 
concerns that are to a certain extent peripheral in relation to the development of 
the central ideas of the book: on the one hand, there is the philological task of 
giving an account of the origins and historical significance of ancient Greek 
tragedy; on the other, there is Nietzsche's purpose to justify an accentuated 
admiration for Richard Wagner and his music, this seen precisely as a rebirth 
of the ancient tragic spirit. The legitimacy of these preoccupations, or indeed 
the degree of success in shaping them into tenable expositions, does not affect 
the validity of the theoretical insights about the aesthetic that the text provides: 
whether Nietzsche has a place in philological orthodoxy, or Wagner is regarded 
as a musical genius, is only accidental for the present engagement with the 
theory of The Birth of Tragedy. The legitimacy of such an engagement becomes 
clear if, following Nietzsche's own remarks in his 1886 critical foreword to the 
book, we regard The Birth of Tragedy as an integral part of Nietzsche's 
consistent philosophical development, as well as a work that prefigures this 
1 
development. Rather than emphasising the Wagnerian tribute, for example, we 
would like to say, with Sarah Kofman, that 
the time of a re-reading that tries to make The Birth of Tragedy to be 
born again detaching it as much as possible from Wagner (and thus 
from Schopenhauerian pessimism) emphasises the aspect of triumphal 
overcoming, and conceals the illness under its remedy. 4 
That is to say, such a reading emphasises the continuity of The Birth of Tragedy 
with Nietzsche's later works, in which the positive aspect of life-affirmation is 
more clearly present, and not just as a `remedy' for or counterpart to an 
essentially negative existence. 
However, it must be acknowledged that The Birth of Tragedy is 
produced not only in the context of philological concerns and personal 
admiration, but also under the spell of a philosophical tradition that Nietzsche 
was later to repudiate openly: the metaphysical tradition that includes both Kant 
and Schopenhauer as its heirs. References to these two thinkers are always 
positive throughout the book: 
' Sarah Kofman, Explosion II: Les enfants de Nietzsche (Paris: Galilee, 1993), p. 87. My 
translation. 
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through Kant and Schopenhauer the spirit of German philosophy [... ] 
introduced an infinitely more profound and serious consideration of 
ethical questions and art. ' 
Thus the degree of tribute to Kant and Schopenhauer can be seen as an index of 
the dependence of The Birth of Tragedy on a tradition from which Nietzsche 
was later to depart. This would also explain why the book is considered, even by 
Nietzsche himself, as the exposition of an artistic metaphysics. We would find 
here the old metaphysical themes, only reworked in the context of art: the 
separation of reality from immediacy, the unreliable nature of the world of 
phenomena, the positing of a transcendent realm of value. Nevertheless, what 
we find in fact is a displacement of metaphysics through art: the traditional 
notions of metaphysics are employed, and some even endorsed, but only to be 
rendered mobile in a context dominated by the tension between sacred and 
aesthetic experience. We could say of the Nietzschean position that it has 
the painful character of a process that consists then in expressing, with 
Kantian and Schopenhauerian formulations, unheard-of and new 
555 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, trans. S. Whiteside 
(London: Penguin, 1993), §19, p. 95. ['Der deutschen Philosophie, durch Kant und 
Schopenhauer [... ] eine unendlich tiefere und ernstere Betrachtung der ethischen Fragen und der 
Kunst eingeleitet wurde'. Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (henceforth KGW) ed. by 
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 111.1 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyer, 1972), p. 
124. ] 
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valuations, which are radically opposed to the spirit as well as to the 
taste of Kant and Schopenhauer. 6 
The Birth of Tragedy can thus be seen as a particular locus of displacement, and 
not simply as a continuation of a decadent tradition in the form of a young 
philosopher's `artistic metaphysics' or `metaphysics of illusion'. The old 
concepts are put to the service of a new structure, so that the interaction 
between reality and illusion, in its being part of an artistic game, can no longer 
be easily reconciled with a structure of transcendence. 
However, even if the new valuations, with their positive emphasis on 
playfulness, are opposed to the spirit and taste of Kant and Schopenhauer, and 
even if the world of illusion (as opposed to the true, metaphysical one) is 
granted the dignity of art, the emphasis on dualisms persists, suggesting that the 
irreconcilability of dual structures is in fact a clear echo of the metaphysical 
tradition to which Kant and Schopenhauer belong, with its inability to think 
immanence, and thus with its having to resort to a fundamental duality (or to 
duality as foundational). 
The most prominent of the dualisms pervading The Birth of Tragedy is 
that having the Apolline and the Dionysiac as its poles: they are the two primary 
artistic forces at work in ancient Greek tragedy, but their interaction is also at 
6 Kofman, Explosion II, p. 88. My translation. 
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the root of the unfolding of reality as an aesthetic product. Yet here we can 
already see that the structure of this dualism does not simply correspond to the 
positing of an irreconcilable transcendence, and in this sense a fundamental 
distance is introduced with respect to the previous `metaphysics of illusion', the 
long tradition of thought for which immediate reality is essentially illusory and 
therefore not to be trusted. For Nietzsche, the `illusory' is not primarily the 
world of deception, but the world of art: thus through an intimation of the 
aesthetic forces at work in artistic production we can see the illusory under the 
light of the real, since the forces that make reality `appear' as art are the same 
ones that allow us to be creators of art works. 
Already in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche manifests a preference for 
one of these two forces: the Dionysiac, associated with the impulse behind the 
non-visual arts, particularly music, and in contrast with the Apolline, which is 
the impulse behind the visual arts. The notion of the Dionysiac is the closest 
that we can get to the idea of a pure reality, 'in-itself'. However, as we shall see, 
the fact that the Dionysiac cannot be thought of outside the aesthetic process, 
the fact that it is already an aesthetic force, precludes an analogy with a 
traditional metaphysical structure. It is important to note that the notion of the 
Dionysiac is going to be a recurrent motif in Nietzsches works, and that it is 
not difficult to trace a continuity between the aesthetic, creative nature that the 
Dionysiac is assigned in The Birth of Tragedy and the traits of joyfulness and 
life-affirmation that acquire more prominence in later writings; in The Birth of 
9 
Tragedy the Dionysiac is already a source of value and a founding force, and 
not a rigid entity within a metaphysical schema. 
Through the religious figures of Apollo and Dionysus, Nietzsche's 
`aesthetic metaphysics' intertwines the manifestation of reality as art with 
access to ultimate reality as sacred. The two impulses that give rise to artistic 
reality are for Nietzsche those which the ancient Greeks conceptualised as the 
gods Apollo and Dionysus, and the cults and rituals associated with them are 
continuous, respectively, with the two kinds of artistic activity: visual and non- 
visual. Thus the use of ancient religious motifs is not just symbolic, but 
intended to convey essentially the same interrelation between the sacred and the 
aesthetic that Nietzsche perceived to occur in ancient Greece. ' 
The Apolline impulse can be defined as the tendency towards the clarity 
of forms and the definition of boundaries, and finds a parallel in the 
psychological dreaming state, where the visual overtakes all other elements. The 
Dionysiac can be defined as the tendency towards an original unitary yet 
dynamic state, and finds its correlate in the state of intoxication. Both are divine 
tendencies, and both define the limits of Nietzsche's understanding of ancient 
Greek religion. The serenity, clarity and radiance of Apollo applies to all the 
majesty of the Olympus, resulting in an art of visual pleasure, whereas the 
For a different perception of Nietzsche's use of these religious motifs, which is not literal but 
'paraliteral' in the authors' terminology, see J. P. Stern and M. S. Silk, Nietzsche on Tragedy 
(Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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conflicting and frenzied nature of Dionysus, expressed in the loss of boundaries 
in music, constitutes the other side of the opposition, and threatens the order of 
the Olympus. The Dionysiac is felt to be foreign to the nature of the ancient 
sacred cults of Greece, and yet Nietzsche insists that it is the expression of a 
primordial reality, allowing us to have direct access to the sacred primal unity 
of the real in a way analogous to the direct access to the essence of the original 
dynamicity that for Schopenhauer musical experience provides. 
This sacred primal unity, this `primordial oneness', is what can only be 
properly called `real': it is for Nietzsche the world in-itself that Schopenhauer 
characterised as blind will. Nietzsche also sees this primal reality as will and 
dynamicity, and thus subscribes to some fundamental traits of the 
Schopenhauerian metaphysics of illusion: the world of phenomena is the 
illusory manifestation of the universal will. However, Nietzsche escapes the 
pessimism inherent in this view by an appeal to the positive value of the 
aesthetic that is even more radical than that of Schopenhauer: the world of 
phenomena itself unfolds according to the mechanisms of art, according to the 
Apolline delight in illusory boundaries, and therefore it shows an essential 
kinship with the other side of the aesthetic spectrum, with the Dionysiac 
expression of the world will. Although there is still a hierarchy that sees in the 
Dionysiac a more direct expression of the will, the generalisation of the 
interplay between the sacred and the aesthetic to the whole of reality both 
assigns a new role to art and restitutes the dignity of the illusory: art is the only 
justification of manifest reality, but at the same time the totality of this illusory 
reality can benefit from enjoying an artistic link to the origin. Art is not only, as 
for Schopenhauer, a metaphysical consolation, given that we cannot attain the 
truly real through the phenomenal world of everyday life; art is also that pattern 
on which we can base our understanding of reality, because reality unfolds as 
art, according to aesthetic mechanisms, from the sacredness of the original 
oneness to the polychrome variety of phenomena: 
[... ] this above all must be plain to us, to our humiliation and our 
enhancement, that the whole comedy of art is not at all performed for 
us, for our improvement or edification any more than we are the actual 
creators of that art world: but we can assume for our own part that we 
are images and artistic projections for the true creator of that world, 
and that our highest dignity lies in the meaning of works of art - for it 
is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are 
eternally justified. 8 
The justification of the real can only be attained through the categories of 
aesthetics, not because the aesthetic is regarded as a privileged reality, but 
x Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §5, p. 32. ['Denn dies muss uns vor allem, zu unserer 
Erniedrigung und Erhönung, deutlich sein, dass die ganze Kunstkomödie durchaus nicht für 
uns, etwa unsrer Besserung und Bildung wegen, aufgefürt wird, ja dass wir ebensowenig die 
eigentlichen Schöpfer jener Kunswelt sind: wohl aber dürfen wir von uns selbst annehmen, dass 
wir für den wahren für den wahren Schöpfer derselben shon Bilder und Künstleriche 
Projectionen sind und in der Bedeutung von Kunstwerken unsre höchste Würde haben - denn 
nur als aesthetisches Phänomen ist das Dasein und die Welt ewig gerechtfertig'. KGW, 111.1. p. 
43. ] 
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because reality in its entirety becomes intelligible only when viewed 
aesthetically. In this sense The Birth of Tragedy provides a standpoint from 
which the sacred (as the ultimate reality) and the aesthetic cannot be thought 
separately, since it is precisely as an aesthetic phenomenon that sacredness 
expresses itself to create the world of appearances, providing for this world of 
appearances a justification which, partaking of the contingent character of the 
aesthetic process, is the only possible one, and constitutes for Nietzsche a solid 
ground for the affirmation of existence precisely because of its contingency. 
This could be seen as a variant of the Christian creationist model, but the 
differences are important: although the notion of the original `will' which 
objectifies itself is modelled on the notion of the personal human will, it is not 
the free choice of a personal god that creates the world, but the impersonal 
artistic force which is continuous with the individual will of the creative artist. 
Drawing from the impersonal dimension of artistic creation, beyond their 
authors' reach, Nietzsche entertains a notion of `will' that is nevertheless not 
wholly dissociable from its actualisation in individual artistic creation: reality 
can only be justified as art, and the artistic process of the objectification of the 
universal will is the same as the creative process of the individual artist. Art 
does not only provide a model among others according to which we can 
understand reality: reality is only intelligible according to aesthetic parameters, 
and the activity of the artist is a participation in this ontologically prior artistic 
process; under this view, it makes sense that Nietzsche would call art the `true 
metaphysical activity', since it is the activity through which we can understand 
the objectification of a sacred ground into the reality of appearances: thus it 
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puts us in touch with that which is not reducible to the physicality of the 
everyday world of illusion. Yet it is not a metaphysical activity in the traditional 
sense, since the duality which it presupposes (the artistic will vs. its 
objectification) already belongs to the objectified, immanent world of 
appearances: the will of the artist is not a symbol or an analogue of the will that 
creates the world, but a participation in this will itself; reality as appearance and 
the artistic product have the same ontological status, and are not just each 
other's analogue. 
We can take Nietzsche's use of traditional terminology for the 
description of a displacing new structure as the possibility of reading back the 
history of metaphysical thought from this new perspective: not as the history of 
a fundamental error, but as the history of the attempts to achieve a self- 
grounding status for (illusory) theoretical activity; once the grounding is shown 
to fall outside the limits of theory, those attempts are legitimised, and their 
vocabulary can be used. This is so because the inadequacy of these vocabularies 
is constitutive of the illusory character of theory, now understood as part of the 
artistic unfolding of reality: just as the Apolline world of defined images is 
illusory in relation to the Dionysiac intimation of the primordial and unitary 
state of natural flux, the world of theory is illusory in relation to the original 
dynamicity that it tries to capture, and this is its constitutive nature, as theory. 
But a fundamental displacement in relation to previous understandings of the 
tradition takes place, since with Nietzsche's `artistic metaphysics' an essential 
contiguity is revealed between the ever-changing world of physis and that of its 
14 
`transcendence': they are immanently related as the artistic will is to the artistic 
product. The dynamicity of physis, the artistic will, is itself the source of the 
metaphysical discourse, which does not transcend physis, but rather relates to it 
in a contingent manner within the structure of artistic creation. Thus the 
transformation of traditional metaphysics into an artistic one in The Birth of 
Tragedy is not simply a variation in terminology, but a significant turn that 
proves the term `artistic metaphysics' to be something of an oxymoron. 
Art is not to occupy the place of metaphysics, but rather, metaphysics is 
to be shown to respond to the same mechanisms as art-production. Thus, if the 
justification of the real can only be made through the categories of aesthetics it 
is not because the aesthetic is regarded as a privileged reality, but, to say it 
again, because reality in its entirety becomes intelligible only when viewed 
aesthetically. In this sense, Nietzsche surpasses aestheticism in The Birth of 
Tragedy by, instead of conceiving of art as a substitute or remedy for life (as 
Schopenhauer and fin-de-siecle aestheticism would have it), producing a theory 
that rests on the indissociability of the two, and ultimately on the affirmation of 
life understood through art. For this reason, Nietzsche provides an adequate 
conceptual framework for the aesthetic ideas underlying much of literary 
Modernism, in contrast to earlier articulations of life and art, to which his 
theory was contemporary. 9 
See Michael Bell, Literature, Modernism and Myth: Belief and Responsibility in Twentieth 
Century Literature (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 27-28. 
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This pervasiveness of the aesthetic structure threatens the basis of 
traditional conceptions and delimitations, yet assumes a strange continuity with 
this tradition; while endorsing the old view of art as imitation, Nietzsche 
enlarges this view so that it becomes almost self-contradictory: 
art is not only an imitation of the truth of nature, but a metaphysical 
supplement to that truth of nature, coexisting with it in order to 
overcome it. '° 
This implies that nature already has the quality of the aesthetic, but it 
incorporates human artefacts as an excess that is neither strictly alien nor fully 
assimilated; human artistic life provides a metaphysical supplement because it 
reproduces, within the artistic unfolding of reality that reality itself carries out, 
the artistic mechanisms that constitute it. The concept of imitation shows now 
the consistency of its place within the system: it can only prove meaningful not 
with reference to a process of traditional mimesis, but as an organic 
reproduction within the sphere that contains both imitation and imitator: the 
aesthetic manifestation of reality (by reality itself) in the form of illusion. To 
understand this particular notion of imitation it helps to bring to mind the 
notions of `excess' and `overfullness' that will play an important role in 
Nietzsche's later writings: we must be able to conceive, against the standard 
1' Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §24, p. 114. ['Die Kunst nicht nur Nachahmung der 
Naturwirklichkeit, sondern gerade ein metaphysisches Supplement der Naturwirklichkeit ist, zu 
deren Ueberwindung neben sie gestellt'. KGW, 111.1. p. 147. ] 
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logic of representation, of entities that are more than what they are, without for 
that reason ceasing to be themselves; the excess of reality allows for a dynamic 
process that is not external but constitutive, yet in its dynamicity continuously 
threatening the stability of a basis. In terms of representation, since the dynamic 
of the real is that of artistic production, in this picture the represented and 
representing elements are not external to each other, but part of a continuity that 
nevertheless involves differences (because of its being a structure of 
representation). To this view of the world, which wants to reconcile imitation 
with participation, corresponds the pre-modern view of the universe as a cosmos 
infinitely reproduced within a multiplicity of microcosmoi which are also part 
of a the general totality, the organisational principle being immanent and yet 
transposable from one level to another. ' l 
Therefore, the concept of imitation in The Birth of Tragedy is certainly 
of a kind, and not synonymous with Aristotelian mimesis. According to 
Nietzsche's concept of the imitative nature of art, the Apolline and the 
Dionysiac (the primary artistic impulses) 
spring from nature itself, without the mediation of the human artist', 
and in them `nature's artistic urges are immediately and directly 
11 To this view also corresponds metonymic as opposed to metaphoric representation, as will be 
discussed in chapter 2. 
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satisfied [... ]. Faced with these immediate artistic states in nature, every 
artist is an "imitator"'. '2 
Thus human creations participate through imitation in the Apolline tendency 
towards delight in the beauty of form, through the principle of individuation 
that assigns clear illusory boundaries to them; or else they incorporate the 
Dionysiac sense of intoxication at having glimpsed into the unity of reality after 
the fragmentation of the illusory world of individuals. These opposed (and, as I 
shall show, complementary) forces are the basic concepts upon which Nietzsche 
builds his theory of the aesthetic in The Birth of Tragedy, and as their belonging 
to an immanent structure of imitation has shown, their status bears some 
complexity: they are not simply aesthetic forces, because, strictly speaking, the 
aesthetic is what results from their interplay; they stand outside manifest reality 
in so far as reality and its illusory appearance are their products; they are not 
only instrumental metaphors, because they are prior to the metaphorical 
character of all expression; finally, they are not only categories tied to a 
historical period, because their ascription to the historical development of 
ancient Greece is made under the assumption of an essential continuity between 
this past and our modernity, and it is precisely by emphasising the actual 
12 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §2. p. 18. ['Aus der Natur selbst, ohne G''ermittelung des 
menschlichen Künstlers, hervobrechen, und in denen sich ihre Kunsttriebe zunächst und auf 
directem Wege befriedigen [... ]. Diesen unmittelbaren Kunstzuständen der Natur gegenüber ist 
jeder Kunstler "Nachamer"'. KGW, 111.1, p. 26. ] 
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historical conditions of their occurrence in the past that we can gain an 
understanding of their operativeness in our modernity. 
From this theoretical standpoint, Nietzsche analyses the stages of ancient 
Greek culture not as concepts but as the historical realities prior to the 
formation of historical concepts, though in strict vinculation with them as their 
condition. The pre-Olympian world of the Greeks corresponds to the times 
when nature manifested what was seen as her terrible Titanic powers, and thus 
this world constitutes the early stage of the realisation of the Hellenic will. Out 
of the unbearable wisdom provided by this stage, and in correlation with its 
powerful insight into reality (a reality perceived as an awesome abyss), the 
world of Olympian religion appears then as the necessary counterpart, as the 
transfiguring mirror of beauty. This is how, for Nietzsche, classic Greek religion 
responds to the same impulse as plastic and epic art; thus it would be explained 
how the poetry of Homer manages to stand in inseparable relation to both the 
world of myth and the clarity of forms that characterises classic visual art. If, in 
Homer, religious myth and artistic poetry cannot be detached from each other, it 
is because they spring from the same Apolline force that turns the horror of the 
Dionysiac vision into the blissful delight in the perfection of form. 
However, the Dionysiac longing for the original and awe-inspiring unity 
of natural powers (these perceived as the contradictory joining of limitless 
destruction and limitless creation in Nature) was not completely ruled out from 
the beautiful illusory world of Olympian religion and its individuating 
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boundaries: it persisted first in the form of ancient and barbaric cults, and later 
it progressively found a space within the Greek spirit itself. At this stage in 
ancient Greek culture 
the individual, with all its restraints and moderations, was submerged in 
the self-oblivion of the Dionysiac state and forgot the Apolline dictates. 
Excess was revealed as truth, contradiction; the bliss born of pain 
spoke from the heart of nature. 13 
It was at this point that tragedy emerged, blending the Apolline and the 
Dionysiac in a single artistic form. By rejoicing in the epic nature of the heroic 
world portrayed on the stage, Attic tragedy has an Apolline dimension, since the 
epic is characterised by the clear boundaries and the plasticity of the narrative, 
dreaming state. On the other hand, by negating this world and opposing it 
through the musical intervention of the chorus, Attic tragedy incorporated the 
Dionysiac insight into the mysteries of reality, since the dynamicity of music is 
the parallel to the dynamicity of ultimate reality, which is in an eternal agonic 
state. Through the mediation of its musical elements, tragedy presented the 
illusory as illusory; the heroic world of the stage, of the same nature as the 
phenomenal world, was no longer a substitute concealing a deeper reality, as in 
13 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §4, p. 27. ['Das Individuum, mit allen seinen Grenzen und 
Maasen. ging hier in der Selbstvergessenheit der dionysischen Zustände unter und vergass die 
apollinischen Satzungen. Das Uebermaass enthüllte sich als Wahrheit, der Widerspruch, die aus 
Schmerzen geborene Wonne sprach von sich aus dem Herzen der Natur heraus'. KGW, 111.1, p. 
37. ] 
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the Homeric epic, but an illusion rendered as such by the presence of the music 
of the chorus, the chorus being what was truly responsible for the fall of the 
hero. Music, as for Schopenhauer, constitutes for the early Nietzsche a direct 
idea of the world-in-itself, of the universal will, and thus lies at the heart of 
Dionysiac experience. Nietzsche finds an essential kinship between musical 
experience and the Dionysiac rites which filled the initiates with the 
intoxicating experience of the dismemberment of their individual selves; thus it 
is only proper that the collapse of the individuality of the tragic hero takes place 
through the intervention of the chorus: the hybris of the hero is punished by the 
forces of de-individuation, just as the phenomenal world constantly reverts to 
the primordial reality of the universal will; the dynamic of Greek tragedy is also 
the dynamic of reality, accounted for in a discourse that is only `metaphysic' in 
the sense that art is metaphysic, that is, in its essential relation to the original 
physis, to the original reality. 
1.2. The Mutual Requirement of the Apolline and the Dionysiac 
The joining together of the two artistic forces in Greek tragedy is only one 
instance of the relationship between the Apolline and the Dionysiac, which 
adopts different modes according to different art forms. Music, as the art closest 
to sacred dynamic unity, and painting, as the paradigmatic visual art, would 
stand at the ends of a spectrum; nevertheless, the terms of interaction that 
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Nietzsche provides for the two artistic impulses in The Birth of Tragedy allow 
for a more complex characterisation, so that the notions of individuation vs. 
formlessness and contemplation vs. involvement cannot simply be aligned with 
the two poles which the two divine forces are. 
There appears to be a contradiction when Nietzsche subscribes to the 
Kantian and Schopenhauerian notion of contemplation as the true artistic state, 
while at the same time he places the highest artistic value in the closeness to the 
Dionysiac attuning with the universal will; according to this idea music is for 
Nietzsche the most `objective' art. If the artistic is essentially will-less, detached 
from desire, how is the Dionysiac to count as a reference for the valuation of 
art? And if we take the example of lyric poetry, whose artistic status Nietzsche 
does not deny, how can the clearest expression of individual will and subjective 
longing be granted artistic value? Where is the Dionysiac, the objective, the 
universal, in lyric poetry? The answer to these questions requires a deeper 
understanding of the Nietzschean notion of `universal will', a notion that at this 
stage can be seen as already prefiguring his later concept of the `will to power' 
in so far as it stands for reality's excess with respect to itself: the only truly real 
is the tendency toward the increase of force, and this tendency is not to be found 
in any substratum, but it is to be taken as the non-substantiated constitution of 
primordial reality; excess and overflow are not a characteristic of the original 
reality, but original reality itself, essentially contradictory because its essence is 
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pure becoming (and only in a metaphorical sense can we say that `becoming' is 
`essence') 
Nietzsche's concept of will presupposes both a naturalisation of the 
human and a humanisation of nature: under this view the world-in-itself is 
characterised as longing and desire, as an essentially dynamic force, but 
retaining its objective character, its traits of universality and anonymity, as 
opposed to a personal will. To make sense of the idea of a universal will we 
must be able to conceive of a dynamism that cannot be encapsulated in 
subjectivity, and yet retains the characteristics of personal longing; it is for this 
reason that such an idea does not respond to our modern, secularised 
mechanistic view of the dynamic of natural processes. On the contrary, this 
primary dynamism of the will is first expressed in the exuberantly powerful 
expressions of Nature, whose cyclical generations also point to the Nietzschean 
conception of the eternal return; this is a generative power that the Greeks recall 
among others in the figure of the satyr, `a symbol of nature's sexual 
omnipotence, which the Greeks were accustomed to considering with respectful 
astonishment. 14 Behind nature's sexual power, behind the ever-generating force 
of the natural world, the universal will stands as the non-differentiated realm of 
ultimate reality, into which only Dionysiac intoxication can glimpse. Since this 
realm is conceptually previous to any individuation and to any characterisation 
14 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §8, p. 40. ['Sinnbild der geschlechtlichen Allgewalt der 
Natur, die der Grieche gewöhnt ist mit ehrfürchtigem Staunen zu betrachen. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 
54. ] 
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of the human subject, it is the space prior to subjectivity, prior to the 
conception of the will as subjective desire. The will as subjective desire appears 
thus as a derived concept, fully understandable only in relation to the larger 
notion of an objective, world will. It is in this sense that Nietzsche's claim about 
the contemplative nature of pure art is compatible with its dependence on a 
relationship with the universal will, for the individual subject has precisely to 
abandon his subjective will in order to embrace the mystical state of the 
dissolution of his own self into the undifferentiated flow of the primal unity. 
Therefore, art is will-less only because it involves a distancing from the 
subjective will, parallel to the embracing of the universal will: it is not will-less 
because it is static, but because it is attuned with a will which is not subjective. 
Without bearing this distinction in mind, Nietzsche's use of the terms is 
misleading, and leads to important incongruities. 15 
Still the question about lyric poetry remains: how can the exacerbation 
of subjectivity be a truly artistic form? Precisely by presenting subjectivity in 
the only way in which it can appear: as an illusion. The lyric poet succeeds in 
communicating the sacred experience of his own dissolution in so far as he uses 
the illusion of his individual self to let the eternal reality of the world will speak: 
's One of these incongruities is pointed out in Michael Tanner's edition of The Birth of Tragedy. 
p. 120, note 16. 
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the artist has already abandoned his subjectivity in the Dionysiac 
process [... ]. The `I' of the lyric poet therefore sounds from the very 
depths of being: his `subjectivity' in the sense used by modern 
aestheticians is a falsehood. 16 
The Apolline delight in illusory individuation takes here the form of the 
mediation of the poet's subjectivity, just as within tragedy it took that of the 
individuality of the epic hero: the self of lyric poetry 
is not that of the waking, empirically real man [... ], but rather the sole. 
truly existing and eternal self that dwells at the basis of being, through 
whose depictions the lyric genius sees right through the very basis of 
being. 17 
The lyric genius understands then, as well as the tragic one, the relationships of 
mutual requirement in which the Apolline and the Dionysiac stand within true 
art, for in both art forms the universality of the Dionysiac force is expressed 
16 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §5, p. 29. ['Seine Subjectivität hat der Künstler bereits in 
dem dionysischen Prozess aufgegeben [... ]. Das "Ich" des Lyrikers tönt also aus dem Abgrunde 
des Seins: seine "Subjecktivität" im Sinne der neueren Aesthetiker is eine Einbildung. ' KGW, 
111.1, p. 40. ] 
17 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §5, p. 30. ['Nur ist diese Ichheit nicht dieselbe, wie die des 
wachen, empirisch-realen Menschen, sondern die einzige überhaupt wahrhaft seiende und 
ewige, im Grunde der Dinge ruhende Ichheit, durch deren Abbildern der Lyrische Genius bus 
auf jenen Grund der Dinge hindurchsieht. ' KGW. 111.1, p. 41. ] 
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through mechanisms of individuation, of which the epic hero and the subjective 
poet are clear indexes. But even the musical dimension inherent in lyric poetry 
stands in close association with the individual images which are its counterpart, 
for, even though music `does not require images or concepts', 18 it must find 
expression in accordance with certain criteria of form, and thus in the context of 
lyric poetry the linguistic form acts as `the mirror of imagery and concepts' 19 
thanks to which the universal will appears as music; it is then an inevitable 
tendency of the Dionysiac that it must seek expression in the Apolline: 
in the phenomenon of the lyric poet [... ] music strives to make its 
essence known in Apolline images: bearing in mind that music, at its 
highest level, must also seek to attain its highest expression in images, 
we must consider it possible that it can also find the symbolic 
expression of its actual Dionysiac wisdom. 20 
'' Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §6, p. 35. ['Das Bild und den Begriff nicht braucht'. KGW, 
111.1, p. 47. ] 
19 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §6, p. 34. ['Spiegel der Bildlichkeit und der Begriffe'. 
KGW, 111.1, p. 46. ] 
20 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §16, p. 79. ['An dem Phänomen des Lyrikers [... ] die Musik 
im Lyriker darnach ringt, in apollinischen Bildern über ihr Wesen sich kund zu geben: denken 
wir uns jetzt dass die Musik in ihrer höchsten Steigerung auch zu einer höchsten 
Verbildlichung zu kommen suchen muss, so müssen wir für möglich halten dass sie auch den 
symbolischen Ausdruck für ihre eigentliche dionysische Weisheit zu finden wisse. ' KGW, 111.1, 
p. 103-104. ] 
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While such an expression is for Nietzsche to be found perfectly accomplished in 
the balance of ancient Greek tragedy, where the complementary relationship 
between the Apolline and the Dionysiac is shown in the most explicit manner, 
nevertheless this relationship is present, if implicitly, in any form of art: even in 
the redemption through images of the visual arts and in the inevitable formal 
restrictions of the most Dionysiac music. But it is only by virtue of its 
dependence on the Dionysiac impulse that art acquires aesthetic value: it is thus 
in the case of tragedy, whose acknowledgement of illusions as such is made 
explicit by the negative character of its content; thus also in lyric poetry, where 
the intensification of subjectivity can be easily traced back to an insight into its 
illusory character; thus, finally, in Homeric epic and Olympian religion, in so 
far as, this time implicitly, they are the necessary healing counterpart to the 
original pain and suffering of a purely dynamic existence. The Dionysiac enjoys 
then for Nietzsche a foundational character, and this is corroborated by its 
privileged degree of closeness to reality 'in-itself, or in less traditional terms, to 
`becoming' viewed independently of its representational actualisations; this is 
the sacred flux out of which aesthetic representations arise. 
Yet in so far as Apollo is also a deity, the metaphors not being innocent, 
if metaphors at all, the Apolline still keeps a relationship with the sacred, not 
only by being a counterpart, but by virtue of an essential character which is 
reflected in the unquestionable divine rights of Apollo within the Greek 
pantheon. The Apolline's essential relationship with the sacred is manifested in 
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the fact that the Apolline cannot be conceived of outside the structure of 
unfolding which has the Dionysiac as its first moment, requiring its illusory 
actualisation: 
the truly existent, the primal Oneness, eternally suffering and 
contradictory, also needs the delightful vision, the pleasurable illusion 
for its constant redemption21. 
The evaluative terms with which this mutual requirement is characterised here 
betray Nietzsches youthful attachment to Schopenhauer and his pessimistic 
outlook, which Nietzsche was later to see as typically Christian. For the later 
Nietzsche the primal and contradictory world of becoming will not necessarily 
be loaded with a negative character, and its need of illusory representations will 
certainly not be understood in redemptive terms, but as the inevitable and joyful 
discharge of overfullness. However, it is the relation of mutual requirement that 
must be emphasised here, and the one that will find a traceable continuity in 
later theories. 22 At this point, the terms of the co-implication are expressed by 
21 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §4, p. 25. ['Das Wahrhaft-Seiende und Ur-Eine, als das 
ewig Leidende und Wiederspruchswolle, zugleich die entzückende Vision, den lustvollen 
Schein, zu seiner steten Erlösung braucht. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 34. ] 
22 This dynamic of opposition, in which two contrary forces are also complementary, may bring 
to mind the structure of Hegelian dialectics: it is, however, essentially different from this 
structure, in its primarily agonistic character, without sublation. Thus, if it is to find a 
precedent, the Heraclitean understanding of struggle is a better instance than Hegel's. See in 
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saying that, if the demon Silenus, Dionysus's companion, also participates in 
the god's insight into the unbearableness of reality, then 
in the highest artistic symbolism, we behold that Apolline world of 
beauty and its substratum, the terrible wisdom of Silenus, and we 
intuitively understand their reciprocal necessity. 23 
Aided by these statements, we can now approach the elements of 
Nietzsche's aesthetic metaphysics and set them in motion. Using the traditional 
structure of reflection, Nietzsche compares the gap between dreaming and 
waking life to that between the Apolline and the Dionysiac: just as our ordinary 
waking life is a first degree of illusion and our dreaming is a second, Apolline 
images and reflections are two stages removed from the reality of the universal 
will, of which music, as the Dionysiac art, is a direct copy. But, having agreed 
on the reciprocal requirement of the Apolline and the Dionysiac, this static 
system of reflection (that owes so much to the traditional metaphysics of light 
and its dualism of reality and appearances) can be turned into a dynamic tension 
in which the status of the mirror is highly problematic. Whereas in the previous 
this respect the article by Sarah Kofman, `Nietzsche and the Obscurity of Heraclitus', trans. by 
F. Lionnet-McCumber, Diacritics, 17/3 (Fall 1987), 39-55. 
23 Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy, §4, p. 25. [`[... ] Haben wir, in höchster Kunstsymbolik, jene 
apollinische Schönheitswelt und ihren Untergrund, die schreckliche Weisheit des Silen, vor 
unseren Blicken und begreifen, durch Intuition, ihre gegenseitige Nothwendigkeit. ' KGW, 111.1, 
p. 35. ] 
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structure of reflection (will-Dionysiac-Apolline) the mirror has no extension, in 
other contexts the mirror has an active role: Nietzsche tells us of how the 
`Hellenic "will" held up a transfiguring mirror to itself, 24 this mirror being the 
Apolline structure of images and concepts that makes music appear, within 
lyric poetry, as an individual subjective will: the will of the poet. Here the 
sequence is: universal will-Dionysiac music-Apolline images-individual will. If 
we can therefore see lyric poetry as 
the imitative effulgence of music in images and concepts, we may now 
ask: `How does music appear in the mirror of imagery and concepts? ' 
It appears as will in Schopenhauer's sense of the word, as an opposite 
of the aesthetic, purely contemplative will-less state. 25 
Nietzsche fails here to distinguish between the notions of an individual and a 
universal will (or rather, a personal vs. an impersonal will), thus conceiving of 
the yearning of the poet as part of nature's own yearning. If we make such a 
distinction, the extent to which the lyric poet participates in nature's longing is 
24 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §3, p. 23. ['In der sich der Hellenische "Wille" einen 
verklärenden Spiegel vorhielt. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 32. ] 
25 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §6, p. 34. ['Die nachahmende Effulguration der Musik in 
Bildern und Begriffen betrachten, so können wir jetzt fragen: "als was erscheint die Musik im 
Spiegel der Bildlichkeit und der Begriffe? " Sie erscheint als Wille, das Wort im 
Schopenhauerischen Sinne genommen, d. h. als Gegensatz der aesthetischen rein beschaulichen 
willenlosen Stimmung. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 46. ] 
30 
what truly measures his disinterestedness, the relinquishing of his own 
individuality, and therefore the aesthetic quality of his works. This is more 
consistent with the rest of the theory in The Birth of Tragedy, as well as with 
Nietzsche's later `metaphysics of the will to power' and the morality of `self- 
overcoming'. By failing to make explicit such a distinction, and retaining the 
Schopenhauerian ambiguity which conceives of the will in both personal and 
impersonal terms, Nietzsche has to resort to a non-artistic duality between 
`essence' and `appearance' which does not fit well in the context of his 
exposition. 
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Let us then retain only the confirmation of the dynamicity of 
representation that this identification of the Apolline and the mirror provides: 
the mirror transfigures; it does not only reflect; the mirror being part of the 
continuum of artistic forces, and not a line without extension that separates 
them, it participates in the very artistic process. According to this logic, we 
could go a step further and assert that, since ultimate reality is itself the process 
of artistic creation, reality's artistic overfullness with respect to itself, the 
structure of the mirror is here subverted: the duality between original and 
reflection is dissolved in an artistic continuum in which the transfiguring power 
26 See The Birth of Tragedy, §6, pp. 34-35 [KGW, 111.1, pp. 46-47], where to preserve the 
aesthetic, disinterested `essence' of music Nietzsche comes close to denying its Dionysiac 
character, presenting it as mere appearance of a deeper aesthetic substratum, which is clearly 
inconsistent with the major tenets of the text. 
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of the mirror is the clear index of the interrelation between the Apolline and the 
Dionysiac: the mirror's image-creating power (its Apolline character) is also a 
creative transformation, and by being such it is also part of the reality of 
becoming that infinitely transforms itself. 
Part of my argument in relation to Joyce and Eliot's literary texts will 
rely on the assumption of the mutual requirement of the Apolline and the 
Dionysiac artistic impulses, as a formulation that makes manifest art's internal 
relationship to the sacred, also involving a dynamic conception of 
representation. Nonetheless, Nietzsche's subscription to this point is far from 
unambiguous, given the clearly fundamental role that he assigns to the 
Dionysiac and his own inclinations in favour of Dionysiac manifestations 
(musical art in particular). For all this he seems to be reluctant to admit the 
middle ground of a reconciliation; and yet, I would claim that this reluctance is 
what confers on his theory its validity by virtue of a commitment to dynamism, 
because it is not reconciliation that is at stake here, but the infinite continuation 
of the struggle, of which Nietzsche's text is a re-enactment rather than a 
description. Ultimately, aesthetic value depends on its relation to the primal 
Dionysiac force (just as in Nietzsches later thought the life-affirming forces 
provide the source of all value); yet the fact that the Apolline is a necessary 
counterpart prevents any statement of value made only on account of the 
Dionysiac, which cannot be conceived of as an independent founding force. 
These oscillations between the privileging of one element and the detached 
description of the whole are not to be taken as an undeliberate lack of 
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consistency, but rather as the characteristic features of a thinking of dynamism 
that struggles to find expression while remaining faithful to its sources. It is 
only through a tense language that tension can be most accurately expressed, 
and it is only by using a linguistic form renouncing logical completion that 
Nietzsche can maintain the validity of his claims without having to resort to the 
silence of the mystic. 
1.3. The `Synthesis' of Tragic Myth 
In its attempt to overcome the fundamental inadequacy of linguistic expression, 
The Birth of Tragedy should have been a song rather than a book: `It should 
have been singing, this `new soul', not speaking! '27 or, at least, it should have 
incorporated the musical element of tragedy itself, since it is only through music 
that the deepest wisdom can be attained when the mythic mode of expression 
cannot be fully rendered by words: 
myth does not find adequate objectification in the spoken word [of 
tragic drama]. The structure of the scenes and the visible images reveal 
a deeper wisdom than the poet himself can convey in words and 
concepts [... ]; where the poet failed in his attempts to achieve the 
`' Nietzsche. 'Attempt at Self-Criticism', §3, in The Birth of Tragedy, p. 6. ['Sie hatte singen 
sollen, diese "neue Seele" - und nicht reden! ' KGW, 111.1, p. 9. ] 
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supreme spiritualization and ideal of the myth, he was constantly 
successful as a musician! 28 
Therefore, the most perfect artistic synthesis, tragic drama (as opposed to the 
exercise in speculation of The Birth of Tragedy) owes its success to its relation 
with the non-linguistic, with Dionysiac music. Nietzsche grants tragedy a high 
value by virtue of the way it presents the Apolline as internally related to the 
Dionysiac, myth related to its musical source; for, even if myth, being symbolic, 
belongs to the Apolline world of images, there is already in myth a dimension 
which cannot be fully rendered by the world of defined boundaries; if myth is a 
symbolic expression of the insights of Dionysiac truth, it also falls short of that 
which it expresses, and constitutes for the Dionysiac a trap that must be 
acknowledged as such: 
Dionysiac truth takes over the whole sphere of myth as a symbolic 
expression of its own insights, and gives its voice partly in the public 
cult of tragedy and partly in the secret rites of the dramatic mysteries, 
but always in the old mythic trappings. 29 
`ý Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §17, p. 81. ['Der Mythus findet in dem gesprochen Wort 
durchaus nicht seine adäquate Objectivation. Das Gefüge der Scenen und die anschaulichen 
Bilder offenbaren eine tiefere Weiseheit, als der Dichter selbst in Worte und Begriffe fassen 
kann [... ]; was dem Wortdichter nicht gelungen war, die höchste Vergeistigung und Idealität des 
Mythus zu erreichen, ihm als schöpferischem Musiker in jedem Augenblick gelingen konnte! ' 
KGW, III. 1, pp. 105-106. ] 
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It is only in tragic drama that the articulation between the Apolline and the 
Dionysiac finds a perfect equilibrium, in their respective expressions of myth 
and music, because within such an art form a tension is maintained: 
the myth shields us from the music, just as it gives the music its 
supreme freedom. In return, music bestows upon the tragic myth a 
metaphysical significance of an urgency and conviction that word and 
image, without that external assistance, could never hope to attain. 
Above all, the tragic spectator is overcome by a sure presentiment of 
supreme delight attained along a road of destruction and denial, so that 
he feels that the very depth of things is speaking perceptibly to hi M. 30 
Tragedy thus appears as the instrument for the most expressive form of myth, 
and it does so by sheltering a constitutive structure that involves a necessary 
29 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §10, p. 53. ['Die dionysische Wahrheit übernimmt das 
gesammte Bereich des Mythus als Symbolik ihrer Erkenntnisse und Spricht diese theils in dem 
öffentlichen Cultus der Tragödie, theils in den geheimen Begehungen dramatischer 
Mysterienfeste, aber immer unter der alten mythischen Hülle aus. ' KGW, I11.1, p. 69. ] 
30 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §21, p. 100. ['Der Mythus schützt uns vor der Musik, wie er 
ihr andrerseits erst die höchste Freiheit giebt. Dafür verleiht die Musik, als Gegengeschenk, dem 
tragischen Mythus eine so eindringliche und überzeugende metaphysische Bedeutsamkeit, wie 
sie Wort und Bild, ohne jene einzige Hülfe, nie zu erreichen vermögen; und insbesondere 
überkommt durch sie den tragischen Zuschauer gerade jenes sichere Vorgefühl einer höchsten 
Lust, zu der der Weg durch Untergang und Verneinung führt, so dass er zu hören meint, als ob 
der innerste Abgrund der Dinge zu ihm vernehmlich spräche. ' KGW, I11.1, pp. 130-131. ] 
35 
relationship with the Dionysiac artistic impulse in the form of a manifest denial 
of the Apolline: it is by undermining the success of the hero on stage, to the 
point of destruction, that this particular art form expresses the Dionysiac basis 
of all illusory individuation. This stands in contradistinction with the mythic 
texture of Olympian religion, which, although based on the same principles, 
operates a permanent concealment upon the awe-inspiring realm that lies at its 
basis and that is conceptualised as the primitive world of the Titans. The 
mythical world of the Greeks, for Nietzsche, only unveils its own truth fully in 
the form of tragic myth, where the opposed tendencies at stake in mythopoeia 
find an aesthetic form that only partly tolerates concealment. 
The contest of oppositional tendencies acquires various forms within the 
tragic structure, in a joining that is not entirely a synthesis nor a juxtaposition: 
in this form tragedy also reveals the terms in which aesthetic pleasure in pain 
can be understood; there is joy in the return to the origin, but only at the cost of 
a painful break. Thus the tragic Dionysiac insight provides the 
mystery doctrine of tragedy: the basic understanding of the unity of all 
things, individuation seen as the primal source of evil, art as the joyful 
hope that the spell of individuation can be broken, as a presentiment of 
a restored oneness; 31 
31 Nietzsche. The Birth o/' Tragedy, § 10, p. 52. ['Die Mysterienlehre der Tragödie [... ]: die 
Grunderkenntniss von der Einheit alles Vorhandenen, die Betrachtung der Individuation als des 
36 
but this mystery doctrine also conveys a terrible wisdom, and the attainment of 
the original unity involves violence: the principle of individuation has to be 
broken, and the individual itself has to experience what is seen as its own 
dismemberment; the Titans had to pay the same price as the tragic hero in their 
acquaintance with the excessive wisdom of nature: 
hubris and excess are considered the truly hostile spirits of the non- 
Apolline realm, and hence qualities of the pre-Apolline age, the age of 
the Titans [... ]. It was for his Titanic love of man that Prometheus had 
to be torn apart by vultures; for his excessive wisdom in solving the 
riddle of the Sphinx that Oedipus had to be cast into a bewildering 
vortex of crimes. 32 
Tragedy presents us this process of dismemberment as necessarily intermingled 
with a rejoicing in illusions: the aesthetic pleasure of the negation of the hero is 
inseparable from the painful affirmation of the eternity of the real; some kind of 
Urgrundes des Uebels, die Kunst als die freudige Hoffnung, dass der Bann der Individuation zu 
zerbrechen sei, als die Ahnung einer wiederhergestellten Einheit. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 69. ] 
32 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §4, p. 26. [`Selbstüberhebung und Uebermaas als die 
eigentlich feindseligen Dämonen der nicht-apollinischen Sphäre, daher als Eigenschaften der 
vor-apollinischen Zeit, des Titanenzeitalters [... ] erachtet wurden. Wegen seiner titanenhaften 
Liebe zu den Menschen musste Prometheus von den Geiern zerrissen werden, seiner 
übermässigen Weisheit halber, die das Räthsel der Sphinx löste, musste Oedipus in einen 
verwirrenden Strudel von Unthaten stürzen. ' KGW, 111.1 , p. 36. ] 
37 
violence is always involved in representation. Conversely, some studies of the 
logic of sacrifice and social violence reveal the links between the sacred 
character of these institutions and their aesthetic mechanisms. Rene Girard, 
although trying to keep at a distance from Nietzsche's approach to the classic 
world, 33 shows how the representational character of ritualised forms of social 
violence, such as sacrifice, is precisely what grants them effectiveness, 
preventing the inevitable outburst of actual violence from creating a spiral of 
destruction. For Girard, the mythic sanction over ritualised violence has to be 
explained both as a sacralising process and as a representational one. Also on 
the basis of the texts of some Greek tragedies, he sees a constant sacrificial 
element in myth, by which historical communities, by referring violence to the 
mechanisms of aesthetic representation of the sacred, manage to establish 
solidly the fundamental principles of their survival: 
sacrifice is the boon worthy above all others of being preserved, 
celebrated and memorialised, reiterated and reenacted in a thousand 
different forms, for it alone can prevent transcendental violence from 
turning back into reciprocal violence, the violence that really hurts, 
setting man against man and threatening the total destruction of the 
community. 34 
;3 See Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. P. Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977) p. 55. 
34 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 124-5. 
38 
Nietzsche himself points out to the connection between art and the `instinctive 
zest for life', against the destructive violence that stands at the opposite side in 
the form of 
a practical pessimism that could even produce a terrible ethic of 
genocide through pity, and which is, and always has been, present 
everywhere in the world where art has not in some form [... ] appeared 
as a remedy and means of prevention for this breath of pestilence. 35 
Thus Girard corroborates Nietzsche's link between violence and representation: 
for Nietzsche, representation involves violence; for Girard, actual violence is 
mastered through the representational character of sacrificial violence. 
However, it must be pointed out that Girard's co-ordinates of understanding 
bear a claim to a certain scientific validity, and it is only in this respect that they 
are not reconcilable with Nietzsche's approach, which is genuinely 
philosophical in that it confronts the problems from a purely theoretical 
perspective. While Girard seeks an understanding based on the formulation of 
universally valid laws, backed by the actuality of practices of ancient cultures, 
Nietzsche presupposes a direct link between the actuality of those practices (the 
35 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §15, p. 74. ['Ein praktischer Pessimismus, der selbst eine 
grausenhafte Ethik des Völkermordes aus Mitleid erzeugen könnte - der übrigens überall in 
der Welt vorhanden ist und vorhanden war, wo nicht die kunst in irgend welchen Formen [... ]. 
zum Heitmittel und zur Abwehr jenes Pesthauchs erschienen ist. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 96. ] 
39 
conditions of existence of our ancestors) and their resulting conceptual 
constructs; he can then follow the articulations of concepts and notions without 
having to rely on the uncritical assumptions of methodological principles which 
scientific discourse cannot evade, and his claims do not then bear the 
universality and a-temporality of scientific laws, but the truthfulness of a theory 
that enquires into the very origin of our notion of universality. It is because the 
Greeks are our cultural ancestors that such a theory can be enlightening for us, 
and the actual conditions of their existence are not a reconstructible empirical 
fact or a historical event (which would provide the support for some social 
science), but only the always already lost prerequisite for the unfolding of our 
Western cultural construction, with which those conditions cannot but be 
continuous. This important difference of approach does not preclude a 
philosophical use of scientific understandings of the ancient past, just as 
Nietzsche was ready to interpret scientific postulates of his time for his own 
idiosyncratic theory. The status of the claims differ, but once we suspend, say, 
the scientific status of Girard's claims about tragic violence in ancient Greece, 
we can benefit from an extension of avenues of thought that Girard opens for us 
in our reading of the relationships between sacred and aesthetic experience in 
The Birth of Tragedy. 
1.4. The Degeneration of the Apolline: Christian Music vs. Socratism 
40 
Greek tragedy constitutes for Nietzsche the perfect contest the Apolline and the 
Dionysiac, but equally the alteration of this tense equilibrium results in 
contemptible forms of art and experience. Even in those forms of artistic life 
where the Apolline force was given a predominant role, such as in the case of 
Olympian religion, a tacit requirement of the Dionysiac counterpart was 
somehow present. When this need for reciprocity is forgotten, the Apolline 
appears under the sterile form of what Nietzsche calls Alexandrian culture, 
easily identifiable with what he would later regard as the historicist attitude 
(against the life-affirming one) in the second of his Untimely Meditations36. It is 
this lack of connection with its Dionysiac source that differentiates the 
Alexandrian from the Olympian, even if in both we find a rejoicing in the 
beauty of illusory forms. 
For Nietzsche, Alexandrian culture is inaugurated within Greek tragedy 
by Euripides: he testifies to the failure to base tragedy solely on the Apolline 
spirit, since `Euripidean tragedy [... ] is incapable of achieving the Apolline 
effect of the epic, and has also made the greatest possible break with the 
Dionysiac elements'. 37 The delight in illusion as a counterpart to the wisdom 
36 Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. by R. S. Hollingdale (Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), pp. 59-123. 
37 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy. §12, p. 61. [`Das euripideische Drama [... ] ist ihm 
unmöglich, die apollinische Wirkung des Epos zu erreichen während es andererseits sich von 
den dionysischen Elementen möglichst gelölst hat. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 80. ] 
41 
concerning the eternal unity, which found successful artistic articulation in 
Homeric epic, Olympian cults, lyric poetry and tragic drama, is now turned into 
sterile complacency in existence, which is also a symptom of an ideology of 
weakness, since with the dramatic innovations of Euripides, `the fifth state, the 
slaves, now came into its own [... ]', 38 replacing the mighty aesthetic gestures of 
the past by frivolity and delight in the immediate. 
This slavish turn corresponds to the invention of reason, or, more 
accurately, to the submission of art to the rational. Euripides' `belief that reason 
was the true source of all enjoyment and creativity' inaugurated the dismantling 
of Greek tragedy from within. For those who could not endure the ancient 
tensions, a reasonable art proved to be a good substitute, but also a good 
narcotic, since the absence of a connection with the primordial nature of reality 
left the audiences with the unconsciousness of the dreaming state. Euripides' is 
for Nietzsche one of the first attempts to `overthrow those ancient popular 
traditions, that perpetually repropagated worship of Dionysus', 39 doing away 
with the religious character of tragedy. 
38 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy. § 11, p. 56. ['Der fünfte Stand, der des Sclaven, kommt [... ] 
jetzt zur Herrschaft. ' KGW. 111.1 , p. 
74. ] 
39 Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy, § 12, p. 60. [` [... ] Werfe jene alten Volkstraditionen, jene 
sich ewig fortpflanzende Verehrung des Dionysus nicht um. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 78. ] 
42 
That the end of valuable art coincides for Nietzsche with the beginning 
of secularisation points once more to the need to think together the sacred and 
the aesthetic within The Birth of Tragedy. The parallel figure to Euripides in art 
is Socrates in religion and politics, who, according to Nietzsche, deserved his 
death sentence for his impiety, for his resistance to understanding Greek culture 
within the boundaries of the sacred. Aesthetic Socratism was the principle 
behind Euripides' new turn in tragic drama, and it was also that behind Plato's 
distrust of poetry, for if intelligibility becomes a condition of the beautiful, then 
Plato's views are justified when he `speaks ironically of the poet's creative 
power, in so far as it is not a conscious insight'. 40 
Under the influence of the Socratic spirit, Plato writes his philosophical 
dialogues, in which `the Apolline tendency is cocooned within its logical 
schematism'41, and poetry is made dependent on dialectical thought. This is for 
Nietzsche another instance of the spreading power of the Socratic spirit, whose 
monstrosity subordinates the life-affirming character of art to the intelligibility 
provided by reason. However, it must be noted that, even according to 
40 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §12, p. 64. ['Redet vom schöpferischen Vermögen des 
Dichters, insofern dies nicht die bewusste Einsicht ist, zu allermeist nur ironisch [... ]. ' KGW, 
Ill. 1, p. 83. ] 
41 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §14, p. 69. ['In dem logischen Schematismus hat sich die 
upollinische Tendenz verpuppt. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 90. ] 
43 
Nietzsche, there is more to the Platonic dialogues than logical schematism, and 
that in some senses Plato is for Nietzsche a bad disciple of Socrates. 42 
Socratism, as the voice of the slavish attitude, manifeste of only in the 
death of tragedy, or in the assimilating power of dialectical philosophy that 
results in modern science: it acquired its ultimate expression with the advent of 
Christian religion, whose intellectualising force and negative morality constitute 
for Nietzsche the traits of an unmistakably decadence. Although not explicitly 
attacked in The Birth of Tragedy (as it will be in later writings), Christianity is 
for Nietzsche one of the clearest realisations of the ascetic ideal that is opposed 
to the artistic affirmation of life. In his own criticism of The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche says: 
42 Thus in Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, § 190: `There is something in the morality of Plato 
that does not really belong to Plato but is only to be met with in his philosophy, one might say, 
in spite of Plato: namely Socratism, for which he was really too noble. [... ] Plato did everything 
he could in order to read something refined and noble into his teacher's proposition [... ]'. (trans. 
by R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p. 95). [Es giebt Etwas in der Moral 
Plato's, das nicht eigentlich zu Plato gehört, sondern sich nur an seiner Philosophie vorfindet, 
man könnte sagen, trotz Plato: nämlich der Sokratismus, für den er eigentlich zu vernehm war. 
[... ] Plato hat alles gethan, um etwas Feines und Vornehmes in den Satz seines Lehres hinein zu 
interpretiren [... ]. (KGW, VI. 2, p. 113)]. See also our discussion of the mythic in Plato in 
chapter 4. 
Jýk 
44 
with this questionable book, my instinct, an affirmative instinct for life, 
turned against morality and invented a fundamentally opposite doctrine 
and valuation of life, purely artistic and anti-Christian. 43 
Therefore, there is a continuity that links the Socratic misunderstanding of 
Greek culture to the negativity of Christian religion, which is itself a 
secularisation of a more profoundly sacred vision: that of the ancient world. Our 
modern, Alexandrian religious experience prompts Nietzsche's cry: 
who [... ] would dare appeal to our pallid and weary religions, which 
have degenerated in their fundamentals into scholarly religions? Myth, 
the prerequisite for all religions, is already thoroughly paralysed. 44 
However, just as the Apolline tendency of Olympian religion presupposed its 
Dionysiac counterpart, we may wonder whether the authenticity of an aesthetic 
understanding of the sacred, of the type that Greek tragedy showed, cannot also 
43 Nietzsche, `Attempt at Self-Criticism', §5, in The Birth of Tragedy, p. 9. ['Gegen die Moral 
also kehrte sich damals, mit diesem fragwürdigen Buche, mein Instinkt, als ein fürsprechender 
Instinkt des Lebens, und erfand sich eine grundsätzliche Gegenlehre und Gegenwerthung des 
Lebens, eine rein artistische, eine antichristliche. ' KGW, 111.1, p. 13. ] 
44 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, § 18, p. 87. ['Wer wagt es [... ] sicheren Muthes an unsere 
blassen und ermüdeten Religionen zu appelliren, die selbst in ihren Fundamenten zu 
Gelehrtenreligionen entartet sind: so dass der Mythus, die nothwendige Voraussetzung jeder 
Religion, bereits überall gelähmt ist .' KGW, 111.1, p. 113. 
] 
45 
be found within the secularised visions that the Socratic force has imposed on 
our modern world. And we may also wonder whether the persistence of such a 
Dionysiac sacredness stands not only as a detached counterpart, a reminder or a 
remedy, but as an internal requirement of a process that does not fully surrender 
to analysis. Nietzsche provides the grounds for a positive answer when he 
intends to explain 
how the influence of Socrates, up to our own times and beyond, has 
spread across posterity like a shadow lengthening in the evening sun, 
and how it has continually led to the regeneration of art - in the 
broadest and deepest, metaphysical sense - and by its own infinity 
guarantees the infinity of art. 45 
The terms of this artistic regeneration within the Socratic (and not only against 
the Socratic), the possibility of a `music-making Socrates'46, is matched within 
Nietzsche's thought by an understanding of the elements of sacredness in 
45 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §15, p. 71. ['Wie der Einfluss des Sokrates, bis auf diesen 
Moment hin, ja in alle Zukunft hinaus, sich, gleich einem in der Abendsonne immer grösser 
werdenden Schatten, über die Nachwelt hin ausgebreitet hat, wie derselbe zur Neuschaffung der 
Kunst - und zwar der Kunst im bereits metaphysischen, weitesten und tiefsten Sinne - immer 
wieder nöthigt und, bei seiner eignen Unendlichkeit, auch deren Unendlichkeit verbürgt. ' KGW 
111 .1, p. 93. 
] 
46 See Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy. § 15, p. 75. [ 'Des musiktreibenden Sokrates'. KGW 
111.1, p. 98. ] 
46 
Christianity which escape Christianity's own secularising power, and is best 
understood by reference to the structure of interplay of sacredness and the 
aesthetic which we find in the theory of artistic forces presented in The Birth of 
Tragedy. 
Thus, in the notebooks previous to the composition of The Birth of 
Tragedy, we find the surprisingly corroborating statements of Nietzsche's 
understanding of Christianity's internal tension. What is even more surprising, 
given Nietzsche's often explicit alignment of Christianity with a diseased and 
slavish Apolline tendency, is the recognition of a continity between the 
Dionysiac Greek world and that of Christianity: 
the hellenic world of Apollo is subjugated little by little by the power of 
inner Dionysiac forces: Christianity found tis already prepared. 47 
Thus, the struggle that characterised classical Greece seems to be reaching an 
end, but it is Christianity that takes over this struggle, and tries to end the 
U-119 
aes tic tension with the overwhelming power of its Dionysiac, oriental, Cy, 
7 
intoxicating power: 
47 ['Die Hellenische Welt des Apollo wird allmählich von den dionysischen Mächten innerlich 
überwältigt. Das Christenthum fand sich bereits for. ' KGW 111.3, fragment 7[3], p. 145. ] 1 am 
indebted for this and the remaining Nietzsche references in this chapter to Dr Brobjer (Uppsala 
Universitet , 
Sweden). This translation and subsequent ones in this chapter are mine, unless 
otherwise stated. 
47 
the highest deed of the Hellenic world: the taming of the oriental music 
of Dionysus and its preparation for the expression in images [... ]. With 
the oriental Christian movement the old Dionysiac spirit innundated the 
world, and all the work of the Hellenic spirit seemed in vain. A deeper 
worldview, a non-artistic one, is on the way. 
But it is only on the way, and in fact Christianity, as Nietzsche will enact in the 
form of a tension in his later writings, preserves this tension betweeen the 
Dionysiac groundlessness and the expression in clear images. The Lutheran 
chorale and the music of Palestrina, mentioned in The Birth of Tragedy as this 
kind of aesthetic achievement out of the Apolline-Dionysiac tension, prove that 
there is within Christianity room for a view that is more than a 'deeper, non- 
artistic one'. 
It is interesting to see how in t 's arly notes Nietzsche sees the danger 
tý, 
eVl 
of the loss of the aesthetic dimension of Christianity's Dionysiac character, in 
its excessive orientalism, in its distance from the Greek, Olympian and 
ultimately Socratic yearning for clarity and light. We would like to suggest that 
the progression of Nietzsche's work re-enacts the very tension that The Birth of 
Tragedy describes, between a Dionysiac intoxicating version of Christianity, in 
this early notes, and the thirst for knowledge in the writings immediately 
following and including Human, All Too Human; between the Dionysiac 
emphasis on self-overcoming and the disqualification of the slavish, Socratic 
element of Christianity in his last writings. 
48 
In particular, the tension between knowledge and art is found already in 
these early notes: 
Empedocles is the pure tragic man. His jump into the Etna - thirst for 
knowledge! He yearned for art and found only knowledge. 48 
Later in his life Nietzsche was searching for a formulation of the tension 
between knowledge and art: 
Art in the service of illusion-such is our form of worship. Loving and 
fo tering life for the sake of knowledge, loving and fo/stering error pýý 
and illusion for the sake of life. Giving existence an aesthetic meaning, 
increasing our taste for it, is the basic condition of the passion for 
knowledge. 49 
48 ['Empedocles ist der reine tragische Mensch. Sein sprung in den Aetna aus - Wissenstrieb! 
Er sehnte sich nack Kunst und fand nur das wissen. ' KGW 111.3, fragment 5[94], p. 122. ] 
49 [Die Kunst als die Pflege des Wahnes-unser Cultus. Um des Erkennens willen das Leben 
lieben und fördern, um des Lebens willen das Irren Wähnen lieben und fördern. Dem Dasein 
eine ästhetische Bedeutung geben, unseren Geschmack an ihm mehren, ist Grundbedingung 
aller Leidenschaft der Erkenntniß. (Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente. Frühjahr 
1881 bis Sommer 1882, in KGW II, fragment 11[162], p. 402. Quoted by Sarah Kofman in 
Nietzsche et la metaphore, Paris, Galilee, 1983. p. 189, as §582 of book III of Volonte de 
puissance. ) English translation supplied by Duncan Large in Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and 
Metaphor, ed. and trans. by Duncan Large, London: The Athlone Press, 1993. 
49 
But, from the beginning, the excellence of art will be linked to the original 
Hellenic struggle which had a Dionysiac groundless soil to be actualised in 
images. It is then only consequent that the most accomplished of the Gospels in 
literary terms, participated for Nietzsche in this Hellenic world: 
St John's Gospel out of a Greek atmosphere, born out of Dionysiac 
soil: its influence on Christianity, in opposition to the Judaic. 50 
Equally, when literature loses its truly religious dimension, as with the 
trivialisation of tragedy by Euripides according to Nietzsche, new avenues have 
to be sought for the expression of sacred art; against the secularising modern 
Shakespeare, the music of the mysteries of the church: 
Shakespeare. The realisation of Sophocles. The Dionysiac is 
completely absorbed by images. The suppression of the chorus is 
entirely justified.: but at the same time the Dionysiac element is lost. 
This takes refuge in the mysteries. It emerges in Christianity, and it 
produces a new music. 5' 
50 [Das Johannesevangelium aus griechischer Atmosphaere, aus dem Boden des Dionysischen 
geboren: sein Einfluss auf das Christenthum, im Gegensatzt zum Jüdischen. ' , KGW 111.3, 
fragment 7[13], p. 147. ] 
51 [Shakespeare. Erfüllung des Sophocles. Das Dionysische ist rein in Bildern aufgegangen. Die 
Weglassung des Chors war ganz berechtig: aber man ließ zugleich das sionysische Element 
schwinden. Dieses flüchtet sich in die Mysterien. Es bricht im Christenthum hervor und es 
50 
Therefore, if Christianity as a whole is explicitly compatible with aesthetic 0 
,1 
excellence, who is the true destroyer of the Dionysiac-Apolline spirit; who 
breaks the Hellenic tension that Christianity inherits? As already pointed out, a 
certain form of disease of the Apolline, in which Socrates participates: 
The theoretical genius as the destroyer of Hellenic Apolline art. 
Against this, the world- picture of philosophy, Christianity, and in 
general of instinctive forces: from the ruins of a destroyed art arises the 
mystic. Against illusory representations: new world images are 
opposed, which are broken down with logic again and demand new 
creations. An ever more solid basis, an ever more careful construction, 
complexes of thought ever larger, work together, and this is the world- 
mission of the Hellenes and Socrates. It seems as if myth were 
pregressively excluded. In fact, myth becomes of deeper meaning, and 
more magnificent, because acknowledged regularity is ever more 
magnificent. 52 
gebiert eine neue Musik. ', KGV III. 3fragment 7[134], pp. 201-202. ] Incidentally, let us 
remember that modern European drama, as it is pointed out above in 3.2, arises out of Christian 
mysteries. 
52 [Der theoretische Genius asl Vernichter der heelenischen apollinischen Kunst: dagegen die 
Weltbilder der Philosophie und des Christenthums und Religion, überhaupt der instinktiven 
Mächte: aus den Ruinen der zertören Kunst blüht die Mystik. Gegen die Wahnvorstellungen: 
neue Weltbilder entgegen gestellt, die dann wieder logisch zersetzt werden und zu neuen 
Schöpfungen auffordern. Immer solider die Grundlage, immer vorsichtiger der Bau, immer 
größere Denkkomplexe arbeiten suzammen, dies die Weltmission des Hellenischen und der 
51 
It seems that this destruction has not been completed, and maybe can never be 
completed: myth becomes more magnificent in the regularities of theory, and 
the theoretical genius cannot fully erase the ruins of a destroyed art out of which 
arises the mystic. It is true that the power of logic and the theoretical genius has 
been at times oppressive throughout history: C' \ 
one is thrown into the mythic conception. But, immediately, logical 
thinking so much brings to the surface the opposite power that, 
throughout millenia, logic gags. 53 
However, these are nothing but the static stages of a fight essentially dynamic in 
nature, whose intervals of reconciliation adopt forms that Nietzsche dares to 
suggests: 
The fight between these two forms of art: the philosophical world- 
images declare themseves to be verifiable truth; the religious ones, to 
be non-verifiable truth: therefore, revelation. A joining is possible: on 
Sokrates. Scheinbar wird ja der Mythus immer mehr ausgeschlossen. In Wahrheit wird der 
Mythus immer tiefsinniger und großartiger, weil die Erkannte Gesetzmäßigkeit immer 
großartiger wird'. KWG 111.3, fragment 6[12], p. 139. ] 
53 [Man wird zur mystischen Conception gedrängt. Sodann aber drängt überhaupt die Wucht des 
logischen Denkes die Gegenmacht hervor, die dann mitunter auf Jahrtausende die Logik in 
Bande Schließt'. KWG 111.3, fragment 6[12], p. 139. ] 
52 
the one hand, a rigorous setting of the limits of logic; on the other, the 
acknowledgment that illusion is necessary for our existence. 54 
Let us notice that this conflict between the theoretical genius (represented by 
philosophy in this case) and religious truth is set within an aesthetic framework: 
they are forms of art. This corroborates the internal link between the sacred and 
the aesthetic in The Birth of Tragedy that the previous pages have tried to 
unveil, but it also gives us a clue for an understanding of Nietzsche's 
philosophy as a whole in terms of an aesthetic tension: 
This [the fight between philosophical world-images and religious ones] 
is the opposition between the Apolline and the Dionysiac, which can 
find a joining in tragic art and music, and which reaches here the goal 
of its conflict. All the illusory character of the world, and that of art 
too, has to appear to us as already developed: but it must develop itself 
again - an astral flux. 
55 
54 ['Kampf dieser beiden Formen der Kunst: die philosophischen Weltbilder behaupten sich als 
erweisbare Wahrheit, die religiösen als nicht erweisbare, darum geoffenbarte W<ahrheit>. 
Gegensatz des theorischen Genies und des religiösen Genies. Es ist eine Vereinigung möglich: 
einmal schärfste Bestimmung der Grenze des Logischen, anderseits die Erkenntniß, daß zu 
unsrer Existenz der Schein nöthig ist'. KWG 111.3, fragment 6[12], p. 139. ] 
55 ['Dies der neue Gegensatz des Apollinischen und des Dionysichen, der in der tragischen 
Kunst und Musik eine Vereinigung finden kann, die hier das Ziel des Confliktes erreicht. Die 
volle Scheinbarkeit der Welt, auch die Kunst muß uns als entwickelt sich zeigen: aber sie muß 
sich wieder abwickeln. - Einfluß der Gestirne'. KWG 111.3, fragment 6[12], p. 140. ] 
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In this unresolved development, presented itself as artistically illusory, we can 
find a key for the interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy of becoming, in his 
notions of the eternal return, and the instability and need for self-overcoming of 
the human. This is going to be my line of interpretation, in the positive spirit of 
a music-making Socrates which Nietzsche allows himself to imagine. 
/4 
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2. Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of MetonvmN, 
The distinction between aesthetic detachment and Dionysiac contagion that The 
Birth of Tragedy articulates can be reformulated by applying it to one of its sides 
- to the realm of aesthetic representation proper - in order to elucidate the 
relationships between different representational modes. The capacity for the 
Apolline/Dionysiac distinction to be reproduced beyond its own limits is pointed 
out by Nietzsche himself in The Birth of Tragedy, when he qualifies both the 
Apolline and Dionysiac states as artistic and illusory, that is, as both falling 
within the realm of artistic product, rather than, as it would be expected, within 
the realm of artistic product and artistic production respectively. If Nietzsche 
can push the Apolline/Dionysiac distinction beyond its own limits it is because 
this very distinction contains a displacing power prior to any task of 
demarcation (prior to the original Apolline illusion of limits), and therefore re- 
inscribes itself as distinction within as well as without the limits which it 
defines. In fact, The Birth of Tragedy primarily sees the Apolline and the 
Dionysiac not as oppositions to some reality that precedes them, but rather the 
contrary, the emphasis being placed on them as original forces whose interaction 
gives rise to aesthetic products (and therefore logically preceding this 
production). In any case, whether the Apolline/Dionysiac distinction qualifies 
the genesis of art or the taxonomy or art's outcome, the mobility to which these 
two opposed perspectives testify allows for a third option that this chapter 
attempts to exploit: the articulation of the Apolline and the Dionysiac as 
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constitutive of art's definitory inner operations. 
The Birth of Tragedy emphasises the genetic character of these primary 
impulses: the Dionysiac and Apolline forces constitute art's excess with respect 
to itself, and cannot be fully apprehended through the analysis of art's internal 
logic. Without challenging this position, it is still possible to draw an analogic 
line between the articulation of aesthetic forces, according to The Birth of 
Tragedy, and that of divergent modes of aesthetic representation; in the drawing 
of this analogy, the nature of some notions of art theory appears under a new 
light. 
2.1. Representation as Rhetoric 
For the establishing of a paradigm of modes of aesthetic representation 
let us again turn to Nietzsche, this time to his fascination with rhetoric and 
rhetorical tropes. According to Nietzsche's own understanding of rhetorical 
tropes, there is room for a theory that holds these as irreducible modes of 
engagement with reality, and therefore there is room for a theory that uses 
rhetorical tropes as indexes of semiotic categories, in order to explain the 
functioning of systems of signs in general, including aesthetic systems of signs. 
The aesthetic import of all signification will become clearer later, but for the 
moment let us say that there is for Nietzsche an ineluctable aesthetic element in 
all sign-producing and all perceiving. His theory of language in his early 
writings (which to an extent incidental for our purposes merges with a theory of 
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perception), opens a chasm between the realm of reality and the realm of 
meaning, bridged only by the aesthetic: 
in any case it seems to me that the `correct perception' - which would 
mean `the adequate expression of an object in the subject' - is a 
contradictory impossibility. For between two absolute different spheres, 
as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and 
no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation. ' 
Thus, for his theory of language, seeing language as instrument of mediation 
between subject and object, Nietzsche resorts to rhetoric, and the context of the 
exposition of this theory (with its talk of `images', `illusions' and `essences') 
suggests that its conclusions can be extended to a general theory of 
representation (probably for the same reason for which semiotic studies have 
never completely managed to shake off their dependence on linguistic models). 
Linguistic representation, as the archetype of meaning-creating confrontation 
with reality, is governed, for Nietzsche, by the rules of persuasion: 
the question of how an act of the soul can be presented through a sound 
image must be asked. If completely accurate representation is to take 
place, should the material in which it is to be represented, above all, not 
be the same as that in which the soul works? However, since it is 
something alien - the sound - how then can something come forth 
Friedrich Nietzsche, `On Truth and Lies in a Normoral Sense'(1873), in Daniel Breazeale (ed. 
and trans. ), Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1979), p. 86. These notebooks seem to 
be still not available in the Colli and Montinari edition in German. 
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more accurately as an image? It is not the things that pass over into 
consciousness, but the manner in which we stand toward them, the 
pithanon [power of persuasion (plausibility; also a thing producing 
illusion)]. The full essence of things will never be grasped. [... ] Instead 
of the thing, the sensation takes in only a sign. That is the first aspect: 
language is rhetoric [... ]. 2 
Yet for all its emphasis on the craftsmanship of the rhetor, as opposed to the 
spontaneity of a natural language, Nietzsche seems to endorse here far too many 
metaphysical postulates: 3 the positing of `essences', of `things' prior to 
representation; the existence of a primal reality which then language encounters. 
The emphasis on the rhetorical nature of language, already present here and to 
be developed in later writings into a privileging of interpretation over truth, is 
however no innocent displacement of the hierarchy of the `proper' or the 
`primordial'. What characterises language is not its relationship with a 
substratum of reality whose rendering happens to be rhetorical (both in terms of 
tropes and in terms of persuasion, although there is no clearly established link 
here): rather, the fact that language is essentially rhetorical conditions any 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, `Description of Ancient Rhetoric'(1872-73), in Sander L. Gilman, C. Blair 
and D. J. Parent (ed. and trans. ), Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language (Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 23. My underlining. Translator's addition. 
3 There remains some unclearness about the lack of transcendentalism in Nietzsche's early 
rhetorical notions, in particular in that of metaphor. See in this respect Tracy B. Strong, 
'Aesthetic Authority and Tradition: Nietzsche and the Greeks', in History of European Ideas, 
Vol. II, 1989, p. 997. 
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approach to its assumed substratum, to the effect that reality becomes secondary 
in respect to the rhetorical operations upon reality which language performs. 
Then our objection can be modified, and state that what takes place here, as in a 
placing of interpretation over truth, is just an inverted metaphysics, in which the 
grounding character of primordial reality has now been shifted to the dynamic of 
rhetorical procedures. To this it can be answered that making reality depend 
upon a plurality of rhetorical modes of persuasion, or truth upon interpretation, 
cannot possibly correspond to the structure of an inverted metaphysics, since the 
multiple and dynamic character of what is now taken as primary defies the 
conditions of stability required for the positing of a fundamental split between 
two worlds; it is also important to note that the notions of reality and truth are 
not replaced by those of rhetorical devices and interpretation: rather, it is 
precisely as functions of rhetorical and interpretative activities that it makes 
sense to talk of reality and truth. 
Thus the primacy of rhetoric in Nietzsche's notes for a theory of 
language, which can be seen as a precedent v(//his later privileging of i cr ,ý 
interpretation over truth, still retains a commitment to the irreducibility of the 
non-linguistic to the rhetorical forces constitutive of language, even if this non- 
reducible realm should not, in all rigour, have been talked of as that of 
`essences' or `things'. Nietzsche's resort to this vocabulary, inheritance of his 
youthful devotion to Kant and Schopenhauer, ought not to obscure the fact that 
the context of ideas in which these terms occur has already done away with their 
metaphysical import, and this vocabulary now takes on the value of that which 
is a function of rhetorical activity, without completely losing its authoritative 
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connotations. That is to say: with Nietzsche, metaphysics is not inverted but 
displaced, put at play, assimilated to a structure of immanence. This may 
become clearer in the context of a theory of interpretation, since there the 
absolute of the original text is clearly for Nietzsche nothing but a function of the 
dynamic of interpretation. There is, according to Sarah Kofman, no 
original text independent of interpretations. It is precisely this text 
which rigorous philology would decipher and which would allow one to 
distinguish interpretations from one another [... ]. If this were so, then 
rigorous philology would arrive at the essence of being , and 
Nietzsche's philosophy would be an ontology which it would be hard to 
tell apart from a demystified form of dogmatic metaphysics. As 
Heidegger has it, Nietzscheanism would then be nothing but an inverted 
Platonism. [... ] The goal of rigorous philology is therefore not to 
separate the text from its interpretations - which is impossible since 
the text is constituted by them - but to distinguish a certain type of 
interpretation from other interpretations. 4 
And if interpretations are defined in relation to the powers that they serve, the 
rhetorical operations of language upon its referent seem to be motivated by their 
persuasive force, by their ability to convince regardless of accuracy. This view 
would be consistent with Nietzsche's reduction of representational activities to 
power relations, but it is not explicitly linked with the main account of meaning- 
creation that he gives in his early notes, unless we force the connections and we 
say that, after all, metaphor, the main process of meaning-creation according to 
Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, trans. and ed. by Duncan Large (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1993), p. 135. 
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Nietzsche, has been regarded by the tradition as one of the `master tropes'. 
Leaving aside the question of the link between persuasion, power and 
tropes, the significance of this move is that rhetorical mechanisms, and that of 
metaphorical transference above all, are used to explain the origin of language 
and its primary nature. Behind the celebrated phrase of truth as a `movable host 
of metaphors'5 is a theory of language that regards meaning and concept 
formation as the result of a series of metaphorical moves: 
the tropes, the non-literal significations, are considered to be the most 
artistic means of rhetoric. But, with respect to their meanings, all words 
are tropes in themselves, and from the beginning. Instead of what truly 
takes place, they present a sound image, which fades away with time. 6 
And this sound image has already been the result of metaphorical transpositions: 
to begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first 
5 Nietzsche, `On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', in Breazeale, Philosophy and Truth, p. 
84. 
6 Nietzsche, `Description of Ancient Rhetoric', in Gilman et al., Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric 
and Language, p. 23. ['Als wichtiges Kunstmittel der Rhetorik gelten die Tropen, die 
uneigentlichen Bezeichnungen. Alle Wörter aber sind an sich und von Angang an, in Bezug auf 
ihre Bedeutung. Tropen. Statt des wahreb Vorgangs stellen sie ein in der Zeit verklingendes 
Tondbild hin. ' (Ibid., p. 22)] 
60 
metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. 7 
Rather than a contrast with contemporary or superseded theories of language 
gestation and acquisition, what is relevant here is to note how Nietzsche extends 
the applicability of the metaphorical scheme to a realm that falls clearly outside 
it: with this use metaphor is no longer a `figure', but a founding structure which 
nevertheless has its origin in its being a `figure'. Further, concept formation is 
an operation that depends on those metaphors having already solidified and not 
having been taken as such: 
everything which distinguishes man from the animal depends upon this 
ability to volatilise perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to 
dissolve an image into a concept. [... ] Even the concept - which is as 
bony, foursquare, and transposable as a die - is nevertheless merely 
the residue of a metaphor. ' 
From this passage it can be seen that assigning a primary role to rhetorical 
operations in linguistic representation creates the problem of the status of one's 
own theory. Such a theory must now show awareness of the primary character 
of that which underlies the instruments of theoretical analysis: in other words, a 
purely conceptual engagement with the theory of the rhetorical substratum of 
concepts would betray itself It is for this reason that 
7 Nietzsche, `On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', p. 82. 
'Nietzsche, `On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense'. p. 85. 
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Nietzsche inaugurates a type of philosophy which deliberately uses 
metaphors, at the risk of being confused with poetry. Such a confusion 
would not be regrettable in Nietzsche's eyes: for the opposition 
between philosophy and poetry derives from metaphysical thinking; it 
is based on the fictitious separation of the real and the imaginary, or the 
no less fictitious separation of the `faculties'. Philosophy is a form of 
poetry. 9 
Yet this is so only to the extent that philosophy also constitutes a full 
engagement with the rhetorical essence of language, as poetry does, this 
engagement being essentially different in nature; for, as Kofman points out, '° 
the accuracy of language and the task of unmasking remain typically 
philosophical, even if in the relentless pursuit of truth we can only use one set of 
rhetorical devices against another in the hope that truth will emerge as the very 
process of interaction. Thus, 
the philosopher does not just `play' with metaphors; his play is of a 
`formidable seriousness', for it is designed to oppose modernity's 
hatred for art, to obliterate precisely the opposition between play and 
seriousness, dream and reality. 11 
9 Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, p. 17. 
10 See Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, p. 18. 
11 Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor. p. 18. 
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Even though `obliteration' is too strong a word, there is a sense in which, under 
the light of Nietzsche's thought, these boundaries are redefined, and in which 
Nietzsche's early assertion about the nature of philosophy holds true: 
philosophy is invention beyond the limits of experience, it is the 
continuation of the mythical drive. 12 
The full extent of the mythic import of philosophy should not occupy us now; 13 
let us pay attention for the moment only to the fact that the philosophical text 
must show an explicit awareness of the primary nature of rhetorical operations if 
it concedes, as Nietzsche does, that those operations extend beyond the realm of 
artistically crafted discourse to the very processes of language-constitution. 
Sarah Kofman provides an analysis of one of the aspects through which 
Nietzsche shows this awareness: his sustained use of metaphors. 14 
And yet something seems to be hidden behind this primacy of one of the 
`master tropes'. Already in Nietzsche there seems to be a tension between this 
privileging of metaphor and, not only the context of persuasion of rhetorical 
12 Nietzsche, `The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and Knowledge'(1872), 
in Breazeale, p. 19, paragraph 53. 
13 A discussion of this point is provided in chapter 4. 
14 See Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor. chapter IV. 
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artifacts, but also the different logic of a different trope: metonymy. ls If 
concepts operate on `perceptual metaphors', on a replacement of a stimulus by 
an image, and of an image by a sound, the operation by which concepts are 
formed is of metonymic character: no longer a substitution of an item for a 
different one, but an item being replaced by one of its aspects: 
language never expresses something completely but displays only a 
characteristic which appears to be prominent to it. [... ] A partial 
perception takes the place of the entire and complete intuition. 16 
Thus, another rhetorical trope is given primary importance in the formation of 
language, and its legitimacy, as a rhetorically valid item opposed to logic is, as 
in the case of metaphor, clearly asserted. Talking of the thought of Thales, 
Nietzsche writes: 
The whole world is moist: therefore being moist is the whole world. 
Metonymy. A false inference. A predicate is confused with a sum of 
15 Let us advance as provisional points of reference some classical definitions of metaphor in 
contrast with metonymy: while metaphor is the transposition of the meaning of one term into 
another, based on a relationship of similarity or analogy (e. g. `pearls' for `teeth'), metonymy 
operates this transposition based on a relationship of actual or conceptual proximity or 
contiguity (e. g. `keel' for `vessel'; physical contiguity which involves a substitution of the 
whole by a part, `death' for `poison': conceptual proximity: effect for cause). 
" Nietzsche, 'Description of Ancient Rhetoric', p. 23. ['Die Sprache drückt niemals etwas 
volständig aus, sondern hebt nur ein ihr hervorstechend scheinendes Merkal hervor. ' (ibid., p. 22) 
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predicates (definition). 
Logical thinking was employed very little by the Ionians and developed 
quite slowly. But, false inferences are more correctly understood as 
metonymies, i. e. they are more correctly understood rhetorically and 
poetically. 
All rhetorical figures (i. e. the essence of language) are logically invalid 
inferences. This is the way that reason begins. '7 
Therefore Nietzsche has room not only for metaphor, but also for metonymy, a 
trope traditionally used as a contrast to metaphor. In Nietzsche's handling of 
these notions, it seems that metaphor retains an all-encompassing character, and 
metonymy is defined only in relation to metaphor and sometimes even as one of 
its species. This is not surprising, given metaphor's history of pre-eminence, but 
I would like to argue that the apparently secondary engagement of Nietzsche 
with metonymy as a mode of representation contains the key for an 
understanding of the primacy of metaphor as well as of Nietzsche's aesthetic 
ideas at large. 
The conceptualisation of metaphor and metonymy as modes of 
representation that surpass their originary nature as rhetorical tropes is already at 
work in Nietzsche's approach to these notions. Yet to explore their implications 
fully it is useful at this stage to resort to an influential text in the history of the 
studies of systems of representation: Roman Jakobson's `Two Aspects of 
17 Nietzsche, `The Philosopher', in Breazeale, p. 48, paragraphs 141-142. 
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Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances' (1956)18. Here metaphor 
and metonymy are placed at the extreme poles of a twofold structure of 
representation, and a set of associations is established across linguistic theory, 
speech disturbance analysis and theory of aesthetic genres. It can be argued that 
this article inaugurates a contemporary tradition of oversimplification of a 
complexity that rhetoric has enjoyed as an autonomous discipline over the 
centuries. Such is the position of Brian Vickers; for him, a 
tradition behind the atrophy of rhetoric in modern theory reduces the 
tropes to two only, metaphor and metonymy. The instigator of this 
reduction was of course Roman Jakobson, who wanted to apply `purely 
linguistic criteria to the interpretation and classification' of aphasia. 19 
Certainly Jakobson's structuralist linguistics regards itself, most probably 
without legitimacy, as invested with enough authority to apply the scheme of 
binary oppositions to a tradition which is by its very essence multiple and 
organic. Yet we would like to defend this move, provided that it does not 
attempt a redefinition of disciplinary boundaries; that is, provided that it does 
not try to reduce rhetoric to linguistics, but only to make use of rhetorical 
distinctions for its own linguistic purposes. The history of the influence of 
18 In Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, Fundamentals of Language (The Hague, 1956), pp. 55- 
82, reprinted in Roman Jakobson, On Language, ed. by Linda R. Waugh and Monique 
Monville-Burston (Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 115-133. 
19 Brian Vickers. In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 442. 
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Jakobson's notions seems to make this defence even more difficult, since, in 
Vickers' words, 
the effects of Jakobson's dichotomizing reduction of rhetoric have [... ] 
been disastrous, as a whole critical school has attempted to read 
literature solely in terms of metaphor versus metonymy, ignoring all 
other verbal devices. 20 
Our intention is not to enter the polemic between those defending the integrity 
of rhetoric as an autonomous discipline and those welcoming its merging with 
twentieth-century developments of linguistic discourses, but only to find support 
in the degree within which it is legitimate to transpose categories from discipline 
to discipline in order to arrive at a better understanding of foundational notions. 
Nietzsche's extension of rhetorical procedures to our primary encounters with 
reality was not aimed at turning rhetoric into a theory of representation: rather, it 
tried to understand the theory of representation on the model of rhetoric; after 
all, history records him primarily as a philosophical thinker, not as a rhetorician, 
nor even a philologist. In an analogous way, Nietzsche's early emphasis on the 
recognition of the artistic value of existence, for all its literalness, did not need 
to involve the abandonment of independent artistic pursuits. Bearing this 
distinction in mind we can, for our convenience, delineate an understanding of 
representational procedures based on the polar opposition of metonymy and 
metaphor, these taken as semiotic categories whose meaning exceeds that of 
their strict, rhetorical definition. 
20 Vickers, In Dett'nce of Rhetoric, p. 448. 
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2.2. Similarity versus Contiguity 
Jakobson's use of the notions of metaphor and metonymy revolves around 
structuralist binary oppositions, and is particularly dependent on the Saussurean 
distinction between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of language. While 
along the paradigmatic axis linguistic items relate to one another by virtue of 
their potentiality to substitute one another's position in uttered speech, along the 
constituted speech chain (the syntagmatic axis) linguistic items relate to one 
another in the form of a context; while as speakers we select items from a code 
structured in paradigmatic, `vertical' series, we also combine them `horizontally' 
in order to form meaningful utterances; the capacity for items to be selected 
equals their capacity to be substituted, and their combinatory possibilities 
depend on a context governed by syntactic rules. 21 Thus there are two types of 
meaning applying to each level of significative linguistic units: 
a given significative unit may be replaced by other, more explicit sign 
of the same code, whereby its general meaning is revealed, while its 
contextual meaning is determined by its connection with other signs 
within the same sequence. 22 
21 In broad terms, the paradigmatic belongs to the Saussurean parole, as the structured system of 
possible linguistic items, whereas the syntagmatic belongs to the langue, or the actual chain of 
uttered speech which is also un ie y structural rules. 
22 Jakobson, Two Aspects of Language', p. 120. 
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So far these postulates lie themselves open to standard criticisms of the then 
emerging structuralist linguistics, which would find no suitable place here. What 
makes these distinctions bring about more general problems is Jakobson's 
inclusion of and emphasis on another associated pair: similarity and contiguity. 
the constituents of a context are in a state of contiguity, while in a 
substitution set signs are linked by various degrees of similarity which 
fluctuate between the equivalence of synonyms and the common core 
of antonyms. 23 
Thus, the two modes of organisation of linguistic systems (paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic) are to be understood as governed by two primary forms of sign 
production, similarity and contiguity, and the operativeness of these is linked to 
the realm of meaning distinctions. There is only one step from here to 
identifying these two modes of sign production, similarity and contiguity, with 
metaphoric and metonymic tendencies respectively. Thus Jakobson supports 
with a modern linguistic theory Nietzsche's remarks about the indissociability of 
rhetoric and language. As evidence, Jakobson supplies results observed in 
subjects with aphasic disturbances, whose utterances follow a consistent pattern, 
either being ruled by a metaphoric tendency, using only selective modes of 
linguistic organisation, or being ruled by a metonymic tendency, producing 
utterances unintelligible without a context that is missing. 
23 Jakobson, `Two Aspects of Language', p. 120. 
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But Jakobson seems to be thinking of metaphor and metonymy in even 
broader terms, as general modes of representation exceeding verbal language: he 
applies his dichotomy to a number of artistic productions (avant-garde painting 
and cinema, for instance), and most notably, he even advances a theory of 
literary genres on this model, according to which narrative fiction is metonymic 
in essence, whereas poetry is metaphoric. The influence of these patterns has 
reached literary criticism (to the despair of detractors, such as Vickers, 
mentioned above), and has proved relatively useful in accounting for the 
characterisation of literary periods. David Lodge offers a picture of Modernist 
fiction based on this distinction, even though he stresses that the often agreed- 
upon `poetic' and therefore `metaphorical' tendency in Modernist fiction is 
compatible with a use of metonymy which is also typically Modernist: 
the interesting conclusion follows that modern fiction may be 
characterised by an extreme or mannered drive toward the metonymic 
pole of language to which the novel naturally inclines, as well as by a 
drive toward the metaphoric pole from which it is naturally remote. 24 
Yet it can still be argued that these clear-cut distinctions ignore a history in 
which even the characterisation of metaphor and metonymy could not be 
reduced to the single note of similarity or contiguity of meaning. Aristotle's 
24 David Lodge, `The Language of Modernist Fiction: Metaphor and Metonymy', in Malcolm 
Bradbury and James McFarlane (eds. ), Modernism: 1890-1930 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1976), p. 486. 
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account, as Nietzsche also records, 25 includes what we would call synecdoche (a 
species of metonymy) in his definition of metaphor, and even his emphasis on 
analogia (often translated as `proportion') reaches far beyond the strictness of 
`similarity'. 
A middle stage, escaping Aristotelian ambiguity but still not reaching 
dichotomisation, is Nietzsche's own use of the definition of these tropes in the 
notes for his Rhetoric lectures. Drawing from nineteenth century treatises as 
well as classical sources, he maintains the distinction between synecdoche and 
metonymy: while synecdoche takes place `when the whole is known from a 
small part or a part from the whole'26, metonymy is `the substitution of cause 
and effect'. 27 We can see that in both cases contiguity is at work, as opposed to 
similarity in metaphor, since `the metaphor is a shortened simile'. 28 
25 `Aristotle (Poetics, 21) distinguishes in this way: a metaphor is the carrying over of a word 
whose usual meaning is something else, either from the genus to the species, from the species to 
the genus, from species to species, or according to proportion'(Nietzsche, `Description of 
Ancient Rhetoric', p. 55 (see also p. 198)). 
26 Nietzsche, `Description of Ancient Rhetoric', p. 57. ['Cum res tota parva de parte cognoscitur, 
auf de toto pars. ' (ibid., p. 56)] 
27 Nietzsche, `Description of Ancient Rhetoric', p. 25. ['Vertauschung von Ursache und 
Wirkung'. (ibid. p. 24) 
'` Nietzsche, 'Description of Ancient Rhetoric', p. 55. ['Die Metapher ist ein kürzeres 
Gleichniss'. (ibid., p. 54) 
71 
Therefore, there seem to be grounds for the binary opposition that has 
persisted after Jakobson, and while no elements have been found that could 
reduce the two terms to a common ground, 29 some studies, in the Jakobsonian 
tradition, provide reasons for the adopting of the pair similarity-contiguity, 
excluding the differences in contiguity between synecdoche and metonymy. 
Thus Umberto Eco argues that 
when its/ is specified that synecdoche carries out a substitution within 
the conceptual content of a term, while metonymy acts outside of that 
content, its is hard to see why the part for the whole is a synecdoche 
and the material for the object a metonymy - as though it were 
`conceptually' essential for an object to have constituent parts and not 
to be made of some material. 30 
Thus he concludes that the distinction is based on a prejudice belonging to a 
philosophical tradition for which 
to perceive and to recognize the formal characteristics of a thing meant 
to grasp its `universal' essence, to recognize that thing as the individual 
of a species related to a genus. 31 
29 See Eco's attempt in his definitions in terms of identity or interdependence of semantic units, 
in Umberto Eco, A Thcori of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1976), p. 280. 
30 Umberto Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (London: McMillan, 1984), p. 90. 
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There are, then, grounds for an account of metaphor and metonymy (with 
synecdoche as a species of metonymy) that takes them as poles of a binary 
opposition and as operating on the basis of similarity and contiguity 
relationships respectively. Such an account is at variance with a traditional 
understanding of rhetorical tropes, but it may prove enlightening in the 
construction of discourses which do not necessarily have to be in competition 
with Rhetoric as a discipline. Whether that is the case in structuralist linguistics 
or in semiotic studies is of little importance here, since our approach takes even 
a further step away in order to explore the sustainability of this dichotomy only 
as a lens to elucidate the internal tensions of Nietzsche's ideas on artistic 
representation. 
2.3. The Pervasiveness of Metonymy 
Rather than taking account of Jakobson's later expositions of his bipolar 
scheme, 32 we would like to explore the refinements that his earlier article 
already provides, since here there is already at play an uncontrolled erasure of 
binary oppositions that clears the way towards an understanding of Nietzsche's 
aesthetic views as well as their enactment in Modernist narrative and poetry. 
Within Jakobson's article, as well as within Nietzsche's account of rhetoric, 
there seems to operate not so much a privileging of metaphor as a grounding of 
31 Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, p. 117. 
32 See Roman Jakobson's later essay, `The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles'. 
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metaphor on metonymy, as if the contagious nature of contiguity were heard in 
the background, claiming its primordial status. Let us explore Jakobson's article 
first. 
In order to preserve the centrality of the structuralist division between 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, two phenomena appear marginalised: 
patterned speech in the form of phrases and in the form of rhythmic and 
rhyming sequences. To acknowledge the importance of these two phenomena in 
speech production would have been to assign too pervasive a role to the function 
of contexture, thus weakening the structuralist emphasis on some oppositions 
that, in their over-simplification, open the door for the formalisation of the rules 
of speech production. (Let us remember that formal language has been one of 
the banners of Structuralism. ) However, focusing on these two marginal 
phenomena, as two modes of formulaic expression, it is not difficult to see that 
contexture may be assigned a greater importance in the characterisation of sign 
production, not because of the frequency of these utterances but because of their 
privileged status among utterances. 
Jakobson initially characterises combination, based on relations of 
contiguity, as the kind of relation that pertains to the phonological level, where 
no free choice is possible, and where the elements of the phonological chain that 
constitute the word are governed by a context. 
33 Yet we can now say that this 
33 i. e., the phonemes that correspond to a word, such as `aesthetic', cannot have their position in 
the sequence altered, and each one must contiguously remain next to the preceding and 
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kind of relation also operates at a higher level, in the case of coined phrases 
whose structure cannot be altered. This proves that there are cases in which 
contiguity relations (those within the syntagmatic sequence) retain the fixity of 
the phonological chain, and cannot be fully reconciled with similarity (i. e. 
paradigmatic) relations: phrases are not a sequence of exchangeable items, and 
therefore resist formalisation according to syntactic rules (where the variables 
stand for possibilities of paradigmatic substitution). 
This stock of ready-made combinations also involves a threat to the 
distinction between situational context and context of utterance (i. e., the context 
constituted by the events surrounding the act of speech and the context provided 
by the other linguistic items in the utterance, which are not the phrase in 
question), since it provides the basis for the relying on relations of contiguity 
that occur in speech rather than in reality: a keel is to be found physically next to 
the body of the ship, and therefore is a valid metonymic term, but Jakobson also 
takes as metonymic operation that which relies on a purely linguistic contiguity: 
such metonymies may be characterised as projections from the line of a 
habitual context into the line of substitution and selection: a sign (fork) 
which usually occurs with another sign (knife) may be used instead of 
this Sign. 34 
This emphasis on contexture undermines some of the basic tenets of the article, 
succeeding one. 
34 Jakobson, `Two Aspects of Language', p. 125. My underlining. 
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and its disruption is even furthered by the existence of another mode of 
syntagmatic production: that which is based on the adjustment to phonological 
and stress patterns: rhyme and rhythm. 
The first objection to rise against this last inclusion is that rhyme and 
rhythm play an even lesser role in everyday speech than formulaic phrases, and 
that they belong to a highly elaborate form of speech production: poetry. Yet 
there is an extent to which the same process at work in poetic composition may 
be said to govern the relations within linguistic axes. This would involve 
extending the fixed combinatory structure (which Jakobson confined to 
phonological sequences resulting in words) to the formation of syntagmatic 
sequences: the occurrence of phonemes and stresses would depend on the 
structure of the sequence and would determine the choice of words, as if now 
the sentence or the utterance were an `extended word', complying with 
something analogous to phonological combinatory rules of word formation. It is 
in this sense that we can conceive of rhyme and rhythm as operating by relations 
of contiguity and contexture, governed by the exigencies of the phonological 
context. This seems to us the primary way in which rhyme and rhythm can be 
understood according to Jakobson's scheme, and only secondarily in terms of 
devices relying on similarity. 35 
However, even if we accept this account as that of one of the procedures 
within poetic composition, can this still offer any light on the process of 
;` The article provides, however, some support for this second interpretation. 
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language production at large? Jakobson is willing to accept, despite his 
definition of the paradigm in terms of similarity relations, that there are semantic 
relations of contiguity within the paradigm: 36 yet this contiguity does not seem 
to be associable with the continuity which rhyme and rhythm put forward, and 
which we have aligned with Jakobson's intra-word phonological relationships. 
But if we observe the series of items that Jakobson produces as examples of 
paradigmatic semantic contiguity, we see that there is an internal link with 
phonological recurrence. Paradigmatic axes are not only formed by words that 
can share syntactic functions, or in general words that can appear in a given 
position in the utterance substituting each other (here we would say that in this 
case items are related through semantic similarity, including total semantic 
difference as well): paradigmatic axes also include grammatical paradigms and 
lexical paradigms, and these are, according to Jakobson, paradigms governed by 
semantic contiguity: 
a paradigm (in particular a set of grammatical cases such as he-his-him 
or of tenses such as he votes-he voted) present the same semantic 
content from different points of view associated with each other by 
contiguity. [... ] Also, as a rule, words derived from the same root, such 
36 See Jakobson, `Two Aspects of Language', p. 127. Jakobson takes semantic contiguity 
(contiguity of meaning) to be the relation between words, in terms of meaning, by virtue of a 
conceptual proximity (not spatial or actual) which is not reducible to differences or similarities. 
For instance, the metonymy `keel' for `vessel' would not be a case of semantic contiguity, 
whereas 'vote' for 'voter' (action for agent) would. 
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as grant-grantor-grantee, are semantically related by contiguity. 37 
It is easy to note that in these series semantic contiguity is paralle d by aP 
repetition of phonemes, and since this repetition does not seem to be accidental, 
we are inclined to think that there is an internal relationship between the 
recurrence of phonemes and the contiguity of meanings in these paradigms: if 
phonological recurrence is understood under the terms of formal contiguity of 
poetic devices outlined above, then it would appear that there is a point at which 
the distinction between formal and semantic contiguity dissolves, and the 
creation of new meanings within the paradigm would bear an intrinsic 
relationship to the production of poetic utterances. Under this view, notions such 
as process and result or quality and substratum would not only be primarily 
linguistic rather than philosophical notions: they would also have their origin in 
language's own poetic drive, in the formal contiguity of signs prior to their 
signification. 
Jakobson had already suggested the possibility of a purely formal aspect 
of contiguity relations within the paradigm. Against the definition of contexture 
only in relation to the speech chain, sustained by Saussure, he says that 
selection (and, correspondingly, substitution) deals with entities 
conjoined in the code but not in the given message, whereas, in the case 
of combination, the entities are conjoined in both or only in the actual 
37 Jakobson, `Two Aspects of Language', p. 127. 
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message. 38 
And if we allow for purely formal relations in the paradigm, an understanding of 
rhyme and rhythm in terms of similarity becomes secondary, since it does not 
account for the point at which form merges with meaning. 
The need to base formal paradigmatic relations upon a contiguity 
structure, despite their seeming play with differences and identities, makes us 
wonder whether formal similarity is not itself a contradiction in terms within 
sign-systems: whereas semantic similarity comes closer to the structure of 
mirroring, with the positing of an original absolute or archetype in the 
synonymic relation (an identity of meaning is postulated), formal similarity 
escapes this pattern and tolerates, at most, the kind of similarity at work in 
family resemblances, where there is no possible reference to an archetype. Even 
the phenomena of tautology and homonymy are no good counter-examples, 
since tautology belongs to the realm of metalanguage and homonymy (the 
occurrence of a different word identical in form) can only be accounted for as a 
syntagmatic phenomenon, not one within the paradigm. If the mirror structure 
does not fully apply to semiotic systems, 39 it seems that it is primarily thanks to 
the pervasiveness of contiguity relations, which preclude the unbridgeable split 
between the object and its mirror image. The contagious nature of this 
" Jakobson, `Two Aspects of Language', p. 119. My underlining. 
39 See Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, chapter 7, for arguments defending the 
non-signical nature of mirror images. 
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pervasiveness was already noted by Nietzsche: 
rhythm and rhyme thereby become partly an adhesive for our attention, 
since we follow the reading more willingly, and partly they give rise to 
a blind agreement with what is read, prior to all judgement [... ]. The 
more excitable and natural a person is, the more rhythm acts upon him 
as a compulsion to repeat the rhythm and produces that `blind 
attunement prior to all judgement'; this compulsion is usually 
associated with pleasure, but it can tear at souls and overpower them so 
suddenly that it is more like a painful paroxysm. 40 
This is a first glimpse at the primordial force of contiguity as opposed to 
similarity, to which Jakobson's text itself seems to bend inadvertedly conceding 
that the processes at work in poetic rhythm and rhyme are constitutive of 
language at large. We shall now see how this recognition is also behind 
Nietzsche's emphasis on metaphor. 
2.4. The Mimetic Character of Metaphor 
The ascription of a cognitive status to metaphor, according to Eco, goes back to 
Aristotle: 
Aristotle provides the most luminous confirmation of the metaphor's 
cognitive function when he associates it with mimesis [... ]. In the 
Rhetoric (1411 b 25 ff j there is no room for doubt: the best metaphors are 
40 Friedrich Nietzsche, `On Rhythm', in Gilman et al., p. 244. 
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those that `show things in a state of activity'. Thus metaphorical 
knowledge is knowledge of the dynamics of the real. 41 
And we will find this paradoxical combination of irreconcilable elements in 
Nietzsche's account of our metaphorical approach to reality: metaphor is 
mimesis, but it also rests on a dynamicity that exceeds the stable pattern of the 
mirroring. However, there is an important difference with Aristotle; for 
Nietzsche metaphorical activity, as an artistic, rhetorical activity, is in some 
sense prior to concept formation: 
Nietzsche brings about a highly symptomatic reversal in the 
relationship which he establishes between metaphor and concept: 
metaphor is no longer referred to the concept, as in the metaphysical 
tradition inherited from Aristotle, but rather the concept is referred to 
metaphor. 42 
Yet what takes place with Nietzsche is not simply a reversal which leaves the 
structure untouched, metaphor simply exchanging places with the stability of 
conceptual meanings: rather than a reversal, a displacement occurs, with a 
subsequent redefinition of boundaries: 
`carrying over' [ tctc«pcpslv] must not be understood here as a 
transition from one place to another: it must itself be taken as a 
ý1 Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, p. 102. 
42 Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, pp. 14-15. 
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metaphor which, in The Birth of Tragedy, condenses several meanings: 
transfiguration, transformation, ecstasy, self-dispossession and 
metamorphosis (which is possible only if the distinction into well- 
demarcated genera and species is erased). 43 
This already points to the fact that the duality of metaphorical structure is going 
to be undermined in Nietzsche's hands. However, most of Nietzsche Is 
approaches to the analysis of metaphorical structures seem to preserve this 
dualism; if words are the result of a metaphorical operation, they are still 
removed from the `original realm': `we possess nothing but metaphors for things 
metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities'. 44 It seems as 
if the dualism which has conditioned the Western understanding of language 
(and which Saussure formulated as the signifier-signified dichotomy) continues 
to be at work here. Whether in the form of an intra-linguistic pair or as the 
opposition of world to language (and the young Nietzsche chooses this second 
option), this fundamental split appears as the definitory condition of language 
itself, and given language's metaphorical essence, as the first metaphor. 45 
43 Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, p. 15. My addition. 
44Nietzsche, `On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', in Breazeale, p. 83. 
45 On Nietzsche's engagement with the erasing of the binary and oppositional nature of 
language, see Alan D. Schrift, `Nietzsche and the Critique of Oppositional Thinking', in History 
of European Ideas, Vol. II, 1989, p. 785. On metaphor as inscribed in the text of metaphysics, 
and Nietzsche's attack on the metaphoric quality of truth, see Rey, `Commentary', in Michael 
Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong (eds. ). Nietzsche's New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, 
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What linguistic dualism institutes is not only the legitimacy of language 
for mimetic knowledge, but also the very possibility of metaphysical thought, 
since the split between transcendence and immediacy will then be thought 
according to this initial metaphor: very easily the `proper' of a metaphorical 
expression becomes the `otherworldly'. It can be objected that since metaphor is 
based on similarity, there is no unbridgeable split here, 46 that we could even talk 
of shared properties, or of some kind of dependence. Yet in the context of an 
opposition with contiguity, similarity (as the other side of contrast) involves a 
split into two heterogeneous realms which can never be fully reconciled: 
similarity becomes synonymous with heterogeneity, with essential discontinuity 
and contrast. Nietzsche seems to have grasped this when he talks of image 
production: 
imaginative production may be observed in the eye. Similarity leads to 
the boldest further development. But so do entirely different 
relationships: contrasts lead unceasingly to contrasts. Here one can see 
Aesthetics and Politics (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
46 In a somewhat different context, Tracy Strong argues that `what the metaphor bridges is not 
two worlds, but the making of sense and the sense that appears as made [... ]. For Nietzsche 
human beings are architects of meaning [... ]; making sense of the world, the very epistemology 
of authority, it rests on this aesthetic conception of the world'. (Strong, `Aesthetic Authority C. i /1 
and Tradition', p. 996. ) However, as I hope to have made clear by now, there is more to 
aesthetics than a liberating power or a recovery of a lost authority, and there is more to metaphor 
as a surplus of meaning' (Kristeva's expression): there is also metaphor as the precondition of 
the text of metaphysics. 
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the extraordinary productivity of the intellect. It is a life in images. 47 
These thoughts seem to put forward the idea of the continuity between similarity 
and contrast as an interplay of differences (then implying separation) which is in 
turn associated with the creation of images, and with vision and the intellect: 
that is, with the mimetic structure of reflection which is the precondition of the 
unbridgeable metaphysical split. Nietzsche is also aware of the link between 
metaphorical activity and the philosophical strife for control: 
in the philosopher, activities are carried out by means of metaphor. The 
striving for uniform control. Each thing gravitates towards a condition 
of immeasurability. In nature, the character of the individual is seldom 
something fixed; instead, it is always expanding. 48 
The contrast between expansion and the uniformity of metaphorical activity 
corroborates the connection between the initial metaphor which language 
constitutes and the history of actions of metaphysical thought upon nature: 
language as metaphor is the basis of a tradition of thought that ends up in a 
discourse of mastery of natural excess. 
Yet Nietzsche provides us with the key for a view of language that, 
although it acknowledges the metaphorical character of language, it also 
47 Nietzsche, `The Philosopher', in Breazeale, p. 23, paragraph 62. 
Nietzsche, The Philosopher', in Breazeale, p. 34, paragraph 90. 
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incorporates elements which cannot simply rest on this dualistic structure. 
Against the pictorial nature of language, its metaphorical drive, its core structure 
of mirroring, Nietzsche places the fluidity of music: 
music as a supplement to language: many stimuli and entire states of 
stimulation which cannot be expressed in language can be rendered in 
music. 49 
But then, is music not a fundamental constituent of language itself? Is not the 
formal contiguity in the manner of recurrent patterns of sounds (rhythm and 
rhyme), outlined in the previous section, essentially musical in nature? 
We could say that only on the basis of this contiguity can language 
escape the shackles of metaphorical structure and enjoy the qualities that 
Nietzsche ascribes to music here. It is also clear that, although constitutive of 
language itself, this formal contiguity, this metonymic drive, is more explicit in 
poetic language, where meaning relationships are ultimately governed by formal 
contiguities. Poetry is the paradigmatic example of the displacement and 
dissolution of the distinction between the formal and semantic aspects of speech 
units, and in this sense it subverts the very basic dualism of a language 
understood in metaphorical terms: it establishes a contiguity between signifier 
and signified which is ultimately a counterpart to the metaphysical possibilities 
of language. 
'`' Nietzsche, `The Philosopher', in Breazeale, p. 40, paragraph 111. 
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In his description of the metaphorical nature of language, Nietzsche 
cannot but acknowledge the essentially artistic nature of metaphorical 
transference, and this leads him to suggest a subordination of transference to the 
fluidity of the grounds for its possibility. Here we have an analogue to the 
structure of dependence which the Dionysiac and the Apolline forces constitute: 
it is as a primordial basis that the realm of Dionysiac contagion must be 
understood, but in constant tension with the artistic delimitations of the Apolline 
realm. As long as the Apolline setting of boundaries is understood as an artistic 
activity, its essential link with Dionysiac formlessness remains secured. Thus, in 
emphasising the artistic, poetic traits of language formation, he is forced to 
make metaphor depend on an original text of contiguity. Conceptual architecture 
rests on fluidity: 
here one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, 
who succeeds in piling up an infinitely complicated dome of concepts 
upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water. 50 
The primordial character of a lack of discontinuity is highlighted always 
together with an emphasis on the artistic character of language formation, as if 
an artistic exercise of language and the acknowledgement of primal contiguity 
would necessarily have to go hand in hand. 51 Individual perceptions give rise to 
50 Nietzsche, `On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', p. 85. 
s1 This basing of metaphor on metonymy refutes a simplistic reading of Nietzsche's 
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images, which are their metaphors; yet for the formation of concepts the 
metaphorical character of these images must be forgotten: he who creates 
concepts `forgets that the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes 
them to be the things themselves'. 52 What is the nature of this forgetting? Is it 
the active forgetting condition of the splendour of life in Nietzsche's later 
writings? or the life-affirming attitude against the historicist deadening? In this 
contrast, the activity of forgetting is only secondarily a life-enhancing one: only 
to the extent to which it distances us from the lethal whirlpool of the Dionysiac 
absolute lack of difference. 53 Here forgetting is primarily the diseased form of 
understanding of the essence of language: the deceptive character of language as metaphorical 
has the same positive value as any other deception through art, and the metonymic fluidity on 
which the artistic (metaphorical) character of language is based guarantees a way out of mere 
deception. It is not sufficient to say, contrasting Nietzsche's views with Wagner's early aesthetic 
ideas: `In Wagner's system, the word has a metonymic relationship to the referent. According to 
Nietzsche, language is mere metaphor that has no relation to things. Language is never an 
adequate expression of reality' (Mary A. Cicora, `From Metonymy to Metaphor: Wagner and 
Nietzsche on Language', in German Life and Letters 42: 1, October 1988, p. 27). Language 
being an inadequate (metaphorical) expression of reality, it has all the import of the artistic 
process of representation, and ultimately bears an essential relationship to the fluid non- 
difference to which metonymy testifies. 
52 Nietzsche, `On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', p. 86. 
53 In this respect, Alison Ainley seconds Kristeva's view of metaphor as a `surplus of meaning' 
gesturing towards formlessness, but she also acknowledges, with the help of Nietzsche, the 
dangers of the lack of difference, in this case gender difference. See Alison Ainley, "`Ideal 
Selfishness": Nietzsche's Metaphor of Maternity', in Exceedingly Nietzsche 
*, pp. 126-127. Equally , Eric Blondel points to 
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the Apolline drive, the turning of art into theory (exemplified paradigmatically 
by Socrates) and therefore the break of the original tension, artistic in nature, 
between limit-setting and abandonment. In the case of the building of metaphor 
upon metaphor, the problem is not so much to indulge in a further operation of 
transference as to forget the essentially artistic quality of these transferences; to 
forget the poetic nature of a primitive world of metaphor on which similarities 
depend on contiguity: 
only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with 
any repose, security and consistency: only by means of the petrification 
and coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the 
primal faculty of human imagination like fiery liquid, only in the 
invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself, 
in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating 
subject, does man live with any repose, security and consistency. If but 
for an instant he could escape from the prison walls of this faith, his 
`self-consciousness' would be immediately destroyed. 54 
the dangers of a metaphoric world acknowledged as such, the world of art, which contrary to 
what he seems to suggest elsewhere, does not enjoy the healing power of forgetting which 
corresponds to the theoretical-Socratic attitude: `Indeed if man were aware of living in an 
originally and fundamentally metaphorical world, he would succumb to Dionysian madness. 
And Dionysian truth is mortal' (Eric Blondel, `Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor', in The New 
Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation, de. by David B. Alison (London: MIT Press, 
1985), p. 172. Here Dionysiac truth is, of course, essentially opposed to truth arrived at by the 
exercise of theory. 
54 Nietzsche, `On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', p. 86. My underlining. The need for the 
ritual destruction of the self in order to reach the sacred ground of continuity is examined in the 
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Nietzsche's own emphasis is on artistic creation, thus legitimising a privileged 
status for the poetic drive within language formation, underlying the very 
structural metaphor that constitutes language as duality. When this duality 
ceases to be referred to its artistic origin, it falls into the pattern of a mirroring, 
of a mimetic reflection. It is in this sense that Aristotle was able to assign a 
cognitive value to metaphor, and it is also in this idea that Nietzsche assimilates 
knowledge (in the traditional, unrefined sense, which will be modified in his 
later writings) to the metaphorical structure of imitation: 
imitation is the opposite of knowing to the extent that knowing certainly 
does not want to admit any transference, but wishes instead to cling to 
the impression without metaphor and apart from the consequences. [... ] 
But there is no `real' expression and no real knovting apart from 
metaphor. [... ] Knowing is nothing but working with the favourite 
metaphors, an imitating which is no longer felt to be an imitation. 55 
Comparison, elucidation of similarities and copying involve the 
metaphorical/metaphysical split into two realms which is inherent to a structure 
of knowledge; the positing of the stability of an original is a precondition of 
thinking: 
imitation is a means employed by all culture. By this means instinct is 
next chapter. 
ý` Nietzsche, `The Philosopher', in Breazeale, pp. 50-5 1, paragraph 149. My underlining. 
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gradually produced. All comparison (primal thinking) is imitation. 56 
However, the aesthetic import of the mimetic structure (or the poetic import of 
the metaphorical split) cannot be fully comprehended by a dualistic structure of 
knowledge: whenever the aesthetic is at play, dualism relies on a former 
contiguity that the pursuit of knowledge only partially veils. The line of 
division, the mirror itself: shows its problematic status: 
man has evolved slowly, and knowledge is still evolving: his picture of 
the world thus becomes ever more true and complete. Naturally, it is 
only a clearer and clearer mirroring. But the mirror itself is nothing 
entirely foreign and apart from the nature of things. On the contrary, it 
too slowly arose as [part of] the nature of things. 57 
There is here a new concession to a contiguity older than mirroring, to the 
artistic contagion that even the sober activity of knowledge cannot erase from its 
origin. In the context of art, the ambiguous status of the mirror, itself a dividing 
line and part of the realm which it delimits, becomes analogous to the 
ambiguous status of the eye, itself seeing but susceptible of being seen: form is 
ultimately dependent upon the natural continuum to which this eye belongs: 
there is no. form in nature, because there is no inner and no outer. All art 
56 Nietzsche, `The Philosopher', in Breazeale, p. 49. paragraph 146. 
Nietzsche, `The Philosopher', in Breazeale, pp. 37-38, paragraph 102. Translator's addition. 
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depends upon the mirror of the eyes. 58 
In order to be able to think this paradoxical contiguity, we can only employ a 
metonymic structure, modelled on the corresponding rhetorical transference. 
Within this metonymic pattern, contiguity involves a non-identity which is not 
reducible to the interplay of differences, and a non-difference which is not the 
same as identity. The pervasiveness of this fluid relation reaches, according to 
Nietzsche, the very core of synthetic judgement and concept formation, 
undermining knowledge's strife for objectivity: 
a synthetic judgement describes a thing according to its consequences, 
i. e. essence and consequences become identified, i. e. a metonymy. Thus 
a metonymy lies at the essence of synthetic judgement' that is to say that 
it is a false equation. 59 
And further below: 
abstractions are metonymies, i. e., substitutions of cause and effect. But 
every concept is a metonymy, and knowing takes place in concepts. 60 
These views are aimed to undermine the claims of the superiority of knowledge 
58 Nietzsche, `The Philosopher', in Breazeale, p. 40, paragraph 112. 
59 Nietzsche, `The Philosopher', in Breazeale, p. 52, paragraph 152. 
60 Nietzsche, `The Philosopher', in Breazeale. p. 58, paragraph 11. 
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over art, but they can be equally be seen as a levelling of discourses in order to 
subject them to an analysis in terms of modes of representation. Thus, going in 
the opposite direction, we can also see how the metaphorical mode of 
representation constitutes per se, whenever detached from an artistic context or 
forgotten its poetic nature, a tendency towards the objectivity of knowledge. 
Illustrations of this are offered by Jakobson's rendering of some of the 
effects of what he terms the `contiguity and similarity disorders', that is, 
extreme cases of aphasia or language disturbance in which the speakers are 
pathologically driven towards the metaphoric and metonymic poles of language. 
In the exacerbation of metonymic tendencies, the `similarity disorder', a loss of 
the metalinguistic function occurs: the capacity to `name', to speak about 
language, disappears; `the aphasic defect in the "capacity of naming" is properly 
a loss of metalanguage'. 61 We may begin to wonder, at this point, whether this is 
not consistent with an interpretation of the series metaphor-metalanguage- 
metaphysics as revolving around a common core. Symptomatically, the loss of 
metalanguage has as one of its aspects an extreme conception of language in 
which two signs are never identical: `for such patients two occurrences of the 
same word in two different contexts are mere homonyms'. 
62 Is this not the 
expression of an archaic view of language for which metaphorical dualism has 
not yet taken place, and for which each utterance is a singular event, belonging 
61 Jakobson. `Two Aspects of Language', p. 124. 
`'2 Jakobson, Two Aspects of Language', p. 122. 
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to the unfolding of reality as events, and not mirroring its essence in the fixity of 
meaning? Within this view would fall some archaic poetic devices such as the 
kenningar, according to which the occurrence of the object in different contexts 
is paralleled by a corresponding shifting in expression: the dynamicity of events 
and that of language run together. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the exacerbation of the metaphoric 
tendency, or the `contiguity disorder', the most prominent effect is the turning of 
language into a mere system of binary oppositions: 
the aphasic deficient in contexture exhibits a tendency to abolish the 
hierarchy of linguistic units and to reduce their scale to a simple level. 
The last level to remain is either a class of significative values, the 
word, [... ] or a class of distinctive values, the phoneme. 63 
In either case the units are not integrated in a context, and only preserve `a 
purely distinctive function'. It is not difficult to see in this picture a portrait of 
the workings of formal or artificial languages, based on principles of binary 
opposition, and in which all influence of the context has been erased. Again, it is 
only consistent that this kind of expression, here presented as a pathological 
development of the metaphorical tendency, has been the language of the 
scientific discourses directly developed out of our metaphysical tradition. 
Thus, since all enquiry owes its legitimacy to the initial metaphorical 
63 Jakobson, 'Two Aspects of Language', p. 128. 
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split, understood as mimesis, reflections on the nature of representation are 
doomed to be partial, to take sides with metaphor, since they themselves are 
reflections within a mimetic structure from which the relation of contiguity is 
excluded: 
similarity in meaning connects the symbols of a metalanguage with the 
symbols of the language referred to. Similarity connects a metaphoric 
term with the term for which it is substituted. Consequently, when 
constructing a metalanguage to interpret tropes, the researcher 
possesses more homogeneous means to handle metaphor, whereas 
metonymy, based on a different principle, easily defies interpretation. 64 
Here we see how the object of study, in its constituting the hidden structure of 
the very investigation, yields itself to theory in a way that another object 
(metonymy) could not: 
not only the tool of the observer, but also the object of observation are 
responsible for the preponderance of metaphor over metonymy in 
scholarship. 65 
And it is the elusive character of metonymy, its resistance to theory, that 
foregrounds Nietzsche's metaphorical activity, even though a primordial 
contiguity cannot but be suggested in his early writings as the artistic sanction of 
`'' Jakobson, `Two Aspects of Language', p. 132. 
65 Jakobson. Two Aspects of Language'. p. 132. 
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metaphor. 
2.5. The Sacred Character of Poetic Contiguity 
After having manipulated and displaced Jakobson's dichotomies, under the light 
of Nietzsche's own understanding of the polarity between metaphor and 
metonymy, we can now revise the theory of genres that aligns narrative with the 
contiguity of metonymy and poetry with the similarity of metaphor. It is 
undeniable that the sequence of actions that characterises narrative prose is 
basically forwarded by semantic contiguity, by the actual proximity of units of 
meaning; equally, poetry is essentially linked to a deviation from the proper 
which allows for profuse metaphorical activity. Nevertheless, this distinction, 
which has exerted a great influence after Jakobson, does not take into account a 
different sense in which the relations of contiguity and similarity modelled on 
rhetorical tropes can be associated with narrative and poetry. According to this 
different sense, which we have tried to unfold, literary language at large is 
characterised by the kind of contiguity that reaches beyond the separation 
between the formal and semantic levels, and suspends the essentially 
metaphorical character of objective language. There would be only a difference 
of degree between the narrative and poetic genres in this respect, and it would be 
precisely in poetry that the explicitness of the primacy of this kind of far- 
reaching contiguity would be greater. 
Poetry being closer to formulaic, sacred speech, it allows for the 
conception of utterance as event, as an intervention in the order of things by 
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virtue of its belonging, contiguously, to that order. Formal repetitions, sound and 
stress patterns, emphasise the unitary character of poetic discourse, its erasing of 
the mimetic duality. Even the adoption of the Jakobsonian scheme cannot but 
acknowledge that the poetic qualities of Modernist prose, shown in this prose's 
favouring of formal interplay, are linked to a metonymic drive. Talking of 
Gertrude Stein, David Lodge writes: 
her use of repetition with slight variation in her earlier, metonymic 
prose has the effect of converting the dynamic into the static, the 
temporal into the spatial; this is entirely consistent with the aim of 
metaphor-oriented Symbolist and Imagist verse [... ] . 
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Therefore, if it is in poetry that utterances can be loaded with the sacred 
immanence that precedes dualism, it is not because of the abundance of 
metaphors, but because of the underlying contiguity thanks to which words 
interact with each other as if in a context of objects, meaning relationships not 
being independent of formal interplay. 
This commitment to a primordial world of fluid contiguity, captured in 
pre-modern, analogic views of language and the world, is not an exclusive 
prerogative of poetry, even though its nature becomes clearer understood on the 
model of metonymy as a poetic device. Just as Nietzsche's metaphors are a 
compromise with fluidity, the structure of aesthetic mimesis does not need to 
renounce a tribute to contiguity. In fact, a truly artistic dimension arises when 
'6Lodge, `The Language of Modernist Fiction', p. 489. 
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we see the products of the visual arts not as a metaphor of reality (a recreation of 
the experience of vision as a confrontation with reality), but as contiguous with 
the reality that constitutes their original, their `proper'. The contiguity between a 
painting and the non-artistic objects of our vision allows us to regard the 
painting itself as object, as part of reality, and its production itself as the 
experience of vision; conversely, vision is no longer an innocent seeing, and 
becomes entangled with the processes of artistic creation. In this mode, theory 
continues to be the discourse of metaphorical/metaphysical seeing, but can no 
longer disavow itself from the contiguity of the poetic discourse that precedes it. 
97 
3. Sacrifice: The Aesthetic Rendering of Sacredness 
Nietzsche points in The Birth of Tragedy to the mythic essence of ancient tragic 
drama, thus revealing the religious origins of tragedy, and by extension the 
original link between sacredness and art, since all artistic expression is 
measured for Nietzsche in relation to a pattern that he finds in ancient Greek 
tragedy. What Greek tragedy also allows is a voyage in a somehow different 
direction, for through an analysis of tragic drama we can also grasp the 
sacrificial origins of the myths there contained. From this standpoint, tragedy 
reveals not so much its links with the system of myths of an established 
religion, as the mechanisms of its constitution from a set of original ritual 
activities. An analysis of Greek tragedy in this direction has been carried out by 
Rene Girard, for whom ritual has pre-eminence over myth in the process of a 
religion being constituted: 
the more recent theory reverses the [older] procedure, attributing to 
ritual not only the origin of myth, but also the origin of the gods, and 
in Greece - of tragedy and other cultural forms as well. 
' 
This means that ritualistic practices are not expressive of a set of beliefs or a 
mythical discourse, but precede them in the theoretical order as more primordial 
experiences. We are not concerned here with the sequential order of events as 
they actually happened; rather, we are concerned with a theoretical sequence to 
1 Rene Girard, Violence und the Sacred, trans. P. Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkings 
Unis ersity Press. 1977). p. 89. 
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which events and their interpretations are not indifferent, yet for which we can 
claim a certain autonomy and even a priority. That is to say, for us, the actuality 
of the chain of historical happenings is not completely dissociated from, but is 
yet secondary in respect to, the theoretical articulation of its concepts. For an 
account of the structure of sacrifice to be consistent, we must conceive of rituals 
as prior to discoursive ordering, and of this discoursive ordering itself as needed 
for the structuring of mythic beliefs. Therefore, in thinking of a founding ritual 
we are thinking of activities for which no reason is provided and which respond 
to no behavioural code, since they are precisely what constitutes the possibility 
of the arising of reasons, beliefs and codes. If rituals are defined in contrast with 
their correspondent set of beliefs, they must logically preceed them; whether 
this was actually the case or not is not relevant here, although, for rituals to 
maintain their status as practices, it is relevant that the question of their 
historical place in a sequence can remain open. 
Among all the ancient ritual practices, the ritual of sacrifice seems to 
have had paramount importance, and to its structure are reducible many other 
ritualistic acts whose appearance would not initially allow us to include them in 
this category. The centrality of sacrifice becomes clear when its structure has 
been shown to lie at the basis of the very possibility of mythic discourse and to 
constitute the ground for any structure of objectification. In this respect, 
sacrifice is analogous to the grounding power of the unstable tension between 
the Nietzschean Apolline and Dionysiac forces. 
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3.1. Sacredness and Sacrifice 
In its original ritual form sacrifice appears as the ceremonial killing of a victim 
(animal or human) or the ceremonial consumption of some good, according to 
fixed procedures and within a religious structure. The act of killing is not the 
distinctive trait of sacrifice, according to G. Bataille: what is ultimately 
important in sacrifice is the passage from one order of experience to another: 
to sacrifice is not to kill but to relinquish and to give. Killing is only the 
exhibition of a deep meaning. What is important is to pass from a 
lasting order, in which all consumption of resources is subordinated to 
the need for duration, to the violence of an unconditional consumption 
[]2 
From consumption subordinated to duration we move to consumption for its 
own sake: these two modes of engagement with resources correlate to the 
temporality of survival (the lasting order, where change is at the service of the 
preservation of identity or personality) and the temporality of sacredness (the 
order whose identity is change, in which each change does not alter identity but 
enhances it by showing its constitu ve force and dynamicity). The negative ,I 
character of consumption disappears when there is no purpose or hidden 
intention to recuperate what is lost: dynamicity is freed from its ties of 
2 Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion. trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1989), p. 
49. 
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subordination to the temporary perpetuation of contingency, and reaches the 
higher status of the pure affirmation of contingency itself as eternal change. The 
realm of unconditioned, non-subordinated reality, of irrecuperable loss, is made 
accessible through the act of sacrifice. This unconditional realm is the realm of 
the sacred, with which we communicate through a ritual negation of what 
opposes it: contingency and duration. The experience of sacredness is thus 
necessarily linked to a form of denial of our everyday existence, of our `profane' 
duration: 
[... ] what is sacred attracts and possesses an incomparable value, but at 
the same time it appears vertiginously dangerous for that clear and 
profane world where mankind situates its privileged domain. 3 
In this opposition between the profane everyday and sacred value, the dangerous 
value of the sacred world resides in its foreignness to what is properly human; 
to the discrete temporality of the human being the sacred appears as a dreadful 
force whose pattern is not ordered production but irrecuperable excess. At the 
same time, this force is not perceived as simply alien to what is human, but as 
more than human, as the primary occurrence of some unmeasurable dark power 
that is felt to be present within humans themselves, and yet pointing to their 
destruction. For this reason the `unconditional consumption' of the sacred is 
sensed both as incomparably valuable and unbearably violent: 
3 Bataille, Theory of Religion, p. 36. 
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the sacred is that prodigious effervescence of life that, for the sake of 
duration, the order of things holds in check, and that this holding 
changes into a breaking loose, that is, into violence. ' 
Violent behaviour is what most clearly displaces man from an ordered existence 
and leads him back to the continuity of the natural world, where the forces of 
nature are always in excess of themselves and where the animal lives in 
intimacy with its aliments and its victims. In violence human beings recall their 
analogy with the unmasterable, with boundless excess and with continuity (with 
the traits of a sacred world): 
the sacred consists of all those forces whose dominance over man 
increases or seems to increase in proportion to man's effort to master 
them. Tempests, forest fires, and plagues, among other phenomena, 
may be classified as sacred. Far outranking these, however, though in a 
far less obvious manner, stands human violence [... ]. Violence is the 
heart and secret soul of the sacred. 5 
Therefore, violence is offered by Rene Girard and Georges Bataille as the link 
between the sacred realm and the violent institution of sacrifice. Because the 
sacred realm is characterised by the traits of violence (purposeless destruction, 
absence of boundaries, excessive energy), a violent ritual comes into intimacy 
with sacredness; but also, because violence can be ritualised, the dangerous and 
Bataille, Theory of Religion, p. 52. 
Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 31. 
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dreadful element of what is sacred (of violence itself) can be held in check. At 
this point it is useful to use a distinction that Girard makes between reciprocal 
or unrestrained violence (the boundless violence that destroys) and sacrificial 
violence (the ritual violence that allows room for civilisation). In fact, Girard's 
argument constantly revolves around the notion of ritual violence as the founder 
of both religion and civilised society. The institution of sacrifice appears from 
this perspective not as a disclosure of sacredness (as a device to come to 
intimacy with the divinity) but as a mechanism that itself creates the sacred 
through a performance, as indeed etymological resonances suggest: to sacrifice 
(sacerfacere, to make sacred) is not an unveiling but a creative action. From 
this viewpoint, the logic of the constitution of sacredness would need the ritual 
restraints in order for the sacred to appear as such. 
In relation to the institution of sacrifice, as both its generator and its 
attempted mechanism of control, sacredness reveals itself in the form of 
unconditional expenditure, unmasterable force and dangerous violence. A 
fourth aspect may be added, already implied in its violent character and its 
relation to the unmasterable forces of nature: this aspect is the continuity and 
intimacy that the sacred requires and that restores us to the continuity of the 
animal state. For Bataille `the animal world is that of immanence and 
immediacy, for that world, which is closed to us, is so to the extent that we 
cannot discern in it an ability to transcend itself. 
6 The immanence and 
" Bataille, Theory of Religion, p. 56. 
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continuity of a realm prior to any scissure (in which, in our eyes, the animal is 
in a relation of intimacy with everything) are the characteristic traits of a world 
pervaded by sacredness. Similarly Nietzsche, in the second of his Untimely 
Meditations, opposes the immediate life-affirming essence of animality to the 
historicity of the human being: 
[... ] the animal lives unhistorically, for it is contained in the present, 
like a number without any awkward fraction left over; it does not know 
how to dissimulate, it conceals nothing and at every instant appears 
wholly as what it is. 7 
Both for Bataille and Nietzsche, the human perception of animality reveals the 
original continuity and lack of mediation of a world from which we feel 
removed. To this world, the realm of immanent sacredness, we are restored by 
the mechanism of sacrifice; but sacrifice itself, with all its founding power, 
cannot but be intertwined with aesthetic mechanisms which threaten its pure 
belonging to the realm of sacredness. 
3.2. Sacrifice and the Aesthetic 
A sacrifice requires such a number of representational devices that it can be said 
to be an aesthetic as much as a religious act. Sacrifice is necessarily linked to 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, `On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life', in Untimely 
Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge University Press. 1983), p. 61. 
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theatricality: it is a public ceremony that combines display and participation; 
while its visual display and theatrical character allow a distance, the tacit 
assumption of a meaning that matters to all the members of the community 
prevents detachment. 
Regarding the mechanisms of the genesis of sacrifice, the victim is 
chosen, according to Girard, through a double process of substitution, the first 
resulting in an illusion, and the second as an operation of mimesis, imitation. 
The first process involves substituting a single member of the community for 
the whole: this individual, the surrogate victim, takes upon itself the ills and 
sins of the whole community; this mechanism is taken to be `not simply [... ] an 
illusion and a mystification, but [... ] the most formidable and influential illusion 
and mystification in the whole range of human experience'. 8 An example of an 
individual of this kind is the mythical figure of King Oedipus. The second 
substitution is that of a victim outside the community for the surrogate victim. 
In this operation the mimetic nature of sacrifice is at work: the sacrificial victim 
has to belong to a completely different category in order for a community to 
unite unanimously against it, but this sacrificial victim also has to bear some 
resemblance to the original surrogate victim, which was itself a member of the 
community. 
8 Girard, i iolence and the Sacred, p. 82. 
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Rene Girard explains this double substitution as an isolation of violence 
in the first instance and a subsequent satisfaction of the community's violent 
impulses, in order for the community to survive as such. But what interests us is 
not so much the anthropological explanation for these substitutions as their 
characterisation as illusory and mimetic. First, the illusory isolation of an 
impulse that otherwise remains contagious and undifferentiated marks the 
designation of a surrogate victim. The fact that these boundaries are illusory and 
opposed to an unbearable boundlessness assimilates this procedure to the 
Apolline creation of arbitrary boundaries that Nietzsche describes in The Birth 
of Tragedy. This Apolline tendency is precisely characterised there as a desire 
for clarity and individuation, escaping from formless reality to a delight in 
perfect forms. 
Secondly, the mimesis of the sacrificial substitution (the substitution of 
the sacrificial victim for the surrogate victim) can be seen as the originary 
presupposition of a boundary between two orders of reality: between the 
boundlessness of community violence and the foreignness of external objects. 
This original split allows for a mimetic structure of resemblances and 
correspondences between two essentially different orders of reality: an 
anthropological explanation suggests that this split is conditioned by the 
community's need to unite unanimously against the victim; this unanimity is 
also not based on a moral code, but on a raw perception of differences; thus the 
victim has been sensed as essentially foreign but yet not totally unrelated to 
what is truly being expiated (to the sacrificer's own violent impulse), since the 
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foreigness is not great enough to preclude the exertion of violence. In the case of 
the sacrifice of an object (the case of an offering or a ritual expenditure) the 
object can again belong to a separate category of sacrificial objects, but it has to 
retain a resemblance to what is useful: this is the way to relate the sacrificial 
object to the violent appropriation that instrumentalisation constitutes-9 
The operation of mimesis is at work in still another instance: not only in 
the relationship between the surrogate victim and the actual sacrificial victim, 
but also in that between the originary conditions and the ritual re-enactment. 
The rite of sacrifice reproduces the supposedly historical conditions of violent 
chaos, subsequent unanimity and shift from dread to respect towards the victim, 
and it does so in the form of a theatrical re-enactment that is no longer based on 
actual circumstances. In view of this we can say that representation constitutes 
the very essence of sacrifice, and that through these representational mechanism 
the dreadful originary non-difference becomes both mastered and sacralised: 
9 We will see how the instrumentalisation of objects has, for Bataille, a character analogous to 
(if not that of a prerequisite for) the imposition of social order: human beings cannot but feel 
that social order entails a violent profanation of the sacred, animal state of intimacy, and thus 
institute it through a ritual return to this state (sacrifice), just as in the realm of objects, the 
boundless continuity that objects enjoyed within nature is violently pro hate y their being 
instrumental ised, their separation from the cycles of generation and decay; therefore 
instrumental isation is only legitimised by the other version of sacrifice: the ritual relinquishing 
of the usefulness of an object (the gift, the offering). 
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`[... ] the representation of non-difference ultimately becomes the very exemplar 
of difference, a classic monstrosity that plays a vital role in sacred ritual'. '0 
Another structure of illusory substitution takes place at the level of 
participation in the ritual: sacrifice generates in the viewer the illusion of 
identification with the victim, and prompts the experience of one's own death. 
This is the reason why, for Bataille, sacrifice is necessarily linked to an 
experience of anguish in the participants: the rite is an interplay with 
appearances, but one that allows us to experience death, if only through an 
identification provoked by theatrical illusion. 
The representational essence of sacrifice is not exhausted in its mimetic 
character: sacrifice is only such if it is capable of being reproduced; it involves 
repetition, re-enactment and re-creation, and this is another characteristic on 
which its ritual nature depends. As a historical event, or an isolated happening, 
a sacrificial offering is not significant; even if it is always dependent on an 
origin, and presupposing an initial historical event, this is only meaningful from 
within the series of repetitions that always presuppose the origin and make it 
inaccessible in its founding character (since the original moment is, by 
definition, that which cannot be recovered). 
1' Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 64. 
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As a rite made up of mechanisms that are both aesthetic and religious in 
nature, sacrifice is the necessary requirement of any process of objectification, 
including the process of an aesthetic positing of objects. The duality of the 
subject-object structure relies on a breach operated on a previously unified 
continuity and sanctioned by the act of sacrifice. The positing of separate 
objects is for Bataille the first crime against the immanent continuity of the 
sacred world: this objectification is achieved by using objects, by assigning 
them an utility and thus transforming them into tools or instruments, instead of 
remaining just goods to be consumed. The sacred immanence of a relationship 
to change (objects at man's immediate disposal), is replaced by the 
subordination of change to duration (objects as perpetuators of the same, 
objects becoming useful, opening a breach in the continuity of change). 
Instrumental value is thus the origin of both objectification and detachment 
from immanent sacredness. It is for this reason that a price has to be paid to the 
divinity for this initial sacrilegous act of violence, and this is done through the 
ritual of sacrifice. " Sacrifice is the sanction that the profane world of 
instrumentality needs to subsist: objectification has to expiate its crime (has to 
For the purpose of this explanation, it is not necessary to distinguish here between the 
sacrificial offering of an inanimate object and that of an animate one: both belong in this 
context to the category of objects. Let us add that, under this view, a human sacrificial victim 
must be killed in order to ritually relinquish his or her objective quality, and this is what made 
the category of the slaves or the pharmacy particularly apt to provide sacrificial victims, since 
they had an almost unacknowledged human status. 
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be reconciled with the sacred) through a ritual relinquishing of its own essence 
which is at the same time a justification and a painful sanction. 
In sacrifice the object is posited in order to be destroyed, the individual 
solicited in order to die; killing and consumption restore the victim to boundless 
sacredness: 
the principle of sacrifice is destruction, but [... ] the destruction that 
sacrifice is intended to bring about is not annihilation. The thing - 
only the thing - is what sacrifice means to destroy in the victim. 
Sacrifice destroys an object's real ties of subordination; it draws the 
victim out of the world of utility and restores it to that of unintelligible 
caprice. 12 
Since sacrifice is the ritual restitution of an object to the original sacred realm of 
non-differentiation, sacrifice is also the inaugural moment of objectification: in 
this sense any process of objectification rests on an original sacrificial moment 
that, within a single representational structure, establishes a covenant between 
utility and sacredness, between the instrumental value of the individual object 
and the sacred continuity that it relinquishes. 
Representation within sacrifice appears thus tied to its condition of 
possibility; it depends on a lack of difference whose rupture has to be 
12 BatailleTheory of Religion, p. 43. 
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sanctioned by ritual: only when the tribute to the undifferentiated is 
acknowledged can representation and the positing of the object remain within 
the sacred sphere. What is more, only when the undifferentiated has been paid 
tribute to in ritual representation is it then revealed as sacred. If this mutual 
dependence is forgotten, if a process of representation and objectification can 
no longer be retraced to a sacrificial structure, then aesthetic activity moves 
from sacrifice to sacrilege, becoming a sinful or even a blasphemous activity. 
Some modern religions offer attitudes that can be interpreted according to this 
alleged distance: the Moslem prohibition regarding figurative representation, 
and the Protestant mistrust of ornament and visual display. The fact that in these 
instances aesthetic practice is charged with a negative religious value, in 
relation to dogmas that are central to each creed, corroborates the claim of an 
original link between the experience of sacredness and the secularising power of 
representation: representation is sensed to stand in an essential relation of 
opposition to the ecstatic, non-representational experience of sacredness, and 
the essential character of this opposition is already an index of a structure of 
dependence. 
Regarding sacrifice as the foundational structure of both sacredness and 
the aesthetic, the continuous sequence of ritual, myth and drama appears 
consistent. In relation to sacrificial rituals, myth is the first step towards the 
forgetting of the originary mutual dependence of continuity and objectification. 
Myth is always a narrative that conceals the dreadful power of undifferentiation 
and unrestrained forces through a system of differences; it is therefore an 
accentuation of the ritual positing of differences, although in myth there is a 
deliberate concealment of its own basis through a resort to order, narrativity, 
systematicity and clarity. However, this concealment cannot help acting as a 
revealing, and thus mythic narrative contains an essential ambiguity that echoes 
sacrifice's own doubleness. In this respect the image that Nietzsche offers in 
The Birth of Tragedy of the religion of classical Greece participates in the 
striving for clarity that betrays itself: 
the Greeks knew and felt the fears and horrors of existence: in order to 
be able to live at all they had to interpose the radiant dream-birth of the 
Olympians between themselves and those horrors [... ]. The same 
impulse that calls art into existence, the complement and apotheosis of 
existence, also created the Olympian world with which the Hellenic 
`will' held up a transfiguring mirror to itself 13 
Yet the Olympian world presupposes at its centre the obscurity that it covers 
and the suffering that it redeems. Chaos and undifferentiation are ascribed to 
the Titanic era by Olympian myths, but in a gesture that reveals a relationship 
more intimate than that of a sequential overcoming. 
But even myth's tentative disavowal of its obscure centre is openly 
destabilised by the mechanisms of tragic drama. In tragedy we are acquainted 
with the sacrificial origins of myth, for what tragedy portrays in frightful 
tension is the cultural order and the absence of differences; the terms of this 
13 Nietzsche, The Birth of Traged , pp. 22-3. 
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tension restate a sacrificial structure: human or heroic virtue (the Apolline 
clarity of the hero, in Nietzsche's vocabulary) ultimately has to pay a price to 
the powers of darkness when it becomes hybris. However, the development of 
the tragic plot rests not on a closure but on a dramatic questioning of order; in 
other words, on a questioning of mythic narratives that traces them back to an 
inaugural moment of instability. By showing the genealogy of myths, tragedy 
makes apparent the link between them and the institution of sacrifice. Myths 
appear thus as the necessary consequence of an overcoming of chaos and 
continuity through a ritual pact with them: mythical narrative is the 
consequence of the sacrificial structure of objectification. On the other hand, 
the dynamicity of tragedy questions the stability of mythical narrative and thus 
restores it to the ambiguity that was present at its original moment of 
engenderment: in the sacrificial moment. 
[... ] Tragedy is by its very nature a partial deciphering of mythological 
motifs. The poet brings the sacrificial crisis back to life; he pieces 
together the scattered fragments of reciprocity and balances elements 
thrown out of kilter in the process of being 'mythologised'. 14 
That is, what constitutes the dramatic plot is a deliberate erasing of differences 
that traces the mythic tales back to an origin of non-differentiation, to a 
`sacrificial crisis' that then appears with all its dreadful power. 
14 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 64-65 
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Whether this original moment, previous to the institution of sacrifice 
and the subsequent elaboration of myths, is a moment in history or in a 
conceptual chain, does not seem to throw any light on the issue. Girard often 
refers to this moment ('reciprocal violence' or `sacrificial crisis' in his 
terminology, `Titanic world' in Nietzsche's) as an actual state of affairs of a 
community's past history. What characterises this origin, however, is an 
indeterminacy with respect to its qualification as fact or speculation, and yet a 
necessary relation to actuality; the question of whether what is being referred 
here is an actual event (rather than just a theoretical moment in a chain of 
reasoning) is essentially unsolvable and yet has to remain open for the very 
concepts to retain their force: such is the logic of the eliciting of the absolute 
origin; 'could the condition of possibility of actuality have been actual in some 
distant past? ' is a paradoxical question that in this context may remain posited 
and unanswered. 
The space of unrestrained force that this original moment inhabits, 
before sacrifice's covenant and its mythic elaboration, is the space of 
dissolution that the Dionysiac element in tragedy constitutes for Nietzsche. This 
space can only be properly called Dionysiac (and not Titanic, for example) 
when it has been transfigured by the sacrificial structure that tragedy at once 
questions and unveils as myth's ambiguous basis. 
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The internal link between sacrifice and theatricality, shown to be within 
sacrifice's own original structure and also in the re-elaborations of classic tragic 
drama, re-appears at the birth of the modem European dramatic tradition. Our 
own tradition of play-writing springs from the theatricality of medieval 
representations of Christ's Passion: the central sacrificial mystery of 
Christianity as dramatic matter shows then a continuity with a classic literary 
tradition that would seem otherwise to be fully interrupted. '5 
3.3. The Representational Disambiguation of the Sacred 
The original experience of the sacred is essentially ambiguous: sacredness is 
both seen as a dreadful power and a venerable force. It is easy to associate these 
mixed conceptions to an originary experience of the forces of nature: nature is 
both perceived as the original mother and the obstacle for the unfolding of 
human possibilities. The same ambiguity is to be found in what within the 
human realm reproduces the destructive power of nature: in human violence. 
For Girard, violence retains the double quality of what destructs and pacifies: 
reciprocal violence, based on a pattern of reprisal, threatens with total 
destruction, whereas ritual violence acts as the only effective pacifying 
mechanism. 
Ir, See in this respect, Nietzsche's lucid comment on Shakespeare in 1.4. above. 
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For Bataille, the continuity in which sacredness places us is both a 
dreadful dissolution of our human essence and a lost intimacy that we long to 
recover, in an attempt to reconcile ourselves with the authenticity that we 
perceive our own animality to be: 
[... ] the animal accepted the immanence that submerged it without 
apparent protest, whereas man feels a kind of impotent horror in the 
sense of the sacred. This horror is ambiguous. 16 
And the ambiguity of sacredness itself spreads to what propitiates it, be it the 
surrogate victim, the Greek pharmakos or the actual sacrificial victim. Oedipus, 
as a stereotype of the surrogate victim, becomes an ambivalent figure: 
the mysterious union of the most evil and the most beneficial forces is 
of vital concern to the community, and can neither be challenged nor 
ignored [... ]. The beneficial Oedipus at Colonus supersedes the earlier, 
evil Oedipus, but he does not negate him. [... ] If Oedipus is indeed the 
savior of the community, it is because he is a patricidal and incestuous 
son. 17 
Similarly the pharmakos, a social outcast belonging to a reservoir of sacrificial 
victims, is covered by a veil of ambivalence: 
16 Bataille, Theory of Religion. p. 36. 
17 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 86. 
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[... ] the pharmakos, like Oedipus himself, has a dual connotation. On 
the one hand he is a woebegone figure, an object of scorn who is also 
weighed down with guilt; a butt for all sorts of gibes, insults, and of 
course, outbursts of violence. On the other hand, we find him 
surrounded by a quasi-religious aura of veneration: he has become a 
sort of cult object. '8 
Let us remember that the very term pharmakon, as Girard points out, means 
both medicine and poison, as well as an enchanted potion. 
Between these opposites (violence-peace, scornful-venerable, medicine- 
poison), a continuity is reproduced again in the ancient Chorybantic rites, which 
claimed to cure madness precisely by an intensification of the disease's 
symptoms. 19 In this context, an account of Christian redemption through 
Christ's sacrifice, such as the one provided by T. S. Eliot in `East Coker', shows 
its debt to ancient religious views: 
Our only health is the disease 
If we obey the dying nurse 
Whose constant care is not to please 
But to remind of our, and Adam's curse, 
" Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 95. 
19 See Erwin Rhode, Psi"rhe: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Imnortaliti among the Greeks, 
trans. W. B. Hillis (London: Routledge, 1925 (r. 1950)), pp. 286-7. 
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And that, to be restored, our sickness must grow worse. 20 
Modern notions of sacredness normally lose sight of this original ambiguity, of 
this continuity between good and evil. The notion of holiness, for example, 
already relies on a disambiguation and therefore on an implicit sacrificial 
structure. Even more so in the case of an elaborate notion of holiness, such as 
that of Rudolf Otto, according to whom what is holy is identified with what 
remains essentially other. 21 Here the holy is restored its mysterious and frightful 
aspect, but in its being essentially alien to human constitution it differs from an 
original sacredness that is also felt through human violence and animality. 
The fluidity between the natural and the human realm affects the 
distinction between natural and spiritual evil. Natural disasters are given a 
religious significance, and those range from floods to epidemics. Indeed, the 
model of contagion is used as a pattern to discern between pure and impure: the 
notions of contact, continuity and intimacy carry negative connotations; 
impurity is associated with an indiscriminate spreading, with a levelling off of 
differences. Yet the positing of differences, the sacrificial act, itself belongs to 
the continuity that is both exorcised and paid tribute to. It is in this sense that 
sacrifice constitutes an intensification of the disease, an accentuation that only 
by virtue of its ritual and representational components is able to operate a 
20 T. S. Eliot. 'East Coker' V, in Collected Poems, pp. 201-2. 
21 See Rudolf Otto, The Idea o1 the Holy, trans. J. W. Harvey (Oxford University Press, 1923 
(rpt. 1936)). 
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transformation upon an otherwise inescapable impurity. After the sacrificial act 
the victim becomes an object of worship, and contact with the victim is sought 
as much as before it was avoided; most categories undergo a reversal: impure 
becomes pure, contagious becomes curative, and dreadful becomes desirable. 
Even if still presupposing and paying tribute to continuity, sacrifice is the act in 
relation to which distinctions are drawn. The same elements have a propitious 
or unpropitious nature depending on whether they are before or after, within of 
without sacrifice: the blood of murder is different from ritual blood, and this 
also has to do with a system of images for which the colour and texture of 
coagulated blood is already tinted with impurity. The disambiguation that 
sacrifice operates is only possible thanks to mechanisms that lie at the basis of 
aesthetic reproduction: because sacrificial ritual involves substitution, mimesis, 
representation and repetition, the original doubleness of sacredness can be 
surpassed, even if revealed as a condition of this surpassing. 
Therefore, the clue for an understanding of sacrifice is not only its 
mimetic character (emphasised by Girard), but also how the representational 
aspects appear as part of a fluidity that renders them contingent, always 
dependent on the non-difference that they hide. In sacrifice mimesis (the 
miming of an original moment, of a sacrificial crisis) seems to play as important 
a role as methexis, participation (the insertion in public theatricality). This 
duality of process, that once again yields to analogy with Nietzsche's scheme of 
aesthetic forces, characterises sacrifice as the inaugural aesthetic moment 
because of the inclusion of its own impossibility, because of its constitutive and 
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yet never fully realisable tendency to become something other than itself (a 
successful mimetic mirroring or a means of full communion): in establishing an 
impossible reconciliation between representation and its source it renders the 
movement of representation infinite. 
3.4. The Sacrificial Questioning and Setting of Boundaries 
Since in sacrifice objects are solicited in order to be destroyed, and victims in 
order to die, the boundaries that sacrifice creates are only such in the showing of 
their own futility and illusory character. The setting of boundaries is essentially 
tied to a questioning of boundaries, to a revealing of their illusory nature; yet 
after the ritual sanction, after the sacrificial acknowledgement of the illusoriness 
of boundaries, the world of objects and individuals is legitimised. As long as 
sacrifice is re-enacted, it is permissible to reduce objects to their use and 
individuals to their autonomous subjectivity: sacrifice as the tribute to 
continuity perpetuates the link between the boundaries of everyday experience 
and the boundaries rendered illusory in the ritual, and thus the world of 
everyday manipulation and social interaction is granted a sacred sanction. The 
doubleness of the notion of sanction already refers to the legitimising power of 
sacrifice: sanction as penalty is also sanction as validation (sacrifice as 
grounding is also sacrifice as questioning, as renouncement). The only 
legitimising sanction for the world of discontinuous objects and individuals has 
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to come from a ritual relinquishing of their own status as such. Making use 
again of Nietzschean terminology, the Apolline world of well defined edges 
arises as an artistic response to the original terror before the `tyranny of the 
real', and its illusory status is revealed on the tragic stage, where through a 
sacrificial deciphering of the myths heroic virtue is shown in all its futility. 
Therefore, the loss of boundaries in sacrifice (or rather the questioning 
of boundaries that is the condition of their own legitimacy) runs parallel to a 
loss of the self. The illusory nature of the boundaries of the individual is the 
same as that of the boundaries of objects. The restitution of the victim to 
sacredness through its death dissolves the objective quality of the victim, not 
only by destroying the victim's ties to the objectifying world of labour (in the 
case of the sacrifice of a slave or of animals used in farming), but also by 
destroying the boundaries that characterise the victim as a separate entity. 
Moreover, by virtue of the ritual mechanisms of participation, the death of the 
victim is also experienced by the participants, in so far as they identify 
themselves with the victim: 
if one describes the individual in the operation of sacrifice , he is 
defined by anguish. But if sacrifice is distressing, the reason is that the 
individual takes part in it. The individual identifies with the victim in 
the sudden movement that restores it to immanence (to intimacy) 
LL 
22 Bataille, Theoi-v of Religion, p. 51. 
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And this process of identification is again analogous to the spectator's 
identification with the fallen hero of tragic drama, which is in turn a recalling of 
the ritual loss of the self involved in Dionysiac experience. The self is dissolved 
in order to escape the world of utility and discontinuous objects, of `thinghood', 
and return to the realm of boundless sacredness: 
[... ] the assimilation that is linked to the return to immanence is 
nonetheless based on the fact that the victim is the thing, just as the 
sacrificer is the individual. The separate individual is of the same 
nature as the thing, or rather the anxiousness to remain personally alive 
that establishes the person's individuality is linked to the integration of 
existence into the world of things. 23 
It is precisely a questioning of the boundaries of selfhood, of its unitary 
I1; t character, wt onstitutes one of the fundamental traits of the exploration of(-,, 
/ 
t 
inner experience that Modernist literature carries out. It is then not surprising 
that the structure that legitimises this breaking loose of the world of subjective 
experience is shown with some level of explicitness: both in Joyce's A Portrait 
of the Artist and in Eliot's Four Quartets we find a sacrificial structure around 
which the texts revolve. 
In A Portrait of the Artist the Christian ritual of the Eucharist is 
constantly referred to in connection with both Stephen's personal experience of 
23 Bataille, Theorv of Religion, p. 51. 
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religion (e. g. his associations at the time of his first communion) and his 
conscious rejection of religious bonds (e. g. his refusal to make his Easter duty). 
However, the sacrifice that the novel most clearly points to is that of Stephe 
/i 
himself, or rather, that of his own individuality. Even though there is no 
resolution within the story, the tensions that Stephen's enhanced selfhood 
generate in relation to his artistic views call for a sacrificial resolution. This is 
already foreshadowed in the narrative, when in the episode by the river, Stephen 
is called `Bous Stephaneforos' by his schoolmates; 24 Stephen, form the Greek 
stephanos means wreath, garland, and hence the image of Stephen as an ox 
garlanded for sacrifice (a bous stephanephoros). 25 The immediate context does 
not throw any light on this association, but the novel as a whole does. 
In Four Quartets, the centrality of sacrificial structure begins to be 
apparent in the importance assigned to the mystery of the Incarnation. This 
becomes for Eliot the point of intersection of timelessness and time, as the 
answer to a speculative exploration of the experience of time that runs through 
the poems. Then, the motif of God's Incarnation in Christ is deployed in 
relation to its intended sacrificial end: Christ's Passion carries within the poems 
24 See Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 182. 
25 (Iioüc aTECpavE(popoq) For an alternative interpretation, see David Weir, `Epiphanoumenon', 
in James Jo_1"c c Quurterlv, vol. 31 no. 2. Winter 1994, p. 55. 
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the resonances of an intoxicating sacrifice (as shown in the fragment from `East 
Coker' quoted above, in 3.3). 
What the allusions to sacrificial acts ultimately confirm is the originary 
sacrificial structure at the origin of a dissolution of boundaries, and in particular 
of the boundaries of the individual self. The Modernist exploration of an inner 
experience no longer circumscribed to subjectivity manifestly shows in these 
two instances the ancient mechanisms that make it possible. 
3.5. The Sacrificial Questioning of Identity 
A question of the self eventually involves a questioning of identity, since the ý, ; ,; 
h ; 
stability of entities that remain identical to themselves reflects and is reflected 
in the unitary character of an `I' (or an 'eye') that surveys them. G. Bataille 
establishes a sequence and interdependence between the positing of the object 
(as instrument), the positing of the self as object and the positing of identity 
itself. For an object to be no more than what it is, the self cannot be other than 
itself, and ultimately nothing more than a unitary, self-identical consciousness. 
Sacrifice both disrupts and makes possible this correspondence between 
the self-identity of consciousness and that of its objects. The principle of 
sacrifice is precisely the breaking of the boundaries that guarantee identity: 
objects and individualities are revealed to be in excess of themselves, to be more 
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than what they are, and hence their essential link to the obscurity of otherness. 
26 
The irrecuperable surplus that constitutes the sacred character of objects and 
individualities is broken loose by the removal of the illusory boundaries of their 
own identities. Yet again, in the double movement that characterises sacrifice, 
this removal is precisely the sacred sanction that the thinking of identity needs 
to continue its development with legitimacy. Just as the ground for 
objectification involved a price to be paid to the sacred realm of non- 
objectification for the violence exerted on it, now the legitimisation of identity 
analogically relies on a price to be paid to the world of excess. 
The transition from a thought of non-identity to a thought of identity (to 
one that has been legitimised by a sacrificial process) can be illuminated by a 
consideration of the philosophical statements of Heraclitus. Heraclitus' direct 
engagement with an erasing of differences, with a thinking of the flux that is 
also a flux of thinking, bears the resonances of what Girard calls a `sacrificial 
crisis', that is, a dissolution of the sacrificial structure: 
26 In this ultimate push to the logic of sacrifice, I am forced to privilege scrutiny over 
intelligibility, and thus use expressions as paradoxical as 'things that are more than what they 
are', or 'selves that are in excess of themselves'. I hope that the lack of clarity of this section 
shows precisely how difficult and dangerous it is to scrutinise the logic of sacrifice with an 
instrument that falls somehow outside its domain: the intelligibility of language. 
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the fifth fragment of Heraclitus quite clearly deals with the decay of 
sacrificial rites, with their inability to purify what is impure. Religious 
beliefs are compromised by the decadent state of the ritual [... ]. 27 
Heraclitus' thought participates in this erasing of differences previous to the 
effectiveness of sacrifice, being aware of the precariousness of the structuring 
power of sacrificial structure. Girard, talking of his own enquiry into the 
fundamental mechanisms of the ritual, tells us: 
Heraclitus, who has been called the `philosopher of tragedy' and who 
has equal claim to the title `philosopher of myth' seems to have been 
on the track of the same structuring force I am now pursuing. 28 
27 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 43. Heraclitus' fragment, in Diels' edition, reads: 
xaOaipovTaI S' äXXo ai ta'n µtatvö vot otov d 'rtq Eiq mqX v Eµßäc in1X of 
ättovicot'ro. µaivE&Oau 6' äv 60KOill, d 'rtS avtÖv ävOpd itcov Entcppc« onto oiTw 
itoteovtia. Kai 'rol; äyäkµaat Sý tiov'cýotaty £üxov'rat, OKOLOV £1 TLS SOS. owi. 
XF-(YxrjV I)Oiio, Ob it y1. Vd)c Kcov BEovS ovb' r`jpwas oi'rtVE; Eißt 
(Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 1, Zürich/Berlin: 
Weidmannsche, 1952 (r. 1964), pp. 151-2). Cf. English version in Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to 
The Presocratic Philosophers (Oxford: Basil Blacwell, 1948 (rpt. 1962)), p. 25: 'they purify 
themselves by staining themselves with other blood, as if one were to step into mud in order to 
wash off mud. But a man would be thought mad if any of his fellow men should perceive him 
acting thus. Moreover, they talk to these statues ((? f theirs) as if one were to hold conversation 
with houses, in his ignorance of the nature of both gods and heroes'. For Heraclitus as the 'tragic 
philosopher', see Nietzsche, Vachgelassene Fragmente, in KGW 111.3, fragment 5[94], p. 122. 
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Thus Heraclitus' engagement with contradiction and change (as a discourse of 
non-identity) is a form of questioning of an established religious structure that 
lays the basis for a thought of identity. 
But the need for constant re-enactment of this foundational moment 
cannot help bringing about a qualitatively different structure; the ancient 
legitimisation of identity has its sequel in the modern forms of sacrifice, and 
more precisely, in the two sacrificial moments that bear the weight of the 
modern edifice of rationality and identity-thinking: the sacrifices of Socrates 
and Christ. In these two moments (Socrates' self-inflicted death and Christ's 
redemptive Passion), the structure of sacrifice makes a definitive step, and 
moves from sacrifice of the self to self-sacrifice, in an accentuation that lies 
parallel to the accentuation of the pretensions of the rationality that these two 
figures inaugurate, as the double figure of ontotheology. 
At this point in the history of theory (not in the history of facts), identity 
thinking proper is born, due to the radical claims of transcendence, infinity and 
truth that Jean-Luc Nancy ascribes to these violent deaths: 
Western sacrifice is already infinite in being self-sacrifice, in being 
universal, and in revealing the spiritual truth of all sacrifice. But it is - 
and must be - infinite also insofar as it reabsorbs the finite moment of 
2" Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 88. 
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sacrifice itself and thus in so far as it must, logically, sacrifice itself as 
sacrifice in order to accede to its truth. 29 
The intensification of the sacrificial structure that Socrates and Christ's 
sacrifice carry out destroys its own logic with its radicality: we have here not 
only a sacrifice of the self (of the identity of the victim with itself), but also a 
self-sacrifice (the victim is also the sacrificer) that turns upon itself with such a 
violence as to sacrifice the very act of sacrifice. The result of all this puzzling 
reflexivity is precisely the most efficient grounding of the respectability of 
identity-thinking, by virtue of a mechanism that in its radicalisation negates its 
own structure. The claims of universality, infinity and truth could have only 
been associated with this modern mechanism, which disavows itself from its 
predecessors through the reflexivity of intensification. For this reason Socrates 
and Christ are often taken to be, in many respects, the last sacrificial victims, 
29 Jean-Luc Nancy, `The Unsacrificeable', trans. Richard Livingston, in Yale French Studies no. 
79: Literature and the Ethical Question, (Yale University Press, 1991), p. 24. Nancy's article 
treats extensively the possibility of finding in the Nazi holocaust the traits of a sacrificial 
structure, which he finally does not concede. Even so, the fact that a close link can be 
established between the theoretical exploration of the origins of Western culture and the actual 
historical disintegration of that culture (together with others) through a world war, must warn us 
of the dangers of extracting conclusions out of this theoretical domain. I would also like to state 
here that, in my view, the misinterpretation and appropria n of Nietzsche's thought by Fascist 
10 
ideologies was illegitimate even in terms of intellectual rigour, but also in these terms not 
entirely groundless, given the richness, the openness and the dangers that Nietzsche's text still 
contains. 
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and indeed they were in that they unveiled the uselessness of the sacrificial rites 
of their respective religions. They also try to fix the dynamicity of sacrifice, the 
elusive moment of appropriation, by a resort to the infinity of truth: theirs tries 
to be the last sacrifice in its being the definitive `appropriation, by means of the 
transgression of the finite, of the infinite truth of the finite [... ]' 30 
The newness that this gesture claims for itself is also expressed in a new 
mimetic structure (with the consequence of a resistance to methexis), and in an 
attempt at sublation. In the structure of mimesis inherent to the ancient sacrifice 
(explored in 3.2. ), the modern sacrifice (or rather the sacrifice that founds 
Modernity) introduces a breach, that J. -L. Nancy terms a `mimetic rupture': 
the ancient sacrifice is reproduced - up to a certain point - in its 
form or its scheme; but it is reproduced so as to reveal an entirely new 
content, a truth hitherto hidden or misunderstood, if not perverted. 31 
The system of resemblances and substitutions of the sacrificial structure is now 
turned into the dual structure of form and hidden truth, giving place to the 
inauguration of a radical form of mimesis. It is then not surprising that modern 
sacrifice finds a great difficulty in relating its theatrical and representational 
30 Nancy, `The unsacrificeable', p. 25. 
;1 Nancy. `The Unsacrificeable', p. 21. 
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aspects to an original absence of boundaries conceptualised as participation 
(methexis): 
shouldn't we ask ourselves [... ] whether, when Western thought insists 
on denouncing the simulacrum of the 'old' sacrifice, and on presenting 
the new sacrifice as the 'true' mimesis [... ] of the other, it does not 
betray an incapacity, or a refusal, to touch on methexis [... ] ? 32 
Finally, these new forms of sacrifice constitute an attempt at a sublation of the 
ancient sacrificial logic. The solid basis of a world of predictable regularities (of 
entities that remain identical with themselves), which is the parallel to a world 
of individual subjectivities, could only be granted by a gesture that tries to re- 
appropriate infinitely the flux that lies behind the positing of identity. Only thus 
could truth and universality result from a ritual structure: 
sacrifice as self-sacrifice, universal sacrifice, truth, and sublation of 
sacrifice, is itself the institution of the absolute economy of absolute 
subjectivity, which can only mimic (in the pejorative sense) a passage 
32 Nancy, `The Unsacrificeable', p. 26, note 12. This structure seems to have lost , therefore, an 
essential dimension of the ancient sacrifice: the tension between pipq ns and pEO& LS, 
representation and participation, and it i 
/s 
in this difference that it tries to be foundational for ; ýý 
Modernity, just as Socrates tried to do away with Greek religion by enacting himself a pseudo- 
religious rite to which his impiety had led him. This explains why Socrates is for Nietzsche, 
among other things, the main culprit in the disappearance of the religious and aesthetic tension 
between the Dionysiac and the Apolline. 
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through negativity, from which, symmetrically, it cannot but 
reappropriate or trans-appropriate itself infinitely. 33 
An his infinite re-appropriation within this single moment sublates the partial dI 
o ndational moments of all past sacrificial acts. 
Nevertheless, the breach between the ancient and the new sacrifice is not 
as conclusive as it appears to be, and the attempt at closure of ontotheology's 
foundation carries its own failure because of the inescapable logic of sacrifice to 
which, after all is subjected. In so far as Socrates' and Christ's are still 
sacrifices, since "sublation is ultimately incapable of knowing what is truly 
involved in repetition and mimesis, and so in sacrifice", 34 their sacrifices 
remain essentially linked to the ancient ones, restating an interplay of obscurity 
and clarity, of identity and flux, that trespasses the history of modern rationality 
throughout. 
The claims of a definitive revealing or a final accomplishment are vain 
within the logic of sacrifice (even of self-sacrifice), which is governed by the 
aesthetic mechanisms of representation and repetition. Nancy tells us of `the 
slow displacement, the long drifting, that led Bataille to denounce the theatre of 
sacrifice and consequently to renounce its successful accomplishment'. 
35 
33 Nancy, `The Unsacrificeable', p. 27. 
34 Nancy, `The Unsacrificeable', p. 27. 
35 Nancy, The Unsacrificeable', p. 21. 
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Accomplishment and closure can only be grounded on sacrifice, but are always 
rendered illusory in the uncovering of this grounding. Sacrifice reveals as it 
conceals, but can never come to a close in its revealing or concealing; 
conversely, a process of demystification loses its sacrificial origin as soon as it 
comes to a conclusion, and thus casts a shadow upon its own validity: 
[... ] our penetration and demystification of the system necessarily 
coincides with the disintegration of that system. The act of 
demystification retains a sacrificial quality and remains essentially 
religious in character for at least as long as it fails to come to a 
conclusion. 36 
Thus modern sacrifice, with all its attempted closure, remains tied to an ancient 
continuity that stretches beyond itself. And we can find, even in these self- 
sacrifices that are taken to be the foundation of ontotheology, the inescapable 
ancient traits that run against the secularising force that they also contain. 
3.6. The Christian Sacrifice of God 
So far we have assumed an essential kinship between Pagan and Christian 
sacrifice, in opposition to the idea of a true foundational status in Socrates and 
Christ's sacrifice, but perhaps this is the moment to explore some of the 
36 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 24. 
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differences, specially if we keep in mind that for the aesthetic tradition which 
springs from Nietzsche and that we will find in Modernist writing, this kinship 
was far from clear. Let us then pay attention to one of the crucial points of 
Nietzsche's engagement with the sacrificial character of Christianity, indeed 
probably his most celebrated dictum on Christianity: aphorism 125 of The Gay 
Science, the proclamation of the 'death of God', and let us also listen to the lucid 
and unorthodox commentary that Rene Girard offers on this aphorism. 37 
Nietzsche's 
/ty4ads: 
The madman. - Have you not heard of that madman who in a clear 
morning lit a lantern, run to the marketplace and kept on shouting: 'I'm 
looking for God! I'm looking for God!. ' Since at the ime there stood 
many of those who didn't believe in God, he gave rise to a burst of 
laughter. 'Is he then missing? ', said one of them. 'Has he got lost like a 
child? ' said another one. 'Or does he keep himself hidden`? Is he afraid 
of us? Has he taken a boat and emigrated? ' - Thus they shouted and 
laughed all at once. The madman jumped in the middle of them and 
pierced them with his gaze: Where has he gone? ' , he cried. 'I will tell 
you! We have killed him, - you and me! We are all his murderers! 
But, how could we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave 
us the sponge to blur the horizon? What did we do, as we severed this 
Earth from its Sun? Where is she going now? Where are we going? To 
ý! 
ýý ýýýfý 
J, 
37 See Rene Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur dans la pensee de Nietzsche', in Paul Dumouchel 
(ed. ), t 7olence et verite aoutur de Rene Girard: Colloque de Cerisy (Paris: Grasset et 
Fasquelle, 1985), pp. 597-613. Translated as violence and Truth (London: Athlone, 1987). 1 
ha,, e preferred to use my own translations for the quotations from this article. 
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the absence of any sun? Are we not perpetually falling? And 
backwards, sidewards, forward, toward all directions? Is there still an 
'above' and a below'? Are we not wandering like through an endless 
nothingness? Does not the vacuum blow on us? Is it not getting colder? 
Does not the night come continuously, and ever longer? Do we not 
need to 'ýp lanterns in the morning? Do we not hear the noise of the 
gravediggers who bury God? Do we not smell God's putrefaction`? 
gods rot too! God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! 
The holiest and the mightiest being which the world has had so far, he 
has bled under our knives. - Who cleans us of this blood? What water 
will purify us? What expiatory festivals, what sacred games will we 
have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must 
we not become gods ourselves so that we appear worthy before him? 
There was never a greater deed, - and all those who will be born after 
us will belong, because of this deed, to a greater history than any 
history so far. [... ]i38 
Y, /, ýv / 
38 Der tolle Mensch. - Habt ihr nicht von jenem tollen Menschen gehört, der am hellen 
Vormittage eine Laterne anzündete, auf den Markt lief und unaufhörlich schrie: 'Ich suche Gott! 
Ich suche Gott! ' - Dadort gerade Viele von Denen zusammen standen, welche nicht an Gott 
glaubten, so erregte er ein grosses Gelächter. Ist er den verloren gegangen? sagte der Eine. Hat 
er sich verlaufen wie ein Kind? sagte der Andere. Oder hält er sich versteckt? Fürchtet er sich 
vor uns? Ist er zu Shiff gegangen? ausgewandert? - so schrieen und lachten sie ducheinander. 
Der tolle Mensch sprang mitten unter sie und durchbohrte sie mit seinen Blicken. 'Wohin ist 
Gott'? rief er, ich will es euch sagen! Wir haben ihn getödtet, - ihr und ich! Wir Alle sind seine 
Mörder! Aber wie haben wir diess gemacht? Wie vermochten wei das Meer auszutrinken? Wer 
gab uns den Schwamm, urn den ganzen Horizont wegzuwischen? Was thaten wir, als wir diese 
Erde von ihrer Sonne losketteten'' Wohin bewegt sie sich nun'? Wohin bewegen wir uns. ' Fort 
von allen Sonnen'' Stürzen wir nicht fortwährend? Und rückwärts, seitwärts. vorwärts, nach 
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Previous statements made in this chapter are corroborated when Girard 
compares Nietzsche's aphorism with the texture of myth, ritual and Greek 
tragedy, in so far as the aphorism contains the description of the chaotic 
absence of differences: 
Within our aphorism, the very ghost of a centre has disappeared. This 
state of affairs renders our aphorism very similar to myths, rituals and 
Greek tragedy. Everywhere, in the primitive texts, the collective 
murder is associated with the mingling of day and night, heavens and 
earth, gods, men and animals. Monsters proliferate. Everything begins 
with the abolition of differences: the monstruous twins, the 'evil 
allen Seiten? Giebt es noch ein Oben und ien Unten? Irren wir nicht wie durch ein unendliches 
Nichts? Haucht uns nicht der leere Raum an? Ist es nicht kälter geworden? Kommt nicht 
immerfort die Nacht und mehr Nacht? Müssen nicht Laternen am Vormittage angezündet 
werden? Hören wir noch Nichts von dem Lärm der Todtengräber, welche Gott begraben? 
Riechen wir noch Nichts von den göttlichen Verwesung? - auch Götter verwesen! Gott ist 
todt! Gott bleibt todt! Un wir haben ihn getödtet! Wie trösten wir uns, die Mörder aller Mörder? 
Das Heiligste und Mächtisgste, was die Welt bisher besass, es ist unter unseren Messern 
verblutet, - wer wischt diess Blut von uns ab? Mit welchem Wasser Könnten wir uns reinigen? 
Welche Sühnfeiern, welche heiligen Spiele weden wir erfinden müssen? Ist nicht die Grösse 
dieser zu gross für uns. Müssen wir nicht selber zu Göttern werden, um nur ihrer würdig zu 
erscheinen? Es gab nie eine grössere That, - und wer nur immer nach uns geboren wird. gehört 
um dieser That willen in eine höhere Geschichte, als alle Geschichte bisher war'. (F. Nietzsche, 
Die Fröhliche ff issenschaft [The Gay Science]. in KGW, Vol. V. 2, pp. 158-159. My 
translation. ) 
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mixture' [in English in the original] of Shakespeare: the blending from 
which it is convenient to differ. 39 
This state of chaos which Girard refers to as the 'sacrificial crisis' previous to 
the ritual, occurs after the death of God. Is this not a sacrifice, a ritual, then? Is 
Nietzsche's death of God essentially different from Christ's Passion, which is 
undeniably a ritual sacrifice? Is this difference the reason why Modernity 
becomes a 'waste land'? This could be the case, if Nietzsche's prounouncement 
did not, in effect, correspond to the recording of a sacrifice. As shown in 
previous sections, the violence of sacrifice is at the centre of the establishing of 
boundaries and the legitimisation of identity, and therefore puts an end to the 
chaotic world through an engagement with representation. Girard, although 
tentatively, corroborates this: 
To treat as a fixed idea the mechanism of the scapegoat seems to me 
fair in so far as it fixes all ideas. That idea itself, however, does not 
owe its power of fixation but to the fact of existing under the form of 
the sacred, in other words, of not being totally an idea. Without this 
absence of idea, there is no coherent 'system of representation', no 
stable structure. Everything drifts according to the convenience of the 
sacrificial crisis [... ]. Should we search for the engine of all symbolicity 
in the effect of the scapegoat? 40 
39 Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur', p. 604. My emphasis. 
"' Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur', p. 597. 
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Perhaps we should, as it seems only proper that the stability of representation 
had its centre in a vacuum, just as the Dionysiac groundlessness was for 
Nietzsche the source of form. But is Nietzsche talking about, or even enacting, 
a sacrifice in The Gay Science? We know of his reverence for the ritual of 
sacrifice, and we know how, retrospectively, he conceived of The Birth of 
Tragedy as an offer to the sea of excess: 
Many strange and not undangerous spirits have crossed my path, too, 
but above all he of whom I was speaking just now, and he again and 
again, namely, no less a one that the god Dionysus, that great 
ambiguous one and tempter god to whom I once offered, as you know, 
in all secrecy and reverence, my first born - as the last, it seems to 
me, who offered him a sacrifice: for I have found no one who 
understood what ' as doing then 41 0/1 -L 
41 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §295, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, New York: Vintage 
Press, 1966, pp. 234-235. [So sind auch mir manche seltsame und nicht ungefährliche Geister 
über den Weg gelaufen, vor allem aber der, von dem ich eben sprach, und dieser immer wieder, 
kein Geringerer nämlich als der Gott Dionysos, jener große Zweideutige und Versucher-Gott, 
dem ich einstmals, wie ihr wißt, in aller Heimlichkeit und Ehrfurcht meine Erstlinge dargebracht 
habe-als der Letzte, wie mir scheint, der ihm ein Opfer dargebracht hat: denn ich fand keinen, 
der es verstanden hätte, was ich damals tat. (Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von gut und böse. 
§295, in Nietzsches 66 er-ke in drei Bänden, ed. by Karl Schlechta, vol. 11, Munich: Carl Hamser, 
1952, p. 754. ] 
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And do we understand what the madman is doing in The Gay Science? Let us 
notice that the emphasis on 'Go t' has displaced many of the other 
important statements that the aphorism contains: not only the poetic recreation 
on the description of a non-differentiated world, but also the fact that there are 
culprits for God's death, and that we are those culprits; this is, if not a sacrifice, 
at least a collective murder.: 
f-, ý/ 
/ 1? ij/ 
Nobody has ever derived from this tOtx the collective murder. I take ýý x 
hold of it and, in less time than a psychoanalyst needs to say 'Oedipus 
complex', here it is, such as the head of John the Baptist on its silver 
tray. This is not a success, but a fatality. If I tried to take out of the 
aphorism the countless surprising things that our colleagues take, I 
would regretfully fail. Collective murder follows me like my own 
shadow. 42 
Thus here the emphasis is displaced to us as murderers, as accomplices of a 
collective killing. This renders the textual reperc ions of this aphorism S 
throu ut history rather questionable, and makes us revise our own 
interpretations. Was this not then the definitive announcement of the 
desacralisation of the modem world and the disenchantment of nature? Was it 
not the revealing of the vacuity of authority and tradition? What do we have to 
add now to our interpretations of this pronouncement? 
42 Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur', p. 601. 
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this does not add anything, but it changes the sense of the text 
completely. The formula 'God is dead' has enjoyed and always enjoys 
an extraordinary success within our universe. This formula is endowed 
with such a powerful virtue that many successors of Nietzsche - but, 
are they really Nietzsche's successors? - get hold of it every day and 
canalise it through new domains so that they can make a name for 
themselves among men. 43 
Girard then adopts an ironic distance from the pompous tone of the 
consequences that our modernity has drawn out of this pronouncement: 
this tactic has produced spectacular results for a long time. Thanks to 
it, metaphysics is dead. We have all kept watch over it by its bedside. 
We have been in mourning for the whole of philosophy. And since 
around 1890, in each generation, we have informed in a solemn manner 
that man himself is dead. Each time, the sensation is enormous. Truth 
has been dead for a long time, and shortly after fashion. I have said 
myself that the death of God is in process of dying, and without doubt, 
I am in the process of repeating it. Nobody escapes the uncomfortable 
feeling of these funerary announcements. 44 
And it has been in order to veil the capacity to generate resonances and 
uncomfortable feelings by this aphorism that `Nietzsche is taken as the great 
prophet of the natural death of God. 45 God dies not as the consequence of a 
43 Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur', p. 601. 
44 Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur', p. 601. 
45 Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur', p. 602. 
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murderous act of which we are all guilty, but as the consequence of the passing 
of time, of progress, of the advent of Enlightenment and Modernity: 
For Enlightenment philosophy, God cannot die but a natural death. 
Once the naive period of humanity is over, the religious ceases to be 
'credible', as it is said nowadays. Rationalistic optimism has been 
regarded as dead for a long time, victim of the epidemic caused by the 
death of God. In fact, this optimism survives in the idea itself of a God 
that dies of senile exhaustion. This first idea presupposes a second: 
modern atheism is more reasonable than previous religion. 46 
But it is precisely in the last tract of our Modernity (we could even say, in the 
waste land that Modernism beholds) that this death is more acutely felt as a 
crisis: 
one is tempted to conclude that we are dealing with a 'more radical' 
version of the crisis, because it is 'modern', and more modern because it 
is radical. But perhaps this is only our version, for us, who are 
incapable of relativising. We cannot still ritualise it... Perhaps we need 
a collective murder once more... 47 
But a collective murder has no redemptory power if it is not a sacred act, and to 
see this 'collective murder of God' as a sacrifice, and therefore as a re-enactment 
46 Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur'. p. 603. 
47 Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur'. p. 605. 
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of the theatricallity of Christ's Passion, we need to attend to the aesthetic co- 
ordinates to which Nietzsche is always attentive; Girard acknowledges this: 
to locate and understand this strange phenomenon, we need to view the 
use which is made of the aphorism as ritual itself, the sense of which 
Nietzsche reminds us. The ritual constists of reproducing the collective 
murder within the unrecognisability of the reproduced event [... ]. The 
murder is indispensable for the ritual practice in so far as it remains 
unacknowledged. In order to sacralise it, it is necessary that the text 
contain illicitly the collective murder, but precisely in the sense of an 
illegitimate word, which implies dissimulation. If you pay heed to this, 
you will be placed within the domain of the 'aesthetic', or, even better, 
of the 'rhetorical' [... ]. 48 
We have already explored the aesthetic traits of ritual sacrifice, but precisely in 
the previous section (3.5), we seemed to hat there 
1 
is a cv 
() 
0V Yr)4i` 
distinctive trait in Christian sacrifice, a particular founding character which is at 
the same time a reflexive movement and a cancelation, and thus tries to do away 
with the structure of sacrifice itself through the institution of ontotheology. 
Girard also acknowledges that Nietzsche had already detected this 'fundamental' 
difference at the core of Christianity and had treated it as such: for him, if the 
death of God is a collective murder or a Dionysiac sacrifice, it differs essentially 
from the sacrifice of the Passion: 
Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur', pp. 606-607 
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the point of view of the passion is not only contrary to that of 
Dionysus: it is a war machine against the last and all Paganism: it is an 
effort to discredit collective murder, to ruin the well-established, to 
destroy all the non-Christian religions by showing that they are founded 
upon an arbitrary violence [... ]. The greatness of Nietzsche is that he 
apprehends the truth of Christianity with an incomparable power. 49 
However, I take it that Nietzsche apprehends the truth of Christianity even 
beyond the power that Girard concedes him: the fact that Nietzsche never fully 
abandoned an aesthetic view of reality results, in my view, from the fact that he 
too understood the theatricality of sacrifice that Bataille was later to denounce, 
including that of Christ's sacrifice. Nietzsche's engagement with rhetoric and 
aesthetics appears again, therefore, as the site from which to understand his 
crusade against a secularised Christianity oblivious to the aesthetic nature of its 
mechanisms of representation. Nietzsche's anti-redemptive move of the 
affirmation of the present and the positive stance in the face of the crisis of our 
Modernity, could very well be captured in Girar erms: 
if the religious in our world has died of violent death, it will certainly 
be reborn under another form, and under which one matters little. The 
crisis of the modern world is nothing but an episode within an endless 
process. The prodigious importance that we attach to our history has 
the narrowness of our own vision. 50 
Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur'. p. 612. 
Girard, 'Le meurtre fondateur', p. 610. 
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And the re-birth of the religious, or of the sacred in our, broader terms, can take 
place within the text of a lived myth which retains the stamp of its ritual origin, 
as for Nietzsche the mythic element in Greek tragedy retained the sacrificial 
element of the Dionysiac chorus. In the terms of The Birth of Tragedy, Wagner 
is assigned the task of delivering a new, redemptive myth (a naivity, as is well 
known, which Nietzsche will later regret), but still within these terms, and 
leaving aside Wagner's music for the moment, the seed is planted for the 
Modernist rendering of the sacred in the form of literary mythopoeia, and the 
mythic element will persist in Nietzsche's work up to the very end. 
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4. Myth and Secularisation: From Sacred Speech to Philosophy and Literature 
Accounts of myth' and mythic modes of thinking are often sketched in relation to 
modern descendants (religion, philosophy, science, literature) for which myth 
provides a common primordial ground no longer recuperable and supposedly 
surpassed. In contrast, an account of myth that focuses on its own genealogy, rather 
than on its founding nature, throws a different light on the mythical character of 
our modern discourses. From this perspective, myth, although still a speech 
charged with the quality of the sacred, is already the first step in the process of 
secularisation that has the philosophical logos as its vortex and results in our 
modern scientific notions of objectivity. 2 
1 To have a definition around which to work, let us say that a myth is a narrative, with a 
foundational cultural character, which makes intelligible to humans their relationships with their 
s rroundings; therefore it usually accounts for origins and destiny, and it differs from legend and L-c 
folk tales in its foundational and sacred character, which disappears only for those of whose culture 
it is not constitutive: a myth is only a myth if regarded as a myth. 
Z The already secularising character of myth, undestood as part of an inner dialectic, is thematised in 
T. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer. Dialectic of the Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming; Verso: 
London, 1997 (1" ed. Social Studies Association: New York, 1944. ) 
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The emphasis is thus displaced from myth to what precedes it and 
constitutes its condition of possibility: to the original ambiguity of the rituals, and 
among them, of the ritual of sacrifice, whose structure seems to be paradigmatic of 
the exchange with the divine. 3 Within the sphere of the ritual we find in its 
originary form the fundamental experience of sacredness that myth incorporates to 
its own narrative pattern. Whether in the form of boundlessness, purity, or 
otherness, the sacred values within mythic stories are retraceable to a ritual 
structure that precedes them, even if not in the order of events. The priority of ritual 
over myth, regarding the reducibility of one to the other, runs somehow against 
classical anthropological views, and has continued to be a subject of debate, 4 but it 
allows for a more thorough understanding of myth if we suspend to an extent a 
pronouncement on the dependence on recorded facts. 5 This priority is the basic idea 
3 See chapter 3, section 3.1. 
4 See Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, trans. by Janet Loyd (New York: 
Zone Books, 1988), pp. 239 ff., against G. S. Kirk, Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and 
Other Cultures (Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 8 ff. Rene Girard had expressed a view 
similar to Vernant's (see chapter 3, note 1). 
5 It is of no importance for our argument if, for instance, as the result of a particular narrative in 
praise or gratitude to the gods, a particular ritual cult was established for the first time, involving the 
boundlessness of a sacrifice or a gift-giving; nor is it relevant whether recorded materials happen to 
prove the contrary or a generalisation of either: what we have in mind for our argument is the 
conceptual priority of ritual over myth rather than an actual sequence of events. 
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which underlies a view of myth as a first step away from an original intimacy with 
sacredness, and therefore as containing essentially the same secularising force 
which lies at the heart of subsequent discourses, namely philosophy and, more 
recently, modern science, the latter being heir to one of the possible unfoldings of 
philosophical logos. 
If myth can already be secularising, if myth gets closer to philosophy in its 
distance from ritual, then it ceases to be suitable for appropriation by the artistic 
and literary traditions only, and discloses the non-rational grounds of our tradition 
of rationality, which springs from our philosophical ancestors; these grounds of 
rationality are not only confronted to the artistic manifestations that our modern 
secularised age has deprived of any claim to truth or sacred value proper; these 
grounds are also present at the founding gesture of our metaphysical tradition, 
which can be then seen as a mythical dismissal of what of ritual remains in myth. 
This is the gesture that Plato seems to make, 6 both Plato the mythologist and Plato 
the philosopher, a gesture answered centuries later, within one of the crises of our 
modernity, by the mythologizing philosophy of F. W. Nietzsche, in an attempt, this 
time, to close the history of Western metaphysics. However, the reason why Plato 
can be said to inaugurate the history of metaphysics is not only his commitment to 
a logos that is irreconcilable with myth (Socrates had expressed similar impiety 
"A gesture that in its ambiguity, as we will see later, cannot but incorporate in the mythical dismissal 
of myth the sacred dimension of the ritual. 
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earlier, and had been rightly condemned for doing so); it is also the fact that Plato 
writes, and by writing he takes a further distance from the narrativity of myth, one 
of whose essential traits is orality. Plato's myths are written, and by so being, and 
standing within the text in contrast to the philosophical pursuit of truth, they 
inaugurate a distinction which had not been truly operative until that moment: that 
between philosophy and literature. Despite the previous artistic self-awareness of 
the literary writers of classical Greece, it is only through Plato's distinction that our 
modern concept of literature can be applied to works such as those of Homer and 
Hesiod. 
I would like to argue that there is a point of convergence between 
Nietzsche 's attacks on the metaphysical tradition that Plato inaugurates and the 
V' 
inspirational value of Nietzsche's ideas for the aesthetics of literary Modernism: in 
both of these responses to moments of modern cultural crisis a certain 
understanding of mythical ambiguity (not lacking in Plato) and of its power, 
governs the impetus of the whole discourse. In Nietzsche »'s philosophy, and, 
particularly in his early works, there is an explicitly positive valuation of the myth- 
making activity of our Greek cultural ancestors, but also an active engagement in 
myth-making, which will become clearest later in his work, in the mythic voice of 
Zarathustra. Modernist literature, in its turn, develops a treatment of the mythic 
plots and of mythic modes of narrating that can be said to be essentially different 
from the previous literary appropriations of the mythic past, in that now the 
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fictional nature of the texts constitutes a continuum with the insights and contents 
that they try to convey: this is an emphasis on fictional character as a guarantor of 
truth, and this constitutes the paradox of Modernis mythopoeia. 
From this perspective, Nietzsche, in his engagement with myth (with the 
fictional character of myth) recovers for philosophy the respect for the sacred 
sphere that mythical narratives still retain and Modernist literature tries to re-enact, 
thus making up for Socrates' disrespectfulness and the age-long interpretation of 
the ambiguous Platonic expulsion of literature from the republic of truth. 
4.1. Sacred Speech 
If sacredness is defined only in relation to ritual, and this in turn defined through 
the all-encompassing structure of sacrifice, how is it that mythic speech remains 
sacred, and how is it related to the original sacrificial structure? Following 
Bataille's theory of sacrifice, we can conceive of ritual sacrifice as the theatrical 
interplay between objectifying forces and those of non-objectification. The ritual 
consumption of the object or of the victim restores them to the boundlessness of the 
sacred world, but at the same time this non-objectifiable sacredness can only be 
such within a fixed structure. 
7 In the forever unresolved tension between boundless 
7 For a clarification of these notions, see above. 3.1 and 3.2. 
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continuity and objectification that sacrifice constitutes, myth introduces a breach: 
the awe-inspiring vertigo of the loss of boundaries, the cruelty of the ritual, is 
concealed under the recognizable texture of a narrative with clear limits; yet the 
narrativity of myth has not the clarity of the visual arts, and remains irremediably 
tied to the ritual sacredness from which it springs: upon analysis, most classic 
myths reveal at their core a sacrificial structure that involves the dissolution of the 
individual. We could even say that this underlying structure, with its constitutive 
irresolvable tension, generates all the elusiveness and all the ambiguities that 
characterise mythic narratives: proper names are multiplied for the same 
designations, temporality acquires fanciful shapes, good and evil interpenetrate. 
The sacred boundlessness beyond individuation to which the victim is 
restored through ritual killing is the same unmasterable force that constitutes 
Nature's power. 8 At this point the aetiology of Greek myth (possibly the most 
influential body of myths in Western culture if we exclude Christianity) shows a 
kinship between the structure of sacrifice and mythic narrative: it is precisely in the 
8 Yet the identification between sacredness and natural forces does not fully disclose the meaning of 
ritual or of its mythic elaborations, as Nietzsche points out: he qualifies as `ill-advised [.. ] those who 
cannot deal with the magnificent, profound mythology of the Greeks until they have reduced it to 
the physical trivialities of sun, lighting, storm and mist which originally presumably gave rise to it' 
(Nietzsche, Philosop/i"i" in the Tragic age of the Greeks, trans. by Marianne Cowan. Chicago: 
Gateway. 1962, p. 30). 
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most ancient Greek stories that we find a clear identification between sacred 
powers and the forces of nature, between what is to be revered and what is to be 
feared. In the ancient world of the Titans the limitless powers of dynamicity are 
invested with the same cruelty as the divine demands of sacrificial expenditures. It 
will be only later that the Olympian cohort of deities will be less unambiguously 
identified with primary natural phenomena. 9 
The unmasterable forces of nature are eventually overthrown by the new 
gods: the Titans are defeated by the Olympians. Yet, just as sacrifice continues to 
constitute the centre of religious activity in classical Greece, 1° the sacrificial 
9 Thus in Hesiod's account of the mythical origin, the primaeval gods are born out of Nature: 
KXEiE'tE b' äOavätiwv iepöv yývo; aiEv EövTwv, 
of yfjg ýSEyEVOVTO Kai ovpavov äaTEpöEvtog, 
I 
I 
VUK'COS 'L£ övo(P£pf q, ob; 0' &Xµvpöc E'rp£cp£ növTOC, (OEOFONIA, 105-107) ['Sing ye [Muses] 
the holy race of the deathless gods which are for ever: even them that were born of Earth, and starry 
Heaven, and dusky Night, and those whom the briny Sea brought forth' (trans. by A. W. Mair in 
Hesiod: The Poems and Fragments, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908, pp. 34-35)]. This and 
subsequent references to classical works that re-elaborate mythological stories draw on Robert 
Graves's account of sources for his The Greek Myths (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1992). 
10 'The more elaborate Greek festivals were made up of a limited number of basic ritual acts: 
dances, musical and athletic contests, prayers and hyms, processions (... ]. All these elements were 
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structure continues to pervade the objectified world of mythic narrative: after all, 
the Olympian deities are the direct descendants of the Titans; between 
unmasterability and objectification there is a relationship of kinship, in the strictest 
of senses. Mutual respect and mutual requirement arise from this relationship of 
engenderment and war. Nietzsche re-elaborates the terms of this dependence in his 
formulation of the opposition between the Apolline and Dionysiac forces. The fact 
that these categories are primarily aesthetic is not a restriction of their applicability, 
but a hint for an understanding of metaphysics' genealogy as an aesthetic 
distancing from the original sacredness of non-differentiation. Nietzsche in The 
Birth of Tragedy, within a philosophical enquiry, re-engages in the inescapable 
interplay between sacredness and the aesthetic, as a first step for his critique of 
metaphysics. The origins of metaphysics, according to this position are precisely to 
be found in Socrates' sacrilegious attitude and in Plato's mistrust of myth. Plato's 
true metaphysical gesture is not the construction of what has been taken as an 
idealist ontology, but the philosophical secularisation of myth, its transformation 
into a discourse devoid of truth and moral value and therefore alien to the 
philosophical pursuit of wisdom. After Plato, myth becomes literature, or myth in 
our modern, pejorative sense of the term: a deceitful fiction. There are many 
features in the works of the literary writers before Plato that urge us to consider 
them as literature rather than myth: conscious development of literary techniques 
important. but the pivot of Greek ritual was undoubtedly animal sacrifice' (Jan N. Bremmer, Greek 
Religion, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 39-40). 
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and intensified awareness of the individual talent of the poet, for instance. Yet 
literature only acquires its entirely fictional dignity (or indignity) when it is 
opposed, by Plato, to the truthful discourse of philosophy. It is in this sense that we 
can say that literature begins at the same time as metaphysics, " 1 in Plato's writings, 
and therefore it makes perfect sense that Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical attempts 
started with a re-elaboration of the aesthetic theory that the opposition of 
philosophy to literature entails. 
However, it must be pointed out that the secularised version of myth that 
literature becomes after Plato does not always renounce its sacred origins. This is 
what makes Georges Bataille say that `poetry is a sacrifice of words', 12 that is, that 
poetry recovers a sacredness even more original than that of myth. A literature of 
the crisis of Modernity, Modernist literature, suitably receives Bataille's dictum, 
disclosing in its very structure not only the mythical quality but the sacrificial 
renouncement of discourse that precedes it. Nietzsche's praise of ancient Greek 
11 Whether Plato can be rightly regarded as the initiator of `metaphysics', a term coined only after 
Aristotle, calls for extensive debate. We only hope that the sense of the term implied in the text 
appears consistent with our interpretation of Plato. For a discussion of the strangeness of 
metaphysics to the mind of the classical Greek, see Jaume Casals, El Pou de la Paraula: Una 
Histöria de la Saviesa Grega (Barcelona: Edicions 62,1996), pp. 45-74 
12 See Bataille, Inner Experience, p. 136. Below, in p. 149, we read: `among various sacrifices, 
poetry is the only one whose fire we can maintain, renew. ' 
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tragedy largely rests precisely on the mythical quality that Greek tragedy is alleged 
to contain, 13 even if tragedy had lost its truly religious character long before Plato's 
theoretical formulation. For Rene Girard, as for Bataille does modern literature, 
Greek tragedy goes even further, and its true power resides not only in its mythic 
elaborations, but in the subordination of myth to a destabilizing sacrificial 
structure. 14 
Nevertheless, to conceive of a continuity between sacredness and fiction we 
need to step outside the Platonic distinctions (we need to return to the times when 
myth was still not literature), and recover the notion of a logos that is not 
incompatible with the dynamicity of physis. According to such a notion, myth is 
not the deceitful fiction that Plato and our modernity take it to be: mythos, 
belonging to the domain of legein, is referred to as hieros logos, `sacred reason', 
`sacred speech'. 15 If the notion of the sacred is originally extracted from the 
13 See chapter 1. 
14 See chapter 3. 
15 'Even when, in the form of stories about the gods or heroes, the words transmit a strong religious 
charge, communicating to a group of initiates secret knowledge forbidden to the common crowd, 
rnuthoi can equally well be called hieroi logoi, sacred speeches' (Vernant, Myth and Society in 
4 tic lent Greece, p. 204). 
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unmasterability of the forces of nature, of which the Titanic world is a first 
representation, then the mythic tales of the Olympian world inherit this quality, 
which is now made intelligible, systematic, discursive, `logical'. Therefore, the first 
form of discursive intelligibility, in its being sacred, is not opposed to the ever- 
changing matter of the sensible world: it naturally arises from this world without 
imposition or rupture, and it allows for an understanding of reality without 
mediation. Before metaphysics and before literature, in the world of myth and of 
pre-Socratic philosophy, logos necessarily arises from physis, without discontinuity 
or abstraction: logos is a feature of physis itself, and intelligibility and reality are 
not yet dissociated. That lack of dissociation allows for a direct experience of 
sacredness by humans, but also for an exchange of categories between the human 
and the natural world: the source of value and systematicity is not the nomos, but 
the law of nature that nature itself produces, the universal intelligibility; yet this 
law speaks in Greek, through the tongue of the myth-makers. Conversely, the forces 
of physis acquire human form, and the unmasterability of sacred nature is 
encapsulated within human categories, up to and including the serenity of the 
Olympian gods, ancestors of the Greek people. This double movement engenders 
the ambiguity of myth (discursively ordered but arising from the sacredness of 
nature), and allows us to conceive of myth in the otherwise oximoronic terms of 
sacred speech or sacred law. 
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This joining of concepts and notions which we have learnt to treat 
separately recurs in Nietzsche's engagement with the world of ancient Greece, and 
from here it is extended to other spheres of his philosophy. The notion of `universal 
will' that Nietzsche endorses in The Birth of Tragedy, inherited from 
Schopenhauer, presents this irreducibility to either human or natural components. 
For Nietzsche, as for Schopenhauer, the universal will is the ultimate reality, 16 but 
for Nietzsche it is not to be characterised by blindness and unpredictability; rather, 
he models this notion on the dynamicity of the human will, of which the Dionysiac 
discourse of music is a direct copy and the Apolline discourse of the visual arts a 
distorted reflection; it is for Nietzsche akin to the Greek physis in its inexhaustible 
dynamic power, forever creative, but also to the Greek logos in its purposiveness 
and its unavoidable reflection in the ordered world of phenomena. 
Therefore, Nietzsche's aesthetic turn involves a borrowing of the absence of 
distinctions that characterised the ancient Greek conception of reality: there is a 
conflation of value and unmasterability, a dependence of systematic upon excess; , 
nature becomes anthropomorphised and the human becomes naturalised. It is in 
this sense that the notion of the universal will in The Birth of Tragedy, within 
aesthetic co-ordinates, can be said to prefigure the notion of the will to power: 
reality is in both cases characterised as excess with respect to itself, on the model of 
the inexhaustible natural forces of production and destruction; simultaneously, this 
16 For a clarification of these notions, see above, 1.2. 
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boundless excessive power is characterised as will, and therefore modelled on 
human terms, assigned a purpose and an intelligibility. The notions of the universal 
will and of the will to power in Nietzsche, designed to dissolve the stasis of 
metaphysics, constitute a restitution of reason to its sacred origin (to its Natural 
origin), making it again possible to conceive of intelligibility as excess (to conceive 
of hieroi logoi), or of one as the precondition of the other. 
The continuity between sacredness and its apprehension in the philosophy 
and literature of ancient mythic times has another correlate in the new treatment of 
myth that we find in literary Modernism. The sacredness of the unmasterable forces 
of nature, '7 as well as the human co-ordinates of understanding, are presented here 
in parallel to the Nietzschean surpassing of distinctions. Yet what we encounter in 
Modernist literature is not the positing of an ontological or anti-ontological 
category, but rather a literary unfolding that presupposes it. In the works of, say, D. 
H. Lawrence, James Joyce, T. S. Eliot, Thomas Mann, the world of nature and the 
world of subjectivity merge in a way that finds a true precedent only in the remote 
world of the hieroi logoi: subjectivity is not exterior to nature, and nature does not 
cease to acquire the epiphanic quality of what is subjectively meaningful. There is 
not a reflection between subject and world (at least not a simple one) nor a 
17 That is, the primordial character of what inspires a primitive and reverential awe, in response to 
which sacrifice arises, according to Bataille, as seen in 3.1. 
156 
correspondence mediated by a third term (such as, for example, the individuals's 
inner world), as there was in the modern tradition: in Modernism there is a 
continuity of meaning. The waters of Cape Ann for the Eliot of `The Dry Salvages', 
or the fragrance of Stephen's Green for the Joyce of A Portrait of the Artist cannot 
be dissociated from the quality of the subjective experiences themselves: they are 
inserted in a continuity of reality in which subjectivity is in the world as much as 
the world is epiphanic. 
At a point when literature already has a long history as a secularised 
discourse, with no claims to the disclosure of ultimate reality, the mythic worlds of 
Modernist literature begin to speak the truth of their own fiction. '8 In two opposed 
instances, James Joyce opts for an insertion in a pagan tradition, while T. S. Eliot 
adheres to the Christian doctrine, but in both cases the re-creation of sacred worlds 
points to a convergence that is as relevant as the difference in the historical forms 
of the actualisation of these sacred worlds: Greek religion and Christian religion. 
Even if this convergence appears more clearly in the shared impulse of The Waste 
Land and Ulysses, both resting on the complex recovery of the structuring force of 
ancient myths, another point of contact can be found between Four Quartets and A 
Portrait of the Artist, at first sight not so much in a structural or thematic kinship, 
but in a shared distance from the confident intellectualism that The Waste Land 
We return to the mythopoeic Modernist paradox, anticipated by Nietzsche: if truth is a fiction, 
then only a fiction which does not present itself as truth is true. 
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and Ulysses display, this time approaching, by contrast, a genuine appreciation of 
the sacred as not fully reducible to the parameters of the modern human intellect. 19 
And even if what they mainly share is an attitude of respect, springing from 
Eliot's Christian commitment in the one case and from Joyce's recalling of a rich 
childhood and adolescence in the other, Four Quartets and A Portrait of the Artist 
also share, if implicitly, an engagement with myth that is also thematic and 
structural. Stephen's story is made to correspond at crucial points, including the 
epigraph and the last line of the novel, with the story of Icarus' fall, 20 in his attempt 
19 Within the contrast which I attempt to set up, the mythic power of the resonances of The Waste 
Land and Ulysses is eclipsed by the detachment of intellectua ism. 
20 This story is re-told in, among other places, Hyginus' fable XL: `Daedalus pennas sibe et Icaro 
filio suo fecit et accomrnodauit, et inde auolarunt. Icarus altius uolans, a sole cera calefacta, decidit 
in mare quod ex eo Icarium pelagus est appellatum' (Hyginus, Fabulae, ed. by P. K. Marshall, 
Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner, 1993) and Ovid's Metamorphoses: `rapidi uicina solis / mollit 
adoratas pennarum uincula, ceras; / tabuerant cerae: nudos quatit ille lacertos, / remigioque carens 
non ullas percipit auras, / oraque caerullea patrium clamantia nomen / excipiuntur aqua, quae 
nomen traxit ab illo' (VIII, 225-230) ['The scorching rays of the nearer sun softened the fragant 
wax which held his wings. The wax melted; his arms were bare as he beat them up and down, but, 
lacking wings, they took no hold in the air. His lips, calling to the last upon his father's name, were 
drowned in the dark blue sea, which took its name from him' (trans. by F. J. Miller. Loeb Classical 
Library, 1946, p. 423)]. 
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to escape from the labyrinth of Crete. In Four Quartets, clear traces of a mythology 
older than Christian re-elaborations are found in the earthy nature of the men of 
`East Coker', which recalls the spontaneous emergence of the Pelasgian man out of 
the soil of Arcadia21, and the pre-modern ideas of a sea that effectively surrounds 
us in `The Dry Salvages', recalling the ancient imagery of Oceanus. 22 
The sacrificial structure that precedes mythical elaboration is also present: 
in the transfer of the sacrificial character of Icarus' fall to Stephen's, and in the 
centrality of the event of Christ's Passion for Four Quartets. 
4.2. The Aesthetic of M 
2! We read in Pausanias' quoting Asius: 'AvtIO£ov 8flcXac yov Ev UWuc0Jto16Lv 6p£66l ' yaia 
p Xaty' ävßSwKEv, iva Oviticiiv iývoc th1. (book VIII, I, 4) [ `The godlike Pelasgus on the 
wooded mountains / Black earth gave up, that the race of mortals might exist', in Pusanias, 
Description of Greece, trans. by W. H. S. Jones (Loeb Classical Library, 1933), p. 349]. 
22 ýiµt yäp öyroµtvii noX xpöpßou 7teipaTa yairlS, ' 'QKEavöv 'tE, OEthv yEVCßty am 
going to the ends of the nourishing earth, to visit Ocean, the source of the gods' creating' (Homer, 
Iliad, XIV, 200-201 , trans. 
by Martin Hammond, London: Penguin, 1987, p. 248 )]. 
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Literature's dependence on mythic narratives is thematised by Nietzsche in the 
aesthetic theory that The Birth of Tragedy contains. For Nietzsche, it is the 
mythical quality of ancient Greek tragedy that secures its aesthetic success. 23 The 
perfect balance that Greek tragedy achieves is the same balance that we find in the 
mythic blending of objectification with a non-objectifiable ground. Nietzsche's 
aesthetic theory in The Birth of Tragedy continually rests on this opposition: that 
between the ungraspable space of dissolution of the Dionysiac impulse and the 
illusory boundaries that delimit individualities in the Apolline world. What appears 
to be the properly aesthetic in this opposition is the Apolline force, aligned with the 
qualities of visual perception, but its Dionysiac counterpart remains the force of the 
inescapable ground of darkness on which the Apolline rests, and it is only in the 
space of their interaction that the aesthetic takes place, as an impossible attempt to 
objectify, secularise and make visible a non-objectifiable ground whose sacred 
essence cannot but lend itself to a never fully achieved objectification in a 
perpetual tension that never reaches its end. 
The Apolline character of objectification, opposed to the Dionysiac urge to 
be dissolved in the non-difference of the sacred primordial space, links the nature 
of theoretical activity to that of the visual and narrative arts. The kinship between 
`theory' and `theatre' (as well as that between theory and theatre) is not only the 
repetition of graphemes or sounds that recalls the conceptual closeness of their 
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Greek origin: 24 it is also the fundamental link that allows us to consider theoretical 
activity as one of the manifestations of what Nietzsche defines as the Apolline 
impulse. A correlation between theory and the elements of visual perception has 
always pervaded the history of ideas, but in Nietzsche's formulation the kinship 
between philosophy and vision is characterised in aesthetic terms: because the clear 
definition of boundaries that we perceive in narrative and visual art becomes the 
paradigm of all seeing, the philosophical insight, as a mode of seeing, is essentially 
artistic in origin, and constitutes a manifestation of the Apolline aesthetic impulse. 
The distinction between real and fictive objects is not important for 
Nietzsche's aesthetic theory: objects that can be visually apprehended are, precisely 
because of this, essentially fictive, artistically created, whether we normally 
consider them to be so or not; any object, by being an object, is already a fiction, an 
artistic construct that has the Apolline tendency towards individuation and clear 
boundaries as its source; the world itself cannot find a justification if it is not as an 
aesthetic phenomenon, 25 as a fictive show. Thus, the history of theory is for 
Nietzsche in some respect the theory of one of the modes of aesthetic seeing, and it 
does not make any difference that the objects of theory have always enjoyed a 
different, more 'truthful' status: their belonging to the realm of vision, understood as 
24 In Ocopsly, 'to behold'. 
25 See chapter 1, note 2. 
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the Apolline realm of illusion, assigns to them essentially the same fictitious status 
as it does to the works of the visual arts. 
The privilege of aesthetics over any other kind of explanation results in a 
subversion of the traditional divisions between disciplines: thus philosophy 
originates as a form of Apolline activity, and philosophical writing shares its point 
of departure with literature, both being aesthetic forms of justification. Indeed 
Nietzsche characterises Socratism as a diseased form of the Apolline impulse, as an 
aesthetic objectifying force that has forgotten to pay respect to the original ground 
of non-objectification. In this sense Socrates is for Nietzsche the first metaphysical 
philosopher, the first one who fails to acknowledge the sacred character of physis 
(non-objectifiable dynamicity), and therefore, rightly condemned for his impiety by 
the political authorities of the time. It took only the hand of Plato to counteract this 
sentence, and, by writing, to leave the path open for commentators to draw on the 
original sacrilege that distorts the dynamic of myth, misuses the Apolline force and 
results in two secularised discourses (philosophy and literature) instead of the 
original discourses charged with sacredness. 26 
Philosophy and literature remain above all after Plato, in Nietzsche's eyes, 
modes of representation, modes of creating a world of visible or intelligible objects. 
2( Notice that I say 'commentators': the always ambiguous position of 'the divine Plato' in respect to 
myth is explored again a little below. 
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However, in their distance from the original unity of myth, they have lost their 
sacred dimension, their respect for the world of non-individuation. Thus philosophy 
assigns the highest value to objectivity, to entities as they are, forgetting about the 
aesthetic precariousness of any process of individuation; thus literature in its turn 
deprives its constructs of any connection with the sacred ground which manifests 
through its objects. Historical necessity is not a satisfactory explanation for the 
origins of philosophy and literature (as we understand them today) out of the 
secularisation of myth. Nietzsche himself proves this point when he engages in a 
philosophical activity that remains such for him but that takes a fundamental 
distance from the immediate tradition. The only precursors in this way of 
philosophizing who Nietzsche acknowledges throughout all his work are the pre- 
Socratic philosophers. They prove that it was possible to do philosophy and at the 
same time to keep a respect for the sacred ground of non-objectification: they prove 
that it was possible to do philosophy without secularizing myth, indeed in 
accordance with myth. If we bring to mind Heraclitus' engagement with the 
explanation of a physis whose logos does not renounce its ever-changing nature, or 
the mythical tone of Parmenides' encounter with the goddess of truth, the contrast 
with the descendants of Platonism up to Nietzsche's philosophy becomes acute. It 
may also be said that even more ungraspable for us, but no less certain, was the 
different quality of Greek literature before the invention of metaphysics. We could 
even say that literature could only begin to cease to be a ritual discourse after this 
invention. 
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But this event, what we take to be the invention of metaphysics, is it not 
itself charged with the ambiguity of myth? Is this origin of the secular not itself a 
mythical origin, an ideal point in a narrative of sweet deception? The puzzling 
ambiguity of Plato's gestures is well known, and only his commentators could 
build a tradition. Over the shadow of a fictional Socrates, Plato inaugurates 
philosophy as a mode of representation without a sacred dimension: philosophy is a 
longing for the true world because it is itself removed from that true world; the 
dialectical method can restore us to unity precisely because it starts from the 
coldness and detachment that is alien to ritual and myth. Against the deceptive 
stories of the myth-makers, the sobriety of dialectical reason; against the blind 
ecstasy of the Orphic celebrants, the illuminating power of philosophical logos; 
myths can only be subordinated to our pursuit of truth, and the madness of the 
inspired poet or the enraptured celebrant does not grant the wisdom of 
philosophical madness as an insight at the end of a formalisable dialectical process. 
However, Plato reveals himself in his writings as a great myth-maker: the 
quality and influence of some o Plato's myths, such as the myth of creation in 
Timaeus or that of the winged chariot in Phaedrus could even be compared to that 
of the most illustrious sources of our reception of ancient Greek myths. Plato's own 
claim that his myths are only didactic tools and that they are always subordinated 
to a dialectical chain of reasoning becomes weak against the unsurmountable 
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evidence of their force and extension within the dialogues; force and extension that 
in purely textual terms would eclipse the intentions of their author, were his claims 
more trustworthy than the rhetorical mechanisms of a very shrewd sophist. 
Therefore, the philosopher who discredits the value of myth is himself a 
consummate myth-maker. Moreover, it is also Plato, a thwarted tragedian and a 
skilful poet, who bans poets from his ideal republic. He does so in the name of 
truth, 27 although some argue that there is only personal frustration behind this 
gesture. Regardless of Plato's intentions, the dynamic of subsequent interpretation 
required this ambiguous anti-poetic and anti-mythic gesture. For the history of 
metaphysics to be inaugurated, and for it to have a secure origin, myth and sacred 
poetry had to be condemned, and they had to be condemned by an ambiguous 
gesture that is itself mythical and undecidable in character. 
Ultimately the theory of aesthetic representation that lies behind Plato's 
dismissal of poetry turns against itself . The characterisation of the reality of the 
Forms as a world of reference for ours borrows the secularizing power from the 
Apolline tendency of visual representation; through this move truth wants to 
establish itself as the only acceptable mode of reflection, of representation of the 
27 Lacoue-Labarthe points out that Plato carries out an elucidation of mimesis only after having 
produced an account of truth in his Republic (see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, 
Philosophy, Politics. ed. by Christopher Fynsk, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989, 
p. 77 ). 
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real. Nevertheless, by remaining within the co-ordinates of an aesthetic structure, 
this representational inauguration of the metaphysical world contains its own 
failure: it cannot help denouncing its dependence on an non-representable 
Dionysiac ground whose reality is prior to that which can be represented, just as 
Plato cannot help disclosing his abilities as a myth-maker and a poet. 
Nietzsche's aesthetic theory is the reflection, attempting to close a 
metaphysical circle of centuries, of Plato's reduction of philosophy to an aesthetic 
mode of representation, a reduction itself inscribed in the tension between 
aesthetics and its impossibility, and therefore announcing the sterility of its claims. 
To the extent to which it announces its failure by resort to inscription in an 
aesthetic theory and practice, Plato's philosophy is a clear precedent of Nietzsche's. 
Not only because it contains a mythical dimension irreducible to the parameters of 
demonstrative rationality, but also because its own dialectical concepts prefigure a 
theory of representation that The Birth of Tragedy only re-elaborates. 
Plato's theory of representation remains as mythical as Nietzsche's theory 
of aesthetic interplay between Apollo and Dionysus. He may not use Olympian 
deities to characterise his concepts, but the terms of his theory recall both the visual 
character of Apolline myth and the ecstatic nature of Dionysiac ritual. The only 
dignity that our world acquires in relation to the reality of the world of Forms is 
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such by virtue of our world's imitation (mimesis) of and participation 28 (methexis) 
in the world of Forms. The imagery of lighting and reflection dominates Plato's 
construction of his theory29, and on the model of a copy by reflection, an imitation 
(mimesis) through light, the status of our degraded world is explained. 
Nevertheless, the objects of our sensible world also participate in the truth of the 
Forms, and this is how they allow for a philosophical movement that otherwise 
would have needed the mediation of a third term. A relation of participation is the 
very opposite of imitation, since the very concept of miming or reflecting requires a 
clear division between two realms; yet Plato seems to have no problem in aligning 
28 The qualification of the relationship between the sensible world and the world of Forms is 
subjected to revision in Parmenides and Sophist 266d-268c, but the duplicity of this relationship 
seems to remain despite the attempts at simplification or reduction of one to the other: 
µäXu 'ca ý LOU E xatiacpaiVEiat &)5E EyEty . tiä µßv EtSi tavTa ciSßztep 
napaöEiyµa'ra Eßiävat Ev 'raj cpvaEt, -tä 8E &?, Xa 'tovTOt; EOLKEVat Kai Etvat 
öµou) taia. Kai ý µýOsý avirI ioIS ä?, Xotq yiyvEßOat tiwv T )V 
ovx &XXTJ TlS EiKa66ývat a rroiS 
(132d) [ [... ] I think the most like likely view is [Socrates said], that these ideas exist in nature as 
patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas 
is assimilation to them, that and nothing else (trans. by H. N. Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, 1926, 
pp. 219-221) ] 
As par igmatically shown in the influen ial passage in Republic which contains the myth of the cam. 
cave (Rep., 506e-520d). 
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these two notions, as if they were in fact complementary to one another; as if the 
blurring of boundaries modelled on the ritual loss of individuality were the other 
side of the presentation of clearly defined objects modelled on narrative and visual 
art. 
Thus at the very core of Plato's theory of Forms, and not only in the 
periphery that his own mythical narratives are, the aesthetic of reflection and 
dissolution, proper to myth and ritual, is present in a way that clearly prefigures 
Nietzsche's account of aesthetic forces in The Birth of Tragedy. The secularizing 
impulse towards mythic discourse (the desire for clarity, objectification and 
individuation that prompts the transformation of the ritual into myth, as well as 
Plato's thirst for knowledge -philosophy proper-), is already intertwined in 
Plato's text with the origin that it denies and on which it depends: with the sacred 
sphere of non-difference, participation and communion. From this perspective, 
Plato's philosophy is a discourse of respect for the sacred sphere, in the sense in 
which Nietzsche's is and Socrates' wasn't. The disavowal of the mythical 
dimension of philosophy finds in Plato its expression only at the expense of being 
itself integrated in a mythic texture. Similarly, Nietzsche's attempt at the closure of 
the tradition that Plato inaugurates constitutes again a mythic discourse: the origin 
and the closure mirror each other, resting on an aesthetic theory as the ground for 
an ontology and its dismantling, and sharing the textual qualities of myth in their 
emphasis on the truth of fiction. 
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4.3. The Original Mimesis 
Just as Plato's notion of mimesis appears counterbalanced by the notion of 
participation that it itself seems to require, Nietzsche's understanding of the 
structure of imitation incorporates the terms that the logic of this structure would 
seem to exclude. Imitative art is for Nietzsche part of a continuum with that which 
it imitates: the visual arts do not imitate nature, but belong themselves to nature's 
tendency towards imitation. 30 The Apolline delight in the clarity of well-defined 
forms does not confront a natural world whose non-objectifiable character is 
brought into presence: the Apolline force belongs itself to nature's logic of 
manifestation, just as the Greek physis could not but appear through a logos that 
was proper to it. Although the relationship between these two notions is not simple, 
we can legitimately assume that for pre-Socratic Greece the intelligibility of the 
3o For Nietzsche the Apolline imitative and reflective force is also part of Nature's artistic urges: 
4 we have so far considered the Apolline, and its opposite, the Dionysiac, as artistic powers which 
spring from nature itself, titithout the mediation of the human artist' (Nietzsche, The Birth of 
Tragt'dv', p. 18). 
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natural world (of the physis) rested on a law or a word (logos) which was itself 
continuous with and not dissociated from Nature. Similarly, the continuity between 
the primal non-differentiated reality and its distension in the illusions31 of discrete 
forms grounds the mutual requirement between the Apolline and Dionysiac 
impulses which is needed for a consistent interpretation of The Birth of Tragedy. 
The manifestation of ultimate, non-objectifiable reality can only happen in the form 
of illusions; yet it belongs to the very essence of reality to manifest through 
illusions, and therefore the illusions themselves are not fully dissociated from the 
realm of non-differentiation from which they spring. 
One way of interpreting this continuity, this complex understanding of 
mimesis that was already prefigured in Plato, is to privilege the fictive aspect of 
this mimesis: from this standpoint, mimesis would be already at the origin, 
indistinguishable from its real model. 32 Mimesis would precede and encompass 
31 'Illusion' here need not carry (as it often does not in Nietzsche) pejorative connotations. Since 
Nietzsche's philosophy has ultimately an aesthetic bias, 'illusion' has the playful and positive value 
of what it is artistically produced. Against the expectations of those claiming the objectivity of the 
real, Nietzsche celebrates the truth of fiction, of illusion, the positive value of what for others is 
cause of deceit and dispair. 
;ý See Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, pp. 112-113: `would mimesis [... ] not require precisely a 
rethinking of representation? That is, prior to the classical "theoretical" representation (to the 
dualism of the present and the represented), a thought of representation in which the re- of 
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representation, as a doubling that presupposes no original, as an illusion that was 
always there from the beginning. This is a typically post-structuralist interpretation 
of Nietzsche's aesthetics, indulging in the playful possibilities of a purely narrative 
conception of reality. For this theoretical stance the game of reflection has always 
already taken place, the original oneness is already contaminated by the force of 
duplication and repetition. This involves a certain privileging of Apolline elements 
that does not seem entirely legitimate according to Nietzsche's theory: even if non- 
objectifiable reality is from the beginning inserted in a process of repetition, 
doubling, miming and reflection, for the very process to remain active there has to 
be room for conceiving of an essential irreducibility of non-difference to the 
difference of plural narratives. For myth to remain myth, its sacred value has to be 
irreducible to its fictive character; analogically, for philosophy to remain faithful to 
its mythic origin, its claims to truth have to be compatible with its narrative 
structure. A purely narrative view of reality is thus not respectful of the sacred 
quality of myth, and establishes a secularised literature as its substitute, just as the 
modem metaphysical tradition established a secularised philosophy. The notion of 
an all-encompassing mimesis that contains the actuality of events and objects as 
repetition would govern - and carry away - any presentational value [...? ]': and below, p. 117: 
`there is only one remedy against representation, infinitely precarious, dangerous and unstable: 
representation itself. And this is also why ritualization and dramatization - the tragicomedy of 
sacrifice and of the spectacle - never end. To postulate that there is. prior to religious or artistic 
- repetition, a real violence, a true murder, a "cruelty" - and in fact what would prohibit this? 
does not change a thing'. 
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well as their representation breaks the tension that Nietzsche establishes between 
Dionysiac non-differentiation and Apolline difference, and therefore results in 
another secularised discourse, in another `disease of the Apolline', comparable to 
Socrates' impiety. 
Only a mythic discourse that respects its sacred dimension can provide us 
with a satisfactory notion of objectivity: one that acknowledges its own fictive and 
illusory character and simultaneously presupposes a real non-objectifiable ground 
as its source. For this mythic stance the process of objectification, the fictive and 
narrative positing of boundaries, is still indissociable from the ultimate nature of 
reality, but does not exhaust it. As in the ancient notion of a nature that remains 
perpetually creative behind its logical objectifications, for mythic discourse the 
fictive character of intelligibility is compatible with an access to the ultimate 
reality: the actuality of events and the artistic quality of our representations remain 
distinct and yet part of a continuum. In this respect the philosophy of the pre- 
Socratics, the philosophy of Nietzsche and the literature of Modernism are clear 
examples of an engagement with this mythical stance. The forms of rationality of 
the first philosophers are compatible with Greek religion; Nietzsche's aesthetic and 
anti-metaphysical moves restore a respect for non-objectification; Modernist 
fictions incorporate the theme and the texture of myth as a means to surpass the 
limitations of an art with no claims to truth or to the experience of sacredness. 
33 
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While the thematic components are clearer in works such as Ulysses or The 
Waste Land, a deeper engagement with the forms of knowledge proper to mythic 
discourse is achieved in those instances where the obviousness of the thematic 
material leaves way for the ritual and sacrificial structure that myths entail and (fail 
to) objectify. The tragic death of Icarus at the background of A Portrait of the 
Artist, the pervasiveness of the ritual of the Eucharist both there and in Four 
Quartets, the ritual dances of fertility and the archaic flavour of Christian imagery 
in the latter, all point to an inner appropriation of the mythic force by the texts 
which makes the Modernist use of myth essentially different from an external 
literary appropriation of its narrative exuberance. In this sense the de-secularisation 
of philosophy that Nietzsche attempts finds a direct correlate in the re-enchantment 
of the literary world that Modernist writing carries out. 
33 It can be argued that the Romantics attempted exac$lty the same surpassing: the Jena Romantics t "` 
(Schlegel. Novalis, Schelling, etc) wanted to create a 'new mythology', but it is precisely this 
intentionality wXXexposes their different co-ordinates of thought in respect to Modernism: for the ýýýýj t 
Modernists myth is all-pervasive, is already here, and only has to be allowed to speak. 
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5. Eliot and Joyce: A Literary Rendering of Sacredness 
James Joyce and T. S. Eliot enjoy a solid position among the Modernist writers, 
beyond disputes about their filiation or their significance. Their works take part, 
in a more or less explicit manner, in the denouncement of what was perceived 
early in this century as a particular crisis of the spirit of the Western world. The 
terms in which this crisis is sensed (or through which it is ignored) can be 
argued to have found a precedent theoretical articulation in Nietzsche's 
philosophy. ' In particular, the exploration of the mutual implication of the 
sacred and the aesthetic in The Birth of Tragedy provides an enlightening 
background for understanding the modernists' concern with the desacralisation 
of the modern world. 
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (hereafter referred to as A 
Portrait of the Artist) and Four Quartets, as canonical works within the 
Modernist corpus, stand in a relation of dissymmetry to each other, since they 
stand, respectively, for the young Joyce and the mature Eliot, or, more precisely, 
' However, T. S. Eliot would have not acknowledged the existence of such a precedent, since 
his views on Nietzsche reflect, in a few scattered allusions, the spirit of a negative valuation of 
him as a thinker. Most notably and explicitly, in his review of A. Wolfs on Nietzsche, Eliot 
starts his text with the celebrated remark: Nietzsche is one of those writers whose philosophy 
evaporates when detached from its literary qualities, and whose literature owes its charm not 
alone to the personality and wisdom of the man, but to a claim to scientific truth' (T. S. Eliot, 
'Review of The Philosoph. v of Niet: sc{ie, by A. Wolf, in International Journal of Ethics, no. 26, 
April 1916, pp. 426-27). 
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for an early and a late stage in the coherent literary development of each other's 
oeuvre. Nevertheless, both of them contain a complex restatement of the link 
between the sacred and the aesthetic, and to the extent to which this restatement 
is achieved, both of them can be taken as points of reference for previous or 
further developments within the series of each author's works. 
5.1. Religion and Art 
The level at which sacredness and the aesthetic first appear linked in these texts 
is that of the association of religion with art in a way analogous to Nietzsche's 
appropriation of Olympian deities for his aesthetic theory. Stephen, the 
protagonist of A Portrait of the Artist as well as Joyce's instrument for self- 
portrayal, sketches his aesthetic theory mainly in relation to the scholastic 
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, and his journey of self-realisation towards the 
independence of the artistic creator includes his Catholic education as a 
fundamental stage. 
The young Stephen is aware of the limitations that his religious 
education imposes on his artistic impulses: 
it wounded him to think that he would never be but a shy guest at the 
feast of the world's culture and that the monkish learning, in terms of 
which he was striving to forge out an aesthetic philosophy, was held no 
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higher by the age he lived in than the subtle and curious jargons of 
heraldry and falconry. ' 
However, even if his theory had to rely on `only a garner of slender sentences 
from Aristotle's poetics and psychology and a Synopsis Philosophice 
Scholasticce ad mentem divi Thomce', 3 the limitations of his learning allowed 
him a great intensity of experience: 
his thinking was a dusk of doubt and selfmistrust lit up at moments by 
the highlights of intuition, but lightings of so clear a splendour that in 
those moments the world perished about his feet as if it had been 
fireconsumed: and thereafter his tongue grew heavy and he met the 
eyes of others with unanswering eyes for he felt that the spirit of beauty 
had folded him round like a mantle and that in revery at least he had 
been acquainted with nobility. 4 
Here appears an instance of a recurrent contrast, that in its most general 
formulation is the contrast between Stephen's inherited religious tradition and a 
personal experience that he seeks to express in art. The mixture of mistrust and 
intuition, of limitation and illumination that arises from Stephen's approach to 
Thomism, already points to a two-way relationship in A Portrait of the Artist, 
2 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, ed. S. Deane (London: Penguin, 1992), 
p. 194. 
3 Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist. p. 191. 
Joyce, .1 
Portrait of the Artist. p. 191. 
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that here appears as that between art and religion within the attempted 
exposition of an artistic theory. It is through the theologically charged ideas of 
St Thomas Aquinas, and his appropriation of Aristotle, that Stephen tries to 
ground his experience of art. 
Stephen makes, as Nietzsche does, an association between the tragic, the 
dramatic and the aesthetic. He easily slides from the first term to the last, 
suggesting a continuity in which the tragic expresses the core or the essence of 
the dramatic, and this in turn the essence of the aesthetic. 5 The Birth of Tragedy 
also implicitly assumed tragic drama to be a centre in relation to which other 
artistic manifestations were defined. Nevertheless, the development of 
Stephen's theory, apart from this point, stands in clear disagreement with 
Nietzsche's account of the aesthetic; Stephen still owes too much to an 
unrevised tradition that Nietzsche criticises, a tradition that understands art 
through emotions and Greek tragedy through Aristotelian catharsis: 
the grave events are supposed to be leading pity and terror inexorably 
towards the relief of discharge; now we are supposed to feel elevated 
and inspired by the triumph of good and noble principles, by the 
sacrifice of the hero in the interest of a moral view of the world [... ]. 
Anyone who still speaks only in terms of those vicarious non-aesthetic 
effects, who does not feel elevated above the pathological and moral 
process, should despair of his aesthetic nature. 6 
5 See Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 222. 
6 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 107. 
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In contrast, Joyce lets Stephen provide definitions of pity and terror as aesthetic 
emotions; these emotions are static, for art is for Stephen essentially stasis, 
detached from the kinetic emotions of loathing and desire: 
the tragic emotion, in fact, is a face looking two ways: towards terror 
and towards pity [... ]. The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, 
desire or loathing. Desire urges us to possess, to go to something; 
loathing urges us to abandon, to go from something. These are kinetic 
emotions. The arts which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are 
therefore improper arts. The aesthetic emotions (I use the general term) 
is therefore static. The mind is arrested and raised above desire and 
loathing. ' 
In this respect, Stephen subscribes to Nietzsche's view of the contemplative 
nature of artistic apprehension, at this stage under the influence of 
Schopenhauer and in accord with a tradition that stems from Kant's views on 
the aesthetic. Nevertheless, Stephen's account differs radically from 
Nietzsche's: Stephen still remains within a conception of the will as an 
individual will, and does not make the static depend upon the impersonality of a 
universal flux, as Nietzsche does. Since for Stephen willing belongs only to the 
realm of the individual, the static quality that art calls for can only be a 
counterpart of the so-called kinetic emotions, and therefore remain itself within 
the individual realm. For Nietzsche, on the contrary, the will is universal, and 
aesthetic apprehension involves a recognition of the illusoriness of individuality 
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(of the individual will, or Stephen's `kinetic emotions'): aesthetic experience is 
also for Nietzsche a denial of this individual will, but only in order to surpass it 
and embrace the dynamicity of the flux of reality that constitutes the ground of 
artistic manifestation; stasis becomes then impersonal dynamism, and 
contemplation becomes absence of individual willing. By modifying the 
Schopenhauerian notion of the universal will (a blind force devoid of purpose or 
value), Nietzsche bestows a new meaning on the concept of aesthetic 
apprehension as a will-less state: an experience does not have to renounce 
dynamicity to be aesthetic; it has to renounce selfhood. Emotion, even static 
emotion, is essentially alien to aesthetic experience; at the same time, such an 
experience involves the impersonality of a universal willing. 
The Birth of Tragedy had already denounced the surrender of art to 
emotions in the tragedies of Euripides, that Nietzsche saw as an imperfect 
affirmation of the Apolline impulse, since in them the Apolline stood 
dissociated from its Dionysiac counterpart, that is to say, from the loss of the 
illusory boundaries of individual emotion. An analogous tendency presides over 
Stephen's speech, when he speaks for a tradition that describes art through the 
Apolline concepts of form, rhythm and harmony of beauty: 
Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 222. 
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rhythm, said Stephen, is the first formal esthetic relation of part to part 
in any esthetic whole or of an esthetic whole to its part or parts or of 
any part to the esthetic whole of which it is a part. 8 
This concern with measure, form and proportion also pervades the following 
passage, in which Stephen discusses the phases of artistic apprehension 
according to Aquinas. 9 Yet a clearer affirmation of a distance from Nietzschean 
aesthetics is Stephen's acknowledgement of a subordination of beauty to truth, 
in an explicit validation of the Socratic turn that Plato re-elaborates and 
Nietzsche condemns: 
Plato, I believe, said that beauty is the splendour of truth. I don't think 
that it has a meaning but the true and the beautiful are akin. Truth is 
beheld by the intellect which is appeased by the most satisfying 
relations of the intelligible: beauty is beheld by the imagination which 
is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible. '° 
Nietzsche not only had denied such a kinship between truth and beauty, but also 
had established the will to truth as the enemy of artistic creation: the aesthetic 
Socratism that held that `to be beautiful everything must be first intelligible"' 
was to be blamed for the death of Greek tragedy. This monstrous deformation of 
Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 223. 
" See Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, pp. 229-33. 
10 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 225. 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Trugedy, p. 62. 
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the Apolline spirit that is the Socratic will to truth was also behind all the forces 
of anti-aesthetic character. 
An even starker contrast between Joyce's recreation of Stephen's ideas 
on art and the aesthetic theory of The Birth of Tragedy arises when Stephen 
invokes Aristotle's formulation of the principle of non-contradiction in the 
course of his exposition: 
Aristotle's entire system of philosophy rests upon his book of 
psychology [Metaphysics, book F] and that, I think, rests on his 
statement that the same attribute cannot at the same time and in the 
same connection belong to and not to belong to the same subject. 12 
Stephen's idea of the kinship between beauty and truth has led him to the 
statement about the non-contradictory nature of the latter. In contrast, 
12 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 225. My addition. On the principle of non-contradiction as 
the dubious foundation of thought for Nietzsche, and its implications for aesthetics in a godless 1/2 
world, see Massimo Riva, '1888-1988: Some Remarks on Nihilism and Secularisation', in 
History of European Ideas, Vol. II, 1989, pp. 979-88. There we read: 'In the drafts for 
Nietzsche's first book, error is philosophically unveiled as the presupposition of thought. The 
principle of (non) contradiction is consequently 'destroyed' as the foundation of thou (and 
therefore of error). All this, stress Colli and Montinari, is written without the help of an artistic 
lie - that is, it must be taken at face-value. The paradoxical aspect of 
it has nothing to do with 
rhetoric, buth with knowledge, and truth. Yet, philosopher and artist are inseparable in 
Nietzsche' (p. 980). 
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Nietzsche's valuation of the will to truth as a negative non-artistic impulse led 
him to affirm the contradictory character of artistic truth when glimpsed in a 
Dionysiac state: 
the individual, with all his restraints and moderations, was submerged 
in the self-oblivion of the Dionysiac state and forgot the Apolline 
dictates. Excess was revealed as truth, contradiction [... ]. 13 
Therefore, Stephen's emphasis on the static and reliance on the Apolline 
concern with form (ultimately forcing him to embrace a certain aesthetic 
Socratism), distances his theory from Nietzsche's. At this level, A Portrait of 
the Artist establishes a relationship that stands still as an index, within which 
the articulation of the sacred and the aesthetic finds no comfortable explanation. 
Yet this connection between Christian scholastic thought and aesthetic theory 
already points to further developments to be found at other levels of the novel. 
Another instance of the connection between religion and art in A 
Portrait of the Artist is the fundamental part that Stephen's Catholic education 
plays in his journey towards artistic self-realisation. Stephen's perception of his 
Jesuit educators is, from his early years, linked to the feeling of isolation that 
keeps him away from his schoolmates and from society at large: religion cannot 
give him comfort, because it is in accord with the society from which he feels 
13 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 27. 
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excluded. Already in his second school, Stephen feels an essential detachment 
from others: 
the noise of children at play annoyed him and their silly voices made 
him feel, even more keenly than he had felt at Clongowes, that he was 
different from others. He did not want to play. He wanted to meet in 
the real world the unsubstantial image which his soul so constantly 
beheld. 14 
And this aloofness is later openly related to a conscious rejection of the social 
order, to which religion stands attached as another obstacle to the development 
of Stephen's artistic spirit: 
his destiny was to be elusive of social or religious orders. The wisdom 
of the priest's appeal did not touch him to the quick. He was destined 
to learn his own wisdom apart from others or to learn the wisdom of 
others himself wandering among the snares of the world. 's 
Stephen's relation with religion adopts then the form of an opposition, as if his 
artistic aspiration necessarily implied a retreat to his selfhood, away from the 
mendacity of society and the religion that ties it together. In view of this 
opposition, Stephen's is the journey of the modern hero in search of meaning 
within himself, at a time when the enchantment of the external world has 
already altogether disappeared as the result of a long process of displacement of 
14 Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist, p. 67. 
15 Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 175. 
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the sacred from the whole to the individual. Hence Maurice Beebe's remark that 
`one reason why the Portrait still seems revolutionary to the young is that it 
argues for the necessary alienation of the artist from God, home and country'. 16 
Indeed, Stephen's rebellious gesture, refusing to make his Easter duty, is 
supported by a statement ('I will not serve' 17) that would fit well into a 
Nietzschean attitude of praise of art and contempt for the slavish ideology 
embodied in Christian religion. Nevertheless, this matter is far from simple, and 
just as Nietzsche cannot but acknowledge the Christian inspiration of an 
aesthetic achievement such as `the ineffably sublime and sacred music of 
Palestrina', 18 Stephen's relation to Catholicism is not only that presupposed by 
his opposition: it implies a further pervasion that the abundance of religious 
references throughout the novel is witness to. Thus Cranly, one of Stephen's 
friends, points out: `it is a curious thing [... ] how your mind is supersaturated 
with the religion in which you say you disbelieve'. 19 The persistence of religion 
in the story, in the form of Stephen's experiences at home and at school, as in 
the form of Stephen's intellectual development, advances a first hint for an 
exploration of Joyce's literary account of aesthetic sacredness. 
Similarly, T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets signal an articulation of art and 
religion through the introduction of explicit Christian references within the 
16 Maurice Beebe, Ivory Towers and Sacred Founts: The Artist as Hero in Fiction firom Goethe 
to Joyce (New York University Press, 1964), p. 260. 
17 Joyce, 
.4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 260. See also p. 126. 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 89. 
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poems: the imagery of the lyrical enquiry that Four Quartets constitute is 
intertwined with veiled references to Christian dogma. Thus, the second part of 
`The Dry Salvages' includes among its images that of an annunciation: 
Where is there an end to the drifting wreckage, 
The prayer of the bone on the beach, the unprayable 
Prayer at the calamitous annunciation? "' 
persisting below in 
The silent listening to the undeniable 
Clamour of the bell of the last annunciation 
and further below in an explicit reference to the Annunciation of the angel to 
the Virgin Mary: 
Only the hardly, barely prayable 
Prayer of the one Annunciation. 
Throughout the passage, the religious atmosphere is built by resort to other 
terms that carry related suggestions: `prayer', `bell'. Such imagery returns in 
part IV of the same poem, with further references to Mary, the `Queen of 
Heaven': 
19 Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 261. 
2" Thomas Stearns Eliot, Four Quartets, in Collected Poems 1909 - 1962 (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1963). P. 207. 
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Lady, whose shrine stands on the promontory 
Pray for all those who are in ships, 21 
Prayer and bell return, this time with the 
sound of the sea bell's 
Perpetual angelus. 22 
The experience of time is a central concern in Four Quartets, and at the 
end of `The Dry Salvages', the third of the poems, a resolution is offered that 
puts an end to a quest that persisted in the text up to this point: the mystery of 
time, the paradoxes of eternity and succession, are to be apprehended within the 
limits of religious life: 
But to apprehend 
The point of intersection of the timeless 
With time, is an occupation for the saint. 23 
A little below, this point is revealed as the mystery of Incarnation: 
The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is Incarnation. 
Here the impossible union 
21 Eliot. Collected Poems, p. 211. 
22 Eliot, Collected Poems. p. 212. 
Eliot, Collected Poems, p. 212. 
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Of spheres of existence is actual, 
Here the past and future 
Are conquered, and reconciled, 
Where action were otherwise movement 
Of that which is only moved 
And has in it no source of movement. 24 
Thus the Christian mystery provides meaning to the experience of time, just as 
it enlightens philosophy when accommodating the terms of the Aristotelian 
conception of God and the earthly that these last lines evoke. A survey of Eliot's 
Four Quartets promptly qualifies them as religious poetry, and yet the kind of 
relationship between religion and art present here is not that found in the 
Metaphysical poets or in the tradition of religious poetry, because, as in A 
Portrait of the Artist, there seems to be a level at which religion and art interact 
regardless of dogma, creed or doctrine, signalling to a very particular meeting 
point. 
5.2. From Doctrine to Sacredness: Sensuousness and Sacrifice 
The use of religious imagery, this time not in opposition to, but in accord with, 
the artistic purpose of the text, is not in itself enough to render clear Eliot's 
24 Eliot, Collected Poems, p. 213 
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engagement with a sacred understanding of the aesthetic. The religious 
references, in the texts by both Eliot and Joyce, have a further dimension that 
confers on the texts a texture of sacredness; their force lies not so much in their 
doctrinal content as in their ability to be reconciled with a certain sensuousness. 
To the extent to which the references pointed out become significant, we move 
from the opposition between art and religion to the interplay between sacredness 
and the aesthetic. 
The streams of consciousness of Stephen as a child mingle his first 
religious thoughts and experiences with his deep awareness of a world of 
sensations. When thinking of the day of his first holy communion, the effect of 
this mixture in his mind is the enhancement of the immediate character of the 
ritual, providing a contact with transcendence as a continuity sprung from 
physical sensations: Stephen's reverential awe is very much in connection with 
the contrast between darkness and flashing gold in the tabernacle of the altar; 
the sin of touching it, the smell of the incense, the scraping of pens, the smell of 
the wine and the sickish feeling that raised in him, all these sensations are 
evoked by Stephen in connection with the ritual of his first communion, as part 
of his personal experience of transcendence. The holy bread and wine do not 
prompt him to reflection, but to evoking aestheticised images and bodily 
responses: 
the world was beautiful: wine. It made you think of dark purple because 
the 'apes were dark purple that grew in Greece outside houses like 
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white temples. But the faint smell of the rector's breath had made him 
feel a sick feeling on the morning of his first communion. '' 
It is not only the mind of the child Stephen, unable to discriminate, that 
approaches religion through a delight in the temporal world: later in the novel, 
the encounter between Stephen and a prostitute, as the climax of a sensual 
awakening to the world, is preluded by the comparison with the vision of sacred 
and ancient rites: 
the yellow gasflames arose before his troubled vision against the 
vapoury sky, burning as if before an altar. Before the doors and in the 
lighted halls groups were gathered arrayed as for some rite. He was in 
another world: he had awakened from a slumber of centuries. 26 
Even Stephen's later repentance resorts to a sensuous delight in appearances 
and devotional gestures, just as his previous surrender to the call of the flesh 
had had the character of a sacred experience. Now 
life became a divine gift for every moment and sensation of which, 
were it even the sight of a single leaf hanging on the twig of a tree, his 
soul should praise and thank the Giver [... J. The attitude of rapture in 
sacred art, the raised and parted hands, the parted lips and eyes as of 
)` Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 47. 
26 Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 107. 
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one about to swoon, became for him an image of the soul in prayer, 
humiliated and faint before her Creator. " 
Likewise, his attempt at self-mortification has the effect of an intensified 
awareness of his senses. And when Stephen's piety fades away, the choice 
between priesthood and freedom with which he is confronted states most clearly 
how his aesthetic ambitions were rooted in the sacredness of his religious past. 
What flatters Stephen in the possibility of becoming a priest is not only the dark 
powers with which he would be invested; it is also the collection of aesthetic 
gestures that his mind evokes in relation to priesthood and its offices: 
[... ]entering a confessional swiftly, ascending the altarsteps, incensing, 
genuflecting, accomplishing the vague acts of priesthood which pleased 
him by reason of their semblance of reality and of their distance from 
it. 28 
Religion is at last revealed for Stephen as essentially sacrificial and, as such, 
indissociable from the rituals of representation and repetition. The sacrificial 
rites of ancient religions involved an identification with the death of the victim 
that could be tolerated only as part of a representational structure that was 
periodically re-enacted. The mythical texture of ancient Greek tragedy retains 
the sacrificial mechanisms in its treatment of the heroic figures, and for 
Nietzsche the denial of the objective qualities of the hero, within a theatrical 
27 Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist, p. 162. 
2 Joyce, . -i 
Portrait of the . artist, p. 171. 
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structure of representation, allowed the Greeks both to exorcise and to glimpse 
into Dionysiac reality. Now Stephen evokes the plastic nature of the Catholic 
rites, longing 
for the minor sacred offices, to be vested with the tunicle of subdeacon 
at high mass, to stand aloof from the altar, forgotten by the people, his 
shoulders covered with a humeral veil, holding the paten within its 
folds, or, when the sacrifice had been accomplished, to stand as deacon 
in a dalmatic cloth of gold [... ]. In vague sacrificial or sacramental acts 
alone his will seemed drawn to go forth to encounter reality. 29 
After this awareness, it seems only proper that Stephen, when already 
determined to stay detached from his past, sees himself as `a priest of eternal 
imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of 
ever-living life', 30 a formulation that finally brings together in explicit manner 
the two poles of Stephen's experience. Priesthood and imagination, aesthetic 
radiance of life and the sacred power of the artistic creator are blended precisely 
within the imagery of Eucharist, since this sacrament, as a sacrifice re-enacted 
in ritual repetition, stands at one of the points of intersection between the sacred 
and the aesthetic. 
The imagery of Four Quartets is also at times evocative of this meeting. 
There are passages where the Christian references belong to a context that 
Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 172. 
30 Joyce, .4 
Portrait o> the Artist, p. 240. 
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suggests a deeper meaning for the crude realities of the earthly world, bringing 
us back to a ritual conception of Christianity, understanding spiritual damnation 
in terms of bodily evils. Thus, in `East Coker', IV: 
Our only health is the disease 
If we obey the dying nurse 
Whose constant care is not to please 
But to remind of our, and Adam's curse, 
And that, to be restored, our sickness must grow worse. 31 
Purgatorial fire has both the sensuous qualities of the terrible and the beautiful, 
and Christ's passion has the reality of an intoxicating sacrifice: 
If to be warmed, then I must freeze 
And quake in frigid purgatorial fires 
Of which the flame is roses, and the smoke is briars. 
The dripping blood our only drink, 
The bloody flesh our only food: 
In spite of which we like to think 
That we are sound, substantial flesh and blood - 
Again, in spite of that, we call this Friday good. 32 
Some critics react adversely to this sacrificial vision of Christianity: 
31 Eliot, 'East Coker' IV, in Collected Poems, pp. 201-2. 
32 Eliot, 'East Coker' I V, in Collected poems, p. 202. 
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the `end' he [Eliot] has in view implies the Christian tradition as the 
context that defines and explains his attitude. But that tradition 
includes a wide range of diversities; there is more than one Christianity 
[... ]. Eliot obviously assumes that the vindication of the spirit [... ] 
entails that kind of association of `birth and death' with blood and 
`agony'. As insisted on, the association seems gratuitous and willed. 33 
However, within the context of aesthetic redemption, the unpleasantness and the 
immediacy of sacrificial images is certainly a vindication of the spirit, given the 
deeper significance of the aesthetic mechanisms of the ritual. In the same way, 
the blood and the killings on the ancient tragic stage point to a secret meaning 
beyond them: to the unmasterability of the ultimate reality by human 
endeavours. To discredit this passage of Eliot's poem is to close our eyes to its 
engagement with a mythic texture, as another point of intersection of the sacred 
and the aesthetic, underneath doctrinal convictions. 
The symbolism of Pentecost is also intermingled in part IV of `Little 
Gidding' with a sacral purifying fire that brings ancient resonances: 
The dove descending breaks the air 
With flame of incandescent terror 
Of which the tongues declare 
The one discharge from sin and error. 
The only hope, or else despair 
33 F. R. Leavis, The Living Principle: 'English' as a Discipline of Thought (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 197 5). p. 207. 
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Lies in the choice of pyre or pyre - 
To be redeemed from fire by fire 
Who then devised the torment? Love. 
Love is the unfamiliar Name 
Behind the hands that wove 
The intolerable shirt of flame 
Which human power cannot remove 
We only live, only suspire 
Consumed by either fire or fire. 34 
This passage rests on the mythopoeic possibilities of Christianity, indeed on a 
mythic conception of Christianity itself. At the same time, it provides a space in 
which poetry can be conceived as a sacred act. In accord with this, Vincent 
Buckley, commenting on some remarks made by contemporary poets, says that 
they are speaking, not of religion in poetry but of poetry as a religious 
act; [... ] they are locating the religious nature of that act neither in 
some thesis about the autotelic status of poetry nor in some contention 
about the basic themes or subjects for poetry but in terms of how the 
poet is brought as a religious being, concerned with human life and an 
actor in its drama, to create works which themselves carry his religious 
being, fortify creation and exist as, in a sense, sacred spaces. 35 
34 Eliot, 'Little Gidding' IV, in Collected Poems, p. 221. 
35 Vincent Buckley, Poetry and the Sacred (London: Chatto & Windus, 1968). p. 9. 
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If `to "demythologise" Christianity involves de-supernaturalising it in 
accordance with the demands of a de-supernaturalised world', the space of 
poetry, on the contrary, favours the mythic creation within, since the art and act 
of poetry 
serve something of the purpose of a sacralising act; they are resorted to 
in order to set aside certain experiences or places or people or 
memories as representatively revealing ones - in however attenuated a 
form, sacred ones. 36 
Eliot's lyric voice in Four Quartets participates in this sacralising act 
that poetry is, in so far as what is heard there is not a body of doctrine, but an 
appeal to a primary experience of the sacred through a resort to Christian 
motifs. This appeal may seem to be belated, since `by the time Yeats was 
coming into his strength and Eliot was beginning to publish, Nietzsche's "God 
is dead" had gone deep into the individual consciousness and was already 
permeating the culture'; 37 nevertheless, just as Nietzsche's diagnosis pointed to 
a stage in a process that he regretted on the whole (the disenchantment of the 
modern world), Eliot's commitment to the sacred adopts the form of the 
restatement of an original link, eluding being encapsulated in a definite form of 
orthodoxy or heresy. 
"' Buckley, Poetry and the Sacred, p. 21. 
37 Buckley. Poetry and the Sacred, p. 56. 
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5.3. A Ritualistic Use of Language 
This original link between sacredness and the aesthetic, that has been 
revealed by a penetration through both scattered and interwoven references, 
pervades the texts at the level of their own materiality: both A Portrait of the 
Artist and Four Quartets present a surface of ritualistic use of words. The ritual 
of repetition is present throughout Joyce's novel, from the early years of 
Stephen, when 
words which he did not understand he said over and over to himself till 
he had learned them by heart: and through them he had glimpses of the 
real world about him. 38 
Understanding does not come through the dual structure of words whose 
meanings are known to Stephen, but through a ritual acquaintance with the 
presence of the signifier, whose own force draws him to a deeper reality; words 
are not an instrument of learning, but loquacious presences among the objects 
of a material world. 
Such a conception of language announces an engagement with the 
analogical mode of thought: a way of thinking that does not oppose the plane of 
meaning to the plane of expression, but that, on the contrary, presupposes a 
structure of reality in which entities reproduce infinitely within one another. In 
such a world, words lose their dual configuration (in terms of form and 
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meaning) in order to enter a continuity which is itself as a whole charged with 
meaning; language renounces its privileged position as an instrument for 
understanding, removed from the reality that it portrays, in order to take part in 
an inexhaustible interplay among the constituents of a meaningful world. The 
1 possibilities that analogical thought offers are explicitly welcome y Stephen in 
the Proteus episode of Ulysses: 
Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought 
through my eyes. Signatures of all things I am here to read, seaspawn 
and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, 
rust: coloured signs. 39 
The `coloured signs' of sensible experience are also `signatures' to be read, 
because meaning is not restricted to the realm of language; by the same token, 
language recovers it own materiality, its own quality as an object, and thus 
becomes a thing among things, while all of them constantly speak their 
meaning. 
The multidirectional character of threads of meaning that this view 
implies is one of the basic traits of Ulysses, but, even though less apparent, it is 
also present in A Portrait of the Artist, where the complex interplay of 
references subsists without casting a shadow on the intelligibility of the 
narrative (see below, 5.5.2). In both novels, this intensified complexity of 
3S Joyce, 
. -1 
Portrait of the Artist. p. 64. 
39 James Joyce. Ulysses. ed. Jeri Johnson (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 37. 
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interconnected meanings is possible thanks to the underlying linguistic 
conception that Stephen suggests in A Portrait of the Artist, with the `glimpses 
of the real world around him' provided by his mindless repetitions. Only if a 
continuity is granted between the words themselves and the reality that they 
signify can Stephen's repetitions allow him to glimpse into the real world 
without the mediation of the understanding. The granting of such a continuity is 
a characteristically Modernist turn, at a time of enhanced awareness of the non- 
instrumental nature of language, when even the claim is made that the world 
itself is primarily constituted as a language. 
Nevertheless, the modern tradition had already shown at times its 
reluctance to wholly reject the possibility of this continuity, even if its 
reluctance hindered the modern projects of rationality. The clearest example of 
this attitude may be the Romantics' fascination with analogical thought and 
analogical relationships within nature. Although still not with the radical 
gesture of Modernism, Romanticism already looked for an extension of the 
modern paradigm of understanding that would come to affect fundamental 
assumptions of Modernity, and thus looked back in nostalgia to the obscurity 
and magic of the Middle Ages and the ancient past. Modernism performs a 
more decisive break with the modem enlightened tradition, and this opens the 
door (unlike in the case of Romanticism) to a direct engagement with the modes 
of representation previous to the inauguration of such a tradition. In these 
modes of representation the fundamental distinction between the order of things 
and the linguistic order is not operative: things are `signatures' as much as 
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words are sacred; the supralunar world reflects the structure of ours, and each 
organism contains within itself a picture of the whole universe of which it is a 
part, the world thus being always in excess of itself, both infinitely containing 
and infinitely contained in its constituents. The continuity in which the fluidity 
between things and words is inscribed allows for an intervention in the order of 
things through a ritual utterance. It is to this ancient magic world that Stephen's 
repetitions take us back, giving us the key for an interpretative attitude that 
could be attentive to the inexhaustible meaningfulness of words, but also to the 
sacred continuity to which they open, both as depictors of an enchanted nature 
(see below, 7.1) and as disclosers of epiphanic moments (see below, 6.5). 
Against the sacred power of words, as part of a world constituted by 
analogical relationships, the impulse towards individuation draws boundaries 
around words and around the realities that they signify: the dual structure of 
form and meaning already involves a breach in continuity; from this point, the 
path towards higher degrees of individuation lies parallel to that of the 
instrumentalisation of language: only formal languages, the instrumental 
languages par excellence, can accurately name the individual, which is only 
partially captured within the boundaries of the proper name or the 
terminological noun. Therefore, language itself is not to blame as the 
individuating force that segments the original continuity, because language can 
be restored to the sacredness of the ritual, just as Apolline clarity, in Nietzsche's 
terms, can be restored to its interplay with a Dionysiac obscurity that it never 
completely overcomes. Stephen experiences this tension: his concern with his 
199 
own selfhood and individuality (with his inwardness as the sacred space of the 
artist) results in a monstrosity that has to be redeemed by embracing a life 
without the boundaries of the inner self. When the spell of individuation leaves 
Stephen too far removed from the vitality of the real, he has to exorcise his 
dimness by invoking names that, even if proper names, are dissolved in the 
materiality of their own careful enunciation: 
by his monstrous way of life he seemed to have put himself beyond the 
limits of reality. Nothing moved him or spoke to him from the real 
world unless he heard in it an echo of the infuriated cries within him 
[... ]. He could scarcely recognise as his his own thoughts, and repeated 
slowly to himself: -I am Stephen Dedalus. I am walking beside my 
father whose name is Simon Dedalus. We are in Cork, in Ireland. Cork 
is a city. Our room is in the Victoria Hotel. Victoria and Stephen and 
Simon. Simon and Stephen and Victoria. Names. 40 
The plastic force of the ritual of repetition reaches its peak in Joyce's 
reproduction of the act of contrition, whose textual quality breaks the fictional 
barrier to allow us to access the transcendent immediacy of the materiality of 
the printed word: 
-OmyGod 
- Ono, God 
I am heartily sorry 
-I am heartily, sorry 
40 Joyce, .4 Portrait of the . 
Artist, p. 98. 
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-for having offended Thee 
-for having offended Thee- 
- and I detest my sins - 
and I detest my sins - 
above every other evil - 
above every other evil 
because they displease Thee, my God- 
because they displease Thee, my God - 
Who art so deserving 
Who art so deserving 
of all my love - 
of all my love - 
- and I firmly purpose- 
- and I firmly purpose - 
- by Thy holy grace 
by Thy holy grace - 
never more to offend Thee - 
- never more to offend Thee 
- and to amend my life 
- and to amend my life. -ar 
The sermons that had preceded this act of contrition, and that fill a great part of 
chapter III, are another example of a use of words that goes beyond the simply 
evocative or instrumental: even if these are not sacred words, the heavy 
rhetorical charge and excessive length of the speeches transforms the sermons 
into more than an uttered text. Our own exposure to them makes us understand 
41 Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist. p. 146. 
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Stephen's reaction: `so intense are Stephen's revulsion and conversion that he 
becomes physically ill and experiences a mystical vision of hell', 
42 and we know 
that this is not simply due to an expounded doctrine, but to the formal qualities 
of the very words with which we have been confronted. 
The ritualistic use of words in Four Quartets is hard to isolate, since in 
fact lyric poetry itself can be regarded as ritual utterance, formally manifested in 
the richness of devices and mechanisms of repetition and formal interplay. To 
the extent to which lyric poetry is constituted by a formal structure of 
repetitions (of sounds, rhythmic patterns, words, phrases, etc. ), its essence 
appears more clearly defined in relation to an original kinship with both music 
and sacred formulae. Poetry's original relation to music is pointed out by 
Nietzsche, of which relation evidence is given by `the most important 
phenomenon in the whole of ancient poetry, the unification, or indeed the 
identity - which they assumed to be quite natural - of the lyric poet with the 
musician .43 
The very title of Four Quartets suggests a musical character that in this 
case is not only due to the standard procedures of lyrical composition, such as 
this anaphora in `East Coker': 
And a time for living and for generation 
42 Beebe, Iron Toners and Sacred Founts, p. 275. 
'3 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 28. 
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And a time to shake the wainscot where the field-mouse trots 
And to shake the tattered arras woven with a silent motto 
or this other one in the same poem: 
To arrive where you are, to get from where you are not 
You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy 
In order to arrive at what you do not know 
You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance. 
In order to possess what you do not possess 
You must go by the way of dispossession 
In order to arrive at what you are not 
You must go through the way in which you are not. 
And what you do not know is the only thing you know 
And what you own is what you do not own 
And where you are is where you are not. 44 
The music that the title suggests is to be found in a pattern that affects the 
whole work: a pattern of theme and development, not in the manner of a logical 
enquiry, but in that of musical composition, attentive to the flux of an 
underlying spirit. 
Four Quartets, however, does not include direct quotations of passages 
of the Christian ritual, as, for example, Ash Wednesday does: 
" Eliot, Collected Poems. p. 201. 
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Because these wings are no longer wings to fly 
But merely vans to beat the air 
The air which is now thoroughly small and dry 
Smaller and dryer than the will 
Teach us to care and not to care 
Teach us to sit still 
Pray for us sinners now and at the hour of our death 
Pray for us now and at the hour of our death. 45 
45 Eliot, 'Ash Wednesday' I, in Collected Poems, p. 96. Moreover, as Linda leavell points out, 
the ritualistic use of language in a poem so explicitly Christian as 'Ash Wednesday' extends far 
beyond Christian resonances: 'In the final stanza of the poem, the speaker addresses in his ritual 
the divine source of life, the holy mother: 
Sister, mother 
And spirit of the river, spirit of the sea, 
Suffer me not to be separated 
And let my cry come unto thee. 
The spirit of the river is the spirit of betweennes, of the unbroken wings flying seaward; the 
spirit of the sea is the source of life from which we are separated when we are born, like a baby 
from his mother. And the cry we send to thee is less than a word; it is only a primal sign from a 
baby to its mother; it is the ritual itself. In prayer the language is mere nonsense and inadequate 
to speak to God, and yet the prayer and thus the language itself must be uttered in order to cry 
to a meaning beyond itself. (Linda Leavell, 'Eliot's Ritual Method', in Olney James (ed. ) T. S. 
Eliot: Essais_%rom the 'Southern Review'. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1988, p. 151. ) 
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But the fact that the direct use of the poetic possibilities of Christian ritual does 
not appear in Four Quartets does not necessarily weaken the connections 
pointed out and the suggested genealogy of the poetic word: this absence can be 
interpreted as the result of a movement towards the purification of poetical 
essence in Eliot's lyric development, establishing the aesthetic value of the 
ritual through its mechanisms rather than through the insertion of the texts 
themselves. 
2/ ýy L 
5.4. Mythopoeia and Pagan Myth 
It is not only within the co-ordinates of Christianity that these texts put forward 
a mythical conception of reality. The circularity of time and the veneration of 
nature in Four Quartets prove the contrary, even if open references to a 
sacredness other than Christian are difficult to find there; also Eliot 
acknowledges the mythopoeic essence of the human spirit at the beginning of 
`Burnt Norton': 
Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind 
Cannot bear very much reality, 46 
paradoxically affirming at the same time the value of human perception as 
criterion of reality: 
And the unseen eyebeam crossed, for the roses 
Had the look of flowers that are looked at. 47 
This paradox points to a fundamental theoretical assumption of literary 
Modernism: the ultimate justification of reality as aesthetic in character. 
Aesthetic experience and creation, taken as inherently human activities, become 
the model for any approach to reality, including an approach that seeks to grasp, 
Eliot. Collected Poems. p. 190. 
47 Eliot, Collected Poems, p. 190. 
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behind the elusive interplay of appearances, the ontological ground of what is. 
Human kind are essentially mythopoeic, creating narratives and aesthetic 
constructs that are decidedly contingent and removed from the authenticity of 
the real ('human kind / Cannot bear very much reality'). At the same time, what 
is real can only claim its ontological status within the structures of human 
perception and representation, and this is why `the roses / Had the look of 
flowers that are looked at'. 
A theory that unfolds this paradoxical assumption can be found in The 
Birth of Tragedy; There Nietzsche repeatedly concludes that `it is only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified', 48 
thus establishing the basis for the aesthetic turn in modern sensibility: the 
aesthetic paradigm becomes the only legitimate paradigm to confront reality 
when it comes to justification, that is to say, when we are interested in its 
ultimate metaphysical ground. It is only within the aesthetic mechanisms of 
representation that we may find the justification for the phenomenon of the 
world. Reality unfolds for Nietzsche as a work of art (of which we are also 
part). Art becomes the model based on which we can understand reality, not by 
virtue of the legitimacy of a metaphor, but by that of the continuity between art 
and nature: `art is not only an imitation of the truth of nature but a metaphysical 
supplement to that truth of nature'. 49 The legitimacy of the aesthetic mode of 
understanding to confront reality is granted by the fact that reality unfolds as a 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 33. 
"' Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 114. 
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work of art, as the `artistic game which the will, in the eternal abundance of its 
pleasure, plays with itself , 
so 
The characterisation of reality in aesthetic terms still raises the question 
about the status of what remains behind the phenomena that existence and the 
world constitute. Nevertheless, the answer to this question is now essentially 
different from what past metaphysical systems could provide: the status of the 
universal artistic will is not that of a static otherworldly ground, but that of a 
dynamic force that eternally produces the world out of its own excess. In this 
sense, Nietzsche's notion of `universal will' in The Birth of Tragedy prefigures 
his later notion of the `will to power' 
The problem still remains that the world has been reduced not only to 
the category of illusoriness, but also to an illusoriness constituted through the 
mechanisms of aesthetic activity, which import the contingent character of what 
is constructed by us. How to accept as the ultimate metaphysical structure (as 
the articulatory basis of phenomena) a structure that mirrors human contingent 
activity? In other words, how to elevate aesthetic practice to the status of 
ontological justification without doing a violence to these very concepts? 
This is the problem encountered by modernist mythopoeic activity, in 
which both Eliot and Joyce participate: `modernist mythopoeia is a way of 
50 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragetiv. p. 115. 
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combining radical relativity with the apodictic nature of conviction'. 
5' 
Relativity springs from the dependence on structures that have their origin in 
inherently human modes of activity; apodictic conviction results from the claim 
to ultimate justification that these structures hold. Yet this theoretical 
irreconcilability is not apparent in Nietzsche's theory, and is even successfully 
resolved within the texture of modernist literature, where art positively becomes 
an all-embracing category: 
[Nietzsche] assimilated the dualistic elements of life and art so 
completely that they ceased to be separably apparent, and this is an 
important clue to the metaphysics of literary modernism at large. In the 
great works of modernism [... ], the mythopoeic metaphysic disappears 
into the texture of the living experience, or of the text, achieving very 
often a naturalness which has effectively disguised the metaphysical 
implication of its aesthetic forms. 52 
But the naturalness of mythopoeic activity is not always so easily achieved, and 
the power of its paradoxes returns when we consider the implications for 
morality and religion. A view that applies the Nietzschean aesthetic structure to 
religious belief has to conclude, with Henri Bergson, that `the pantheon exists 
independent of man, but on man depends the placing of a god in it, and the 
51 Michael Bell, Literature, Modernism and Myth: Belief and Responsibility in '0th Centur 
Literature (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 4. 
52 Bell, Literature, Modernism and Mi'th, p. 24. 
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bestowal of existence on that deity'. 53 This view, that Bergson attributes to the 
religious mind of ancient civilisations, is alien to modern forms of 
understanding; thus he adds: `such an attitude of mind does indeed surprise us 
to-day'. An analogous surprise is that arising from the survey of a metaphysical 
picture such as the one in The Birth of Tragedy, where `transcendental' value is 
conceptually dependent on artistic creation, but at the same time is assigned the 
absolute value of what ontologically precedes human contingency. 
The same paradox can be easily extended to the realm of moral value: 
the illusory status of value, its aesthetically created character, counts against its 
effective governing power over human action: 
There is indeed no objective value - the `ideal' is illusory - yet 
human greatness lies in acting as if there were. It resides in the 
unending struggle with the recalcitrant `tyranny of the real', in the 
heroic quest for intimations of the numinous which can never be 
rewarded by success - except in mythopoeic self-deception. 
54 
But how to engage in a successful self-deception? Isn't a willing and conscious 
self-deception a contradiction in terms? Given that the naivity of the pre- 
53 Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. A. Audra and C. 
Brereton (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), p. 200. 
54 Peter Poellner, `Early Nietzsche and the Transfiguration of Nature', published as `Der Frühe 
Nietzsche und die Verklärung der Natur' in Nietzscheforschung 3 (1996) (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag), pp. 288-9. 
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modem mind to which Bergson alludes is no longer available to us, is 
Nietzsche's aesthetic metaphysics a fruitful ground for the modernist 
experience? 
The aesthetic accomplishment of modernist literature suggests itself as 
an index of an answer to these questions. I shall attempt to give an account of 
the reasons for this accomplishment as exemplified in the works by Eliot and 
Joyce, thus trying to provide answers while showing that the embracing of 
modernist aesthetics brings consequences for an understanding of religious and 
moral value. Since this will become clearer in the context of Eliot and Joyce's 
mythical conception of Christianity, I shall postpone this account until 6.2. 
In A Portrait of the Artist the weight of mythopoeic activity rests also on 
the possibilities offered by pagan myth. It is the web of implicit or alluded 
mythical narratives that gives the novel its ultimate meaning, and these 
narratives often fall within the domain of a pre-Christian mythology. 
The ancient myth of Icarus and Dedalus governs the structure of the 
story; explicit references to it can be found, among other places, at the opening 
and at the closing of the text: in Ovid's epigraph and in the last entry of 
Stephen's diary. This final sentence draws attention to the dangers of artistic 
boldness, of flying too near the sun, and it does so in the form of an appeal to 
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Dedalus' guidance: `27 April. Old father, old artificer, stand me now and ever in 
good stead'. 55 
In view of the whole story, Stephen's surname is disambiguated: he is 
the young Icarus, not the wise artificer whose artistic fatherhood he fails to 
bring to his side. Stephen's journey of self-discovery is not only the epic inner 
quest of the modern hero in search of his own identity; it is also the mythic 
voyage of a youngster too bold to lend ears to the wisdom of the old, and 
therefore doomed to a tragic end. Stephen's aestheticism is thus bound to fail 
when inscribed within the mythic structure that underlies the story: Stephen's 
attitudes, theories and expectations are put at a distance by the counterbalance 
of a negative valuation arising from the mythic narrative upon which they rest. 
This is a use of myth that attends to its structuring possibilities rather 
than to its content: the pattern of ascension and fall, and of tragic denial of 
parental authority, belongs both to A Portrait of the Artist and to the story of 
Icarus and Dedalus trying to escape from the labyrinth of Crete. Joyce's use of 
this myth, as a background pattern that also completes a suspended judgement 
on Stephen, points to a conception of myth as a structural truth, as a persisting 
pattern whose validity lies not in its content but in its very structure, and whose 
truth is endlessly and implicitly restated in narratives distant in time. 
Joyce, . -4 
Portrait of the Artist. p. 276. 
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Joyce subscribes most clearly to this idea of myth as structure with his 
writing of Ulysses, where the Homeric world lies always outside the text in 
terms of content, but always within when it comes to structure. Once again, the 
elaborate texture of parallelisms of Ulysses finds a precedent in A Portrait of 
the Artist. The cyclical character of mythic time and the structural repetition 
that any mythic narrative constitutes, already show within A Portrait of the 
Artist Joyce's concern with the value of mythic structure: 
[... ]the action of each of the five chapters is really the same action. The 
pattern of dream nourished in contempt of reality, put into practice, and 
dashed by reality, is worked out in the five chapters in five main 
modes, and in numerous subordinate instances. 56 
It is precisely when Stephen's experience is marked by the paradoxical 
temporality of mythic time, that the text itself shows its structure of repetition, 
even in the most explicit manner. Stephen and his beloved E. C. take the last 
tram home, and then Stephen arrives 
#n 
intense state of awareness, in which 6 
he heard what her eyes said to him from beneath their cowl and knew 
that in some dim past, whether in life or in revery, he had heard their 
tale before. 57 
56 Kenner, 'The Portrait in perspective', in Seon Givens (ed. ). James Joyce: Two Decades of 
Criticism, reprinted in Thomas Connolly (ed. ), Jovice'c Portrait: Criticisms and Critiques 
(London: Peter Owen, 1964), p. 56. 
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To this realisation follows Stephen's recalling of the time spent with Eileen, 
which is reproduced not through evocative allusions, but through a deliberate 
repetition of terms that the narrator already employed when this scene was first 
depicted. 58 Similarly, some lines of the passage that precedes Stephen's 
mingling of life and revery reappear unaltered in a later recalling. 59 The 
unpredictable succession of events, like the linearity of the narrative, seem then 
to be subject to a mythic structure of repetition. 
The mythic domain to which the overall structure of A Portrait of the 
Artist resorts is, as in Ulysses, that of pagan antiquity. However, the pagan 
experience of sacredness finds other expressions in the novel: Joyce transports 
us to the realm of Celtic myth when he portrays Stephen choosing a wood as a 
place that is apt for praying and charged with holiness: 
he remembered an evening when he had dismounted from a borrowed 
creaking bicycle to pray to God in a wood near Malahide. He had lifted 
up his arms and spoken in ecstasy to the sombre nave of the trees, 
knowing that he stood on holy ground and in a holy hour. 60 
It is important to note Stephen's posture, with his arms lifted up, as an 
expression of an attitude that is the direct opposite of a Christian spirit of 
57 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 72 
58 Compare Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist, pp. 72-3 with p. 43. 
5" See Joyce, .4 Portrait of the Artist, p. 
241. 
60 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 252. 
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servitude, and therefore essentially different from the kneeling down of 
Christian prayer. 
Yet Stephen holds towards the pagan holiness of his Irish ancestors the 
same attitude as towards Catholicism: Joyce tells us of Davin, one of Stephen's 
fellow students, whose 
nurse had taught him Irish and shaped his rude imagination by the 
broken lights of Irish myth. He stood towards this myth upon which no 
individual mind had ever drawn out a line of beauty and to its unwieldy 
tales that divided themselves as they moved down the cycles in the 
same attitude as towards the Roman catholic religion, the attitude of a 
dullwitted loyal serf .61 
This tells us not so much about Stephen's or Joyce's personal allegiance to the 
national or religious causes behind the myth, but rather about the kinship 
between these causes precisely by virtue of their mythical character: there is a 
point at which Irish nationalism is for Stephen as despicable as Roman 
Catholicism, but the possibility of their clash at the mythical level remains more 
revealing than Stephen's valuation here, since we have already seen that the 
ritual aspects of Catholicism belong to Stephen's life as part of his aesthetic 
vocation. Stephen's joint rejection of Irish myth and Catholicism as forms of 
servitude is here the other side of a joint embrace of both (partially illustrated by 
his praying in the wood) as mythical manifestations of aesthetic sacredness. 
61 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 195. 
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5.5. Restatement of a Nietzschean Dynamic: The Concern with Form 
5.5.1. Organicity and Analogy in Four Quartets. 
Myth, the element without which `all culture loses its healthy and natural 
creative power', 62 rests for Nietzsche in the balanced dynamic of the Apolline 
and the Dionysiac, of which tragic myth is the final achievement. The formal 
concerns that arise from A Portrait of the Artist and Four Quartets restate this 
dynamic, because the high level of formal awareness and perfection that they 
contain remains tied to an essential unmasterability. In Four Quartets, form and 
pattern are opposed to music and movement, in a reformulation of the 
Nietzschean opposition, but its paradoxical mutual dependence is stated as a 
condition of the distinction. Thus in `Burnt Norton', V, we read: 
Words move, music moves 
Only in time; but that which is only living 
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach 
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern, 
Can words or music reach 
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still 
62 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 109. 
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Moves perpetually in its stillness. 63 
The Apolline pattern grants movement its eternity, but it is simultaneously 
subjected to the perpetual movement that it hides. The eternity of a life that is 
more than `only living', and more than only words or music reaching into 
silence, depends not on the static quality of an eternalising pattern, but on the 
form of a perpetual movement. The validity of a pattern dissociated from the 
ever-changing flux that constitutes the ultimate truth cannot be sustained: 
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
For the pattern is new in every moment 
And every moment is a new and shocking 
Valuation of all we have been. 6' 
Thus the Nietzschean distrust of the illuminating power of form is here restated. 
The form that Eliot welcomes, the form of the Chinese jar, still and moving, has 
a necessary relation with life and dynamism: 
`form' and `pattern' ('Gestalt' in the background) are words that 
convey the indisputable truth that the whole may be more than the sum 
of the parts. This last phrase suggests organism, and `organism' implies 
life. 65 
63 Eliot, Collected Poems, p. 194. 
`'' Eliot, Collected Poems, p. 199. 
`'' Leavis, The Living Principle, p. 226. 
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Eliot's formal concerns take into account the inscription of form within a life 
that exceeds it, but also the dependence of life upon its formal expression: this 
double logic is contained in the paradoxical 
as a Chinese jar still 
Moves perpetually in its stillness, 
as well as in a recurrent pun on the double meaning of the word `still': as an 
adverb of time and as an adjective denoting lack of motion. Elusive temporality 
and the transcendental truth of pattern are but two sides of the same, and 
through this inescapable association Eliot builds a text that presupposes an 
internal commitment to life and dynamism. In this sense, Four Quartets can be 
fruitfully approached through the notion of `organism', as Leavis suggests, 
since the organic model of structure is precisely that which fuses the rigidity of 
form with the ever-changing life of engenderment and generation. It is also in 
this sense that the structure of analogical representation outlined in The Birth of 
Tragedy and implicit in A Portrait of the Artist (see 6.3.1) also applies to the 
underlying aesthetic of Four Quartets: form and life in a true work of art are not 
only a precondition of each other, but also each other's excess; organic 
reproduction both escapes and does not escape the transitoriness of the natural 
realm within which it occurs, since `art is not only an imitation of the truth of 
nature, but a metaphysical supplement to that truth of nature, coexisting with it 
in order to overcome it'. 66 That is to say, the organic mode of artistic 
66Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 114 [my italics]. 
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representation tries to overcome the dynamism of the truth of nature by an 
Apolline appeal to the illusoriness of a transcendent pattern, but since this 
pattern always falls back to the organic whole to which it belongs, form and 
contingency cannot but remain in tense coexistence. 
Organic reproduction is thus grounded on the same questioning of 
mimesis that is present both in Nietzsche's deciphering of the Apolline 
pretension of clarity and in Joyce's ritualistic use of words. Mimesis as the core 
of artistic representation had been regarded as an operation of minoring that 
presupposed an essential difference between two orders of reality: nature and 
art; the questioning of this mimetic structure implied a return to the richer 
possibilities of analogical modes of representation. Now Eliot's concern with 
pattern has led us to a similar criticism of mimesis and a similar return to the 
privileging of analogical relationships. The fact that Eliot's concern with form 
and pattern suggests the ideas of organism and organic life completes the 
aesthetics outlined by Nietzsche and embraced by Joyce: to a worldview that 
thinks of reality as held together by inexhaustible analogical relationships 
between entities, an organic view of reality adds the centrality of the living 
being, as a crucial point of intersection from which to understand the hierarchy 
of the real. Yet the organic remains only an instance of the mode of 
configuration by which structures reproduce within one another without being 
reducible to the sum of its constituents: analogy is thus a category that 
encompasses organicity, and grounds the tension between form and dynamism. 
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This unstable tension is at stake in Eliot's concept of `stillness', a central 
notion in the poems, around which revolve both the craving for the eternal and 
the reflections on the transitoriness of life. In Buckley's formulation, 
faith and doubt are, in Eliot's poetry, the bright misty outline of each 
other; and since it is pattern, not instantaneous revelation, that is in 
question, there is a dialectic in each of his major works between form 
and fragmentation, the establishment of pattern and the capture of the 
elusive moment. 67 
Even if we prefer to talk of a misty outline of each other, of an irrecoverable 
excess in respect to each other, rather than talking of a `dialectic', the question 
of this unstable relationship remains central: `the problem which Four Quartets 
pose, and pose quite deliberately, is that of the relation between moment and 
continuity, perception and pattern, shaft of sunlight and crowned knot of fire'. 68 
The success of Four Quartets in finding a solution for this problem consists in 
restating it not in terms of problem and solution, but in terms of an exploratory 
enquiry whose pattern is determined by its dynamism, as an aesthetic of 
incompletion that incorporates the force of its own production, just as an 
organic being owes its form to an undetachable process of generation. Four 
Quartets 
67 Buckley, Poetry and the Sacred, p. 207. 
"' Buckley, Poetry and the Sacred, p. 219. 
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achieves the pattern which is its subject; but it does so only by fighting 
out interiorly, and with great courage and resource, the problem 
involved of realising the possibility of pattern at each stage. This is 
perhaps the deepest sense in which it is an exploratory work; the 
`concepts' it creates have to do with its own procedures as much as 
with any philosophical or theological mysteries. 69 
The representational techniques that go with such a conception of artistic 
creation have to renounce the dualism inherent to restrictive symbolic structures 
that equate mimesis and representation. An organic reality that contains both 
the products and the objects of representation can only be rendered accurately 
by an analogical structure of meaning, to which Joyce has already introduced 
us; similarly, Eliot's technique 
is patterned in such a way as to evoke with splendid accuracy the feel 
of one order of existence yet to evoke also another order of existence to 
which the first has an analogical reference. It works not by deploying a 
central symbol in the midst of the details of some actual situation, but 
by suggesting symbolic references in the whole, and in every part, of 
what is sensuously present. We may call this an analogical use of 
symbolism. 70 
The building of analogical rather than merely symbolic relationships, and the 
underlying organic conception of reality, necessarily result in a view that 
69 Buckley, Poetry and the Sacred, p. 221. 
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conceives of nature as a sacred space, pervaded by the external sacredness 
which Modernity seemed unable to discover any longer, and which both 
Nietzsche and literary Modernism reaffirm within the limits of the aesthetic. 
The gods come back to inhabit the world, restoring the lost continuity between 
divinity and creation, and the reality of a fallen nature recovers the stamp of the 
divine. This becomes particularly clear in Eliot's treatment of nature, where as a 
result of an analogical treatment 
fire, frost, sap, blossom, cold, heat are items of a spiritual as well as a 
climatic condition; the pattern they compose reflects one in which 
Grace is co-present with nature, and in which the paradoxes of this 
extraordinary state of nature present the possibility of Grace. 71 
This `extraordinary state of nature' with which Eliot presents us is the result of a 
breach with the previous aesthetic tradition; analogy and organicity, as the 
modes of thought that granted the possibility of an enchanted nature, had 
persisted throughout Modernity and had even acquired a crucial role in the 
Romantic aesthetic. Nevertheless, the Modernist turn involves a direct 
engagement with those modes of thought, granting an experience that does not 
have to be clouded by anachronism or nostalgia. For the Modernist experience, 
70 Buckley, Poctrvv and the Sacred, pp. 232-3 
71 Buckley, Poetry and the Sacred, p. 233. 
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nature has lost its divine character only to recover it through the transfigurative 
power of the artistic stance towards the world. 
Nietzsche had incorporated these two elements (disenchanted nature and 
transfigurative art) to his theorising, following the Schopenhauerian ideas of the 
blindness of nature and the redemptive power of art. Yet Nietzsche's 
commitment to the artistic mode of experience (which pervaded his work up to 
the very end) allowed him to recover a conception of nature that joined divine 
significance with distance from Romantic visions. Precisely because nature is 
an amoral force (has become the Schopenhauerian flux of willing), we are in 
position to experience its original sacredness, its primary significance. What 
generates a pessimistic view in Schopenhauer becomes motive of joy in 
Nietzsche: the unavailability of spiritualised Romantic nature re-establishes our 
link with an originary experience, which to be fully authentic has to do away 
with the co-ordinates within which Modernity tried to understand it. On the 
other hand, the change of paradigm is only possible through an intensified 
awareness of the transfiguring power of art; art is not a consolation for the evils 
of existence, for the alienation from a disenchanted and amoral nature; art is the 
affirmation that restores reality to its dignity, nature to its sacredness, without 
turning them into an inaccessible realm or a subjective perception. The 
transfigurative power of art frames Nietzsche's metaphysics in The Birth of 
Tragedy, but it is ultimately the constant reference for a refinement of his 
concepts on his way to the metaphysics of the will to power, where the model is 
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still that of the power of artistic creation. Charles Taylor points to this 
continuity when he says that 
Nietzsche wanted to put behind him the doctrine of aesthetic 
transfiguration which he drew from Schopenhauer, and which marks 
his early work. He wanted to go beyond `justifying' the world through 
its manifestation in art and really affirm it. But some aspect of aesthetic 
transfiguration remains. What in the universe commands our 
affirmation, when we have overcome the all-too-human, is not properly 
called its goodness but comes close to being its beauty. It is perhaps 
not reducible to, but cannot be quite separate from, aesthetic 
categories. 72 
Through transfigurative art the universe becomes significant at a time when the 
emotive unity that the Romantics reached with nature is no longer credible; the 
creative power of the artistic imagination can no longer rely on the alignment 
between nature and the passions of the individual spirit, but this impossibility 
opens us to the richness of analogical structures of meaning, within which we 
can be fully reconciled with the sacredness of the external world, and 
communicate with the divine signs of creation. Thus for Eliot 
The dance along the artery 
The circulation of the lymph 
Are figured in the drift of stars 
72 Taylor, The Sources of the Self The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p. 454 
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Ascend to summer in the tree 
We move among the moving tree 
In light upon the figured leaf 
And hear upon the sodden floor 
Below, the boarhound and the boar 
Pursue their pattern as before 
But reconciled among the stars. 73 
The pattern that reconciles heaven and earth and presents the possibility of 
Grace shows now its kinship with the organic pattern that Four Quartets 
presuppose and are inscribed within. 
Likewise, Eliot reconciles nature and the world of the spirit in an appeal 
to a sensibility for which the spirit permeates familiar spaces. Thus in Ash 
Wednesday the following exhortation closes the poem: 
Blessed sister, holy mother, spirit of the fountain, spirit of the garden, 
Suffer us not to mock ourselves with falsehood 
Teach us to care and not to care 
Teach us to sit still 
Even among these rocks, 
Our peace in His will 
And even among these rocks 
Sister, mother 
And spirit of the river, spirit of the sea, 
Suffer me not to be separated 
73 Eliot, 'Burnt Norton', in Collected Poems, p. 191. 
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And let my cry come unto Thee. 74 
Here there is an explicit desire to recover the lost unity with nature, which is at 
the same time a desire for a communion with the universal spirit from which the 
self cannot `suffer to be separated'. The feminine figure of the addressee, sister 
and mother, is evocative not only of the interceding powers of the Virgin Mary, 
but also of the female gender of the spirit of natural production and generation. 
The individuality of the lyric voice longs to be absorbed by the whole, even if 
this involves a loss of self. 
But, if the relative autonomy of the Romantic self is not present in the 
Modernist poetry of T. S. Eliot (in order to remain open to the richness of 
external sacredness) what is the status of the individual spirit here? How to 
account for the detailed account of personal memories and impressions? One 
could say that Four Quartets suggests 
a fine balance between concentrated attention and the expansive 
response, between awareness of particulars and delight in the whole 
[... ]; an `impersonality' has been achieved not by escaping from or by 
disguising emotion but by accepting it and using it as an agent in the 
development of an analogical vision [... ]; a great religious poetry may 
74 Eliot, Ash Wednesday. V, in Collected Poems. p. 105. 
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be written in our time by accepting the self and, as it were, exploring its 
content. 75 
We could go even further, and affirm that the exploration of inwardness and the 
meaningfulness of an analogical world go together, since being faithful to the 
authenticity of one's own inner experience involves a breaking down of the 
boundaries of individual consciousness. In this sense Modernist literature 
implies a turn inward, a commitment to the exploration of the complexities of 
the inner self; for this task to be fulfilled, however, the self has to renounce its 
illusory unity and acknowledge its position at the point of convergence of 
multiple webs of meaning. The modernist self, as the self in Four Quartets and 
Ash Wednesday, is no longer unitary, and loses its centre. In Taylor's words, 
[... ] the epiphanic centre of gravity begins to be displaced from the self 
to the flow of experience, to new forms of unity, to language conceived 
in a variety of ways - eventually even as a `structure'. An age starts of 
`decentering' subjectivity [... ]. Decentering is not the alternative to 
inwardness; it is its complement. 76 
But the new conception of inwardness, which is also an enhancement, performs 
the same break with the Modern tradition as the one we encountered in the use 
75 Buckley. Poctr-i" and the Sacred, pp. 233-4. 
76 Taylor, Sources of the Se4, p. 465. 
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of modes of representation and treatments of nature. The rejection of the 
mimetic paradigm and the estrangement from nature are manifested at the level 
of the subject in a rejection of the notion of a unitary self: 
[... ] a turn inward, to experience or subjectivity, didn't mean a turn to a 
self to be articulated, where this is understood as an alignment of 
nature and reason, or instinct and creative power. On the contrary, the 
turn inward may take us beyond the self as usually understood, to a 
fragmentation of experience which calls our ordinary notions of 
identity into question [... ]. " 
Thus the loss of individual identity lies behind the intensity of experience in 
Four Quartets, as well as the sacredness of nature and the inexhaustibility of 
meaning. 
5.5.2. Language as a Questioning of Selfhood 
The exploration of Eliot's handling of his formal concerns has revealed the 
possibility of and aesthetic rendering of external sacredness in spite of the 
individuation of the modern spirit. Let us see whether the same path leads us to 
similar results in Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist, where selfhood and the sacred 
character of the modern individual's experience are thematised more explicitly. 
77 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 462. 
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In A Portrait of the Artist, the concern with form appears mainly as 
linguistic awareness, even though it is also significant that the narrative pattern 
as a whole has an epic nature, in that it depicts the spiritual voyage of the 
modern hero. But more present than a clearly defined structure of events is 
Stephen's constant reflection on language and words, denoting Joyce's formal 
concerns in connection, not only with the ritual functions already explored, but 
also with the inner world of the individual. Stephen wonders inwardly, through 
Joyce's use of free indirect speech: 
did he then love the rhythmic rise and fall of words better than their 
associations of legend and colour? Or was it that, being as weak of 
sight as he was shy of mind, he drew less pleasure from the reflections 
of the glowing sensible world through the prism of a language 
manycoloured and richly stored than from the contemplation of an 
inner world of individual emotions mirrored perfectly in a lucid supple 
periodic prose? 78 
Here the contrast between the visual and the rhythmic shifts to that between 
what in words is `legend', result of a communal experience, and what in them is 
instrument of the individual consciousness. The insistence on the importance of 
language, throughout the text and often in relation to Stephen's own conscious 
reflections, points to the irresolvability of Stephen's doubts, that is, to the 
impossibility of detaching one's own language from the mechanisms of its 
'S 1. Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, pp. 180- 
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production within a historical community, and, therefore, to the impossibility of 
conceiving of the sacredness of the self away from a broader context of 
sacredness. The awareness of linguistic form is what always puts Stephen in 
connection with what he wants to escape from, while at the same time allowing 
him to build his own aesthetic world. Through words he feels that he can assert 
his own spirit, but through words also he feels that he has to renounce his 
selfhood: 
how beautiful the words were where they said Bury me in the old 
churchyard! A tremor passed over his body. How sad and how 
beautiful! He wanted to cry quietly but not for himself: for the words 
[.. 1.79 
This duality, characterising words as instruments of aesthetic self-realisation of 
the individual, but also as instruments of a constant loss in impersonality, stays 
unresolved throughout the novel, signalling how Joyce restated within his work 
the tension between form and the unmasterable, between linguistic pattern and 
formless reality. Stephen, who, using language as a poet, wants to affirm all the 
profundity of his own spirit, is made constantly aware of how his language is 
not just an instrument, but a reality that only to the extent to which it goes far 
beyond his individual history is apt for aesthetic purposes: 
"' Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 22. 
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his own consciousness of language was ebbing from his brain and 
trickling into the very words themselves which set to band and disband 
themselves in wayward rhythms. 80 
The words arrange themselves without the intervention of Stephen's will; in 
fact, Stephen's linguistic awareness, and Joyce's insistence on the linguistic 
level of the novel, have the effect of a counterbalance to Stephen's own 
affirmation through art: he realises that because his language is, more than 
instrument, the matter for his aesthetic pursuits, his language has an obscure life 
beyond himself, and it asserts not so much the sacred character of his cherished 
selfhood as the sacredness of an impersonality beyond individuation. 
Thus Stephen's experience of the possibilities of linguistic form results 
in a questioning of the unitary self analogous to that resulting from Eliot's 
concern with a dynamic pattern. The inexhaustibility of linguistic associations 
is not only the ground of a ritualistic use of language (as seen in 4.3.1. ); it is 
also the instrument of the dissolution of the psychological boundaries of 
Stephen's selfhood: 
Joyce's associative techniques [... ] are neither deterministic nor 
capricious. They are rooted in a patristic theory of language descended 
from the custom of viewing the universe as a book to be read, to which 
ýU Joyce, .4 Portrait of the 
Artist. p. 193. 
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any written book bears an analogical relation, so that the work of art 
always has ontological rather than merely psychological content. 81 
As with Eliot's formal concerns, the exploration of the complexity of 
linguistic patterns cannot be detached from an enriched conception of reality: 
`the ambiguity of the words corresponds directly with the multiple significance 
of the object', 82 even if after A Portrait of the Artist for Joyce this 
correspondence seems to weaken in favour of a formalist interplay that 
progressively closes upon itself. Yet a continuity of aesthetics subsists, and we 
can even say, with H. Kenner, that `the Portrait is not as far as it seems from 
Finnegans Wake; indeed, a Finneganistic handling of language appears beneath 
it as a sort of subconscious'. 83 
Sometimes linguistic awareness is even motive for Stephen's 
estrangement, as when he reflects on how the English language, as a cultural 
product of a historical community that is not his own, belongs to the dean 
before it belongs to him: 
the language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How 
different are the words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on 
mine! I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit. His 
ý1 Kenner, `The Portrait in Perspective'. p. 47. 
82 Kenner, The Portrait in Perspective', p. 48. 
S; Kenner, `The Portrait in Perspective', p. 48. 
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language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired 
speech. ` 
Therefore, Joyce's restatement of the tension between form and indeterminacy, 
in the manner of linguistic awareness and association, counts against Stephen. 
However, just as Eliot reaches into a deeper communion with aesthetic 
sacredness when accepting the self and surpassing it, likewise Stephen's 
gestures cannot but include a wider and wiser scope of movement when advised 
by his awareness of a language that does and does not belong to him, that 
constitutes him and holds a necessary relation to what is other. Language for 
Joyce is not only the Apolline instrument of individuation and the guarantor of 
identity, but also the voice of the ritual and of the loss of the self in 
impersonality. 
5.6. The Self-reflexivity of Art in Modernist Writing 
The explicitness of formal awareness in A Portrait of the Artist leads to a 
movement of self-reflection: we participate in Stephen's train of thought 
because his mind is devoted to the words (often the written words) to which we 
have direct access; in this sense, the text of A Portrait of the Artist makes an 
object of itself, in an autoreferen ial gesture that is characteristic of Modernist 
E 
literature. A Portrait of the Artist is a writing about the childhood and 
' Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 205. 
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adolescence of a writer (the fictionalised author) that experiences language, 
often in its written form: therefore, the text in front of us has a problematic 
status, that resists a definition in relation to an instrumental or representative 
use of narrative language. 
Reflexivity goes even further in Four Quartets, where some passages are 
a direct commentary of the preceding lines, and are acknowledged as such: 
That was a way of putting it - not very satisfactory: 
A periphrastic study in a worn-out poetical fashion, 
Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle 
With words and meanings. The poetry does not matter. 
It was not (to start again) what one had expected. 85 
At times, the self-references adopt the form of a recalling proper to the style of 
prose writing: 
I have said before 
That the past experience revived in the meaning 
Is not the experience of one life only. 86 
Some other times, the object is not the text itself but the process of its 
composition, the interiority of the author in his creative process: 
8' Eliot, Collected Poems. p. 198. 
86 Eliot, Collected Poems, p . 208. 
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So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years - 
Twenty years largely wasted, the years of 1 'entre deux guerres - 
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt 
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure. S7 
This reflexivity is a characteristic trait of an art that, through reflection on its 
own status, seeks to establish its autonomy with respect to everyday life. 
Detachment is manifested as a dissociation from the public sphere that has the 
consequence of asserting the sacredness of the private sphere, although at times, 
as in some avant-garde movements, detachment takes the opposite form: the 
active leadership of political or social subversion against established orders. In 
either case, what is presupposed is the irreconcilability of art and public life, of 
established social structures and aesthetic creation and experience, these now 
belonging to a purely autonomous realm, in a non-accidental parallel with the 
process of privatisation of religious experience that Modernity constitutes. 
However, the refusal to submit to the ordered structure of the modern 
polis that Modernist art makes, and that is evoked by the self-reflexivity of the 
texts by Eliot and Joyce, also entails a certain return to an ancient community: 
that of the unifying religious character of the Dionysiac that allowed for 
the original formation of tragedy, whose purely religious beginnings 
rule out the very idea of contrasting the populace with the nobility, as 
indeed they exclude the whole area of political and social concerns. "' 
17 Eliot, Collected Poems, p. 202. 
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Art's search for autonomy hides then the affirmation of another kind of 
community beyond the ordered structure of the secularised modern state: the 
affirmation of a community of sacredness. 
With this idea in mind, the dissociation which reflexivity points to does 
not necessarily entail aestheticism, as a devotion to art against life. Rather, in so 
far as the idea of a community can be thought not in opposition to art but as 
required by the very idea of an art faithful to its origins, the notion of a sacred 
community depends on the idea of an autonomous art, and art becomes not an 
obstacle but a model for the affirmation of life, even of public life. 
This surpassing of aestheticism that The Birth of Tragedy theorises may 
perhaps find a clearer example in the text of Four Quartets, since there poetry is 
conceived of in conjunction with a religious experience that is not restricted to 
the realm of the individual and that makes a considerable abstraction of a 
particular creed. A Portrait of the Artist, on the contrary, seems to surrender to 
the attitudes of an aesthetic decadentism, and some passages can certainly be 
viewed as a replica of 19th century aestheticism: 
0! In the virgin womb of the imagination the word was made flesh. 
Gabriel the seraph had come to the virgin's chamber. An afterglow 
deepened within his spirit, whence the white flame had passed, 
deepening to a rose and ardent light. That rose and ardent light was her 
\ti 
Nietzsche, The Birth qf Ti ag>cJ i, p. 36. 
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strange wilful heart, strange that no man had known or would know, 
wilful from the beginning of the world: and lured by that ardent 
roselike glow the choirs of the seraphim were falling from heaven. 89 
In contrast with these aestheticised images and delight in subtle devotional 
passions, the whole context of A Portrait of the Artist reveals more than just a 
superficial link between art and religion that would only adopt the form of an 
aesthetic recalling of the plastic suggestiveness of religious imagery; it reveals, 
rather, the texture of sacredness already referred to, intertwining Stephen's 
religious and aesthetic experience, and therefore it presupposes Stephen's 
failure after the final gesture of disavowal that closes the story. 
For all this Stephen is not only an aesthete, 90 and A Portrait of the Artist 
contains more than aestheticism. The reconciliation of art and life, if 
unaccomplished within the plot, is already present in the complexity of 
Stephen's experience, even if he does not know how to interpret it: after all, he 
is still a `young man'. And the terms of this reconciliation do not have to be 
those of a compromise ratified by biographical data: we do not need to 
`conclude that Joyce modifies Stephen's theories'; 91 we can understand A 
Portrait of the Artist as a profound aesthetic affirmation of life that redeems its 
own imperfections of attitude without having to resort to biography or textual 
'`' Joyce, A Portrait of the . -irrist, p. 
236. 
90 For the view of Stephen as an aesthete, see Beebe, Ivory Towers and Sacred Founts, p. 263. 
91 Beebe, Ivory Towers and Sacred Founts, p. 295. 
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history. Likewise, Four Quartets carries within itself the same Nietzschean 
affirmative aesthetic impulse, problematised in this case by questions of dogma 
and tradition. 
ý, ý ýý2ýýý ý( 
6. Eliot vs. Joyce: The Dissymmetry of Convergent Lines 
Both Four Quartets and A Portrait of the Artist restate a link between the 
sacred and the aesthetic, but they do so from standpoints that at times involve a 
clear opposition: while T. S. Eliot relies on the continuity of tradition to re- 
engage in a sacral-aesthetic experience, Joyce stresses the discontinuity that the 
rebellious spirit of Stephen sees as a necessary condition for his own 
consecration as an artist; while for Eliot religion becomes the privileged 
element, the source of sacredness that nurtures his creations, for Joyce art has to 
remain sovereign if it is to fulfil the ambitions of Stephen's aesthetic 
priesthood. Therefore, there is in both cases an instability pointing to the 
difficulty of achieving the balance of a sustained tension: Four Quartets bends 
towards the authority of religious experience, to which artistic impulses submit, 
and A Portrait of the Artist proclaims the superiority of art in an aestheticist 
rejection of the continuity of religious tradition. In this respect these texts are 
the poles of an opposition, despite their convergence at fundamental points, and 
the terms of this opposition determine how convincingly articulated we see the 
mutual requirement of the sacred and the aesthetic that the texts involve. 
A first response is to acknowledge that the terms of this opposition (an 
affirmation of one notion at the expense of the other in each case) count against 
a tension that the texts maintain with some of their own presuppositions: with 
the affirmation of the creative impulse in Four Quartets, and with the pervasion 
of tradition in A Portrait of the Artist. Thus, to the extent to which this tension 
237 
cannot be resolved, in spite or because of the attempted opposition, these texts 
invite us to rethink some of the foundations of art and religion, in a Nietzschean 
fashion, through a resort to a single conceptual framework. 
6.1. Religious Commitment vs. Aestheticism 
What first strikes us is not the convergence of Four Quartets and A Portrait of 
the Artist, but a distinct contrast of attitudes: there is the starkest contrast 
between the humility of Eliot's lyrical voice and the boldness of Stephen. In 
Four Quartets poetry is presented as an instrument for the affirmation of 
something greater, as an instrument of self-denial: 
The only wisdom we can hope to acquire 
Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless. ' 
The negative tone in talking of the human condition and human endeavours to 
apprehend reality appears throughout the poems, conveying a mood of 
pessimism that rejoices in dwelling in the negative: 
And what you do not know is the only thing you know 
And what you own is what you do not own 
And where you are is where you are not. ` 
1 Eliot. 'East Coker, IF, in Collected Poems, p. 199. 
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This negative view of human life, imposed by an emphasis on the ascetic 
elements of the Christian religion, is regarded by F. R. Leavis as an 
inconsistency: 
Eliot's kind of `humility', consistently believed in, amounts to nihilism. 
But he is not, of course, consistent [... ]. Even when there is no 
conclusive evidence, one suspects in cases of such anti-human 
`spirituality' that there is a compensating worldiness. But the 
inconsistency that stares us in the face is his seeking to establish the 
inevitability of his pondered negation by the exercise of intensely 
skilled human creativity - his own as a poet. 
3 
If we agree with these views we have to conclude that Eliot's artistic success 
counts against a religious view dissociated from an alignment with an aesthetic 
recreation of life. For the kind of spiritual reality that Four Quartets tries to 
attain, against its own poetic success, is often placed out of life, thus 
subscribing to the characteristic nihilism that Nietzsche sees in Christian 
thought: 
the reality that Eliot seeks to apprehend being spiritual, he assumes that 
the spiritual must be thought of as the absolute `other' - the 
antithetically and excludingly non-human [... ]. The real to be 
apprehended is nothing. It is the postulated otherness, the only relation 
2 Eliot, 'East Coker. III', in Collected Poems, p. 201. 
3 Leav is, The Living Principle, p. 215. 
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to which that can be conceived for human nullity is one of conscious 
utter abjectness, utter impotence, utter nullity. 4 
The placing of spiritual value in a transcendent realm to which there is no direct 
access is a well-known gesture, and finds its source in the nihilistic affirmation 
of negativity that lies at the basis of the life-negating discourses, among which 
Nietzsche places Christianity itself. To the extent to which Eliot is engaged in 
the negative, ascetic attitude that Christianity legitimises, he is keeping at a 
distance from Nietzsche's artistic metaphysics, and he is also reinforcing an 
opposition between Four Quartets and A Portrait of the Artist. In his concern to 
apprehend the third term beyond the immanence of life and death, since 
that which is only living 
Can only die, 5 
Eliot resorts to the Christian tradition of pessimism about the human condition 
and to the affirmation of an unattainable transcendence defined by opposition to 
the earthly world. Yet this conception is not consistent with the celebration of 
poetic creativity that the text tacitly (and often explicitly) asserts. Such an 
inconsistency prompts Leavis's question: 
how could `spiritual reality', for the apprehending of which Eliot (thus 
involuntarily conceding the point) uses the word `conscious' be a 
Leavis, The Living Principle, p. 203. 
5 Eliot, `Burnt Norton, V', in Collected Poems. p. 194. 
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reality for us, or anything but a conventionally empty phrase. unless 
apprehended out of life, in which we are. and in terms of our human 
livingness? 6 
Leavis finds a satisfactory explanation for this paradox by appealing to the 
creative nature of language, and of poetic language in particular, which grants 
us a community of meaning and an access to spiritual truth. Eliot loses his own 
selfhood and transcends the enclosure of his human condition as soon as he 
embarks in a literary creative process, both by the communal essence of 
language, which no individual can appropriate, and by the impersonality of 
artistic creation: 
when the artist is creatively successful the creativity to which the 
achievement belongs is not his, though, while transcending the person 
he is, it needed his devoted and supremely responsible service. The 
creative power and purpose don't reside within his personal self- 
enclosure; they are not his property or in his possession. He serves 
them, not they him. 7 
Once the individual behind the lyric voice of Eliot is taken to be, in Nietzsche's 
terminology, an illusion, the necessary illusion that, according to the theory in 
The Birth of Tragedy, lyric poetry uses to grant us an insight into reality, then 
the claims that belong to such an individual can be said to be alien to the higher 
truth that the poems state, and to stand in contradiction with it: Eliot 
6 Leavis, The Living Principle, p. 181. 
7 Leavis. The Living Principle. p. 18-5. 
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is blind to the contradiction that he enacts and is. What he believes in 
supremely (the evidence being the poetry itself) is the taxing human 
responsibility represented by his devotion to his art - the art to which 
his genius has dedicated him. What he asserts about his spiritual quest 
is worth little; the questing that matters is inseparable from the arduous 
creativity. 8 
Therefore, the recognition of the literary value of Four Quartets involves the 
adoption of a frame of mind within which the individual is surpassed by the 
impersonality of creation and of language itself, and within which spiritual 
value appears inseparably linked to the artistic loss of the self and to the life of 
which the artistic process is part, rather than to the affirmation of an 
irreconcilable transcendence: 
only out of life and by the living, who are of it - of the life that is 
inseparable from the creativity intensively manifested by the artist - 
can spiritual values be recognised, served and maintained. To posit, as 
Eliot does, human impotence and nullity is to face oneself with the 
void, with emptiness, with nothingness. 9 
These statements seem to reinforce the Nietzschean oppositions, aligning 
spirituality (as one of the conceptions of the sacred) with the loss of the self in 
artistic creativity, while reserving for the asceticism of Christianity the morbid 
Leavis, The Living Principle, p. 198. 
9 Leavis, The Living Principle, p. 205. 
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delight in the affirmation of nothingness; through these oppositions Eliot's own 
contradictions become clearer: 
in demonstrating his supreme respect for his creativity, the artist 
demonstrates his allegiance to what he knows to be other than himself. 
The demonstration is the assertion of spiritual values, spiritual 
significance, spiritual authority; the resulting evidence their 
vindication. In his witness to the disastrousness of today's triumphant 
philistinism Eliot performed a great service to life and humanity; in his 
assertion of human abjectness and nullity he denied his implicit 
affirmation [... ]. 1O 
However, just as Nietzsche 
/s 
formulations yield to more than interpretations 6 
that preserve dualisms, the engagement with spiritual values in Four Quartets 
does not have to be searched for away from Eliot's Christian beliefs, nor does 
religion in Four Quartets respond only to a modern spirit that has lost touch 
with the original sacredness and has to recover it through an irreconcilable 
aesthetic activity. Even if an opposition to A Portrait of the Artist qualifies 
Four Quartets as a text that privileges religious experience, this distinctive trait 
is not a ground on which to justify a dissociation between the sacred and the 
aesthetic within the poems, claiming either a submission of a poetic project to a 
religious aim or, as Leavis does, an affirmation of spiritual value in spite of 
anti-aesthetic religious views. That this dissociation cannot be claimed to exist 
"° Leavis, The Living Principle, p. 205. 
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will become clearer through an exploration of Eliot's blending of mythic past 
and Christian tradition (see 6.2, below). 
First let us see in what way A Portrait of the Artist stands at the other 
end of the opposition: if humility is the resting place of Eliot's spiritual quest, 
arguably to the detriment of his aesthetic purposes, for Stephen boldness is the 
precondition of his artistic consecration, manifested from his early years in an 
attitude of detachment from and also of challenge to social bonds, all to the 
effect of enhancing his own consciousness as an individual, as someone who 
stands apart and knows no humble renouncement, but no feeling of communion 
either. Stephen hears the voices that tie him to his family, his land and his 
religion, but cannot reconcile them with a spiritual longing that only finds rest 
in loneliness or in his own creations: 
in the profane world, as he foresaw, a worldly voice would bid him 
raise up his father's fallen state by his labours and, meanwhile, the 
voice of his school comrades urged him to be a decent fellow, to shield 
others from blame or to beg them off and to do his best to get free days 
for the school. And it was the din of all these hollowsounding voices 
that made him halt irresolutely in the pursuit of phantoms. He gave 
them ear only for a time but he was happy only when he was far from 
them, beyond their call, alone or in the company of phantasmal 
comrades. " 
11 Joyce. . -1 Portrait of the 
Artist. pp. 88-9. 
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In his path towards art, Stephen finds in religion and the church no possible 
ally: the virtues of the priest could not be further away from the artistic 
affirmation of life that he seeks. Of a priest Stephen thinks that he 
had remained ungraced by aught of saintly or of prelatic beauty. Nay, 
his very soul had waxed old in that service without growing towards 
light and beauty or spreading abroad a sweet odour of her sanctity -a 
mortified will no more responsive to the thrill of its obedience than was 
to the thrill of love or combat his aging body, spare and sinewy, greyed 
with a silverpointed down. 12 
Thus discontinuity with the past, with tradition and with religion is for Stephen 
a precondition of a life that seeks to apprehend aesthetic truth. The boldness of 
the young artist, who wants to break all the ties that constrain the richness of his 
individual spirit, stands in opposition to the mature poet who preaches humility 
and puts art to the service of revelation: A Portrait of the Artist and Four 
Quartets are in this respect the expressions of contrary intentions. Yet their 
points of convergence are as relevant as their dissimilarities, since they 
constitute a restatement of the link between sacredness and the aesthetic not 
only in the terms already described in previous pages, but also in those resulting 
from the oppositions just pointed to. In the case of Four Quartets, this essential 
link is now stated, beyond religious asceticism or poetic immanence, through a 
resort to the mythical character of Christianity and the musical quality of lyric 
poetry. In the case of A Portrait of the Artist, it is stated, beyond sterile 
12 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 200. 
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aestheticism or artistic selthood, through the portrayal of a communion with 
reality in the form of an `epiphany', of a manifestation whose perception is 
qualified as an experience of the sacred. 
6.2. Mythic Christianity and Mythic Consciousness 
The mythical conception of the past determines the engagement of Four 
Quartets with tradition, and, by extension, with the Christian tradition to which 
they adhere. The Christian references already alluded to in chapter 5 are 
interwoven with a conception of time and nature that unveils not only a mythic 
interpretation of Christianity but also its reconciliation with what seems to deny 
the two central Christian ideas of linearity and asceticism. The reflection on 
time takes up a great part of the poems, but from the very beginning it points to 
the present as the privileged place from which to understand temporality: 
What might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining a perpetual possibility 
Only in a world of speculation. 
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. 13 
13 Eliot, `Burnt Norton, I', in Collected Poems. p. 189. 
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Actuality is valued more than speculation, the present more than the past or 
what is only possible; yet Eliot does not dare affirm at this stage the primacy of 
the present with all its consequences, for fear that 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 14 
Not many lines below, however, the step is taken, and the eternity of the present 
within the present is seen to be the only possible redemption: because time can 
only be eternal in its contingency, in its being eternally present, only through 
time can time be transcended: 
Time past and time future 
Allow but a little consciousness. 
To be conscious is not to be in time 
But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden, 
The moment in the arbour where the rain beat, 
The moment in the draughty church at smokefall 
Be remembered; involved with past and future. 
Only through time time is conquered. '5 
Present and actuality contain transcendence within themselves, just as the 
recalled images have to be involved in some kind of present to belong to the 
14 Eliot, 'Burnt Norton, I', in Colleted Poems, p. 189 
`ý Eliot, `Burnt Norton, II', in Collected Poems. p. 192. 
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immortality of the eternal flux of time, in which the present eternally is and 
ceases to be. 
This privileging of the present is also to be found as the result of 
Nietzsche's theory of the eternal return, even if attained through a different 
path; the present there acquires the value of the eternal, since it will be repeated 
endlessly in exactly the same form, and this is a motive of rejoicing for noble 
natures: those who seek to affirm the immediacy of life without ascribing 
transcendence to a realm alien to life itself The link between circularity and the 
eternity of present time can also be traced in Four Quartets: real time is not the 
time that can be measured, but a time that surpasses past and future and 
dissolves distinctions: 
The tolling bell 
Measures time not our time, rung by the unhurried 
Ground swell, a time 
Older than the time of chronometers, older 
Than time counted by anxious worried women 
Lying awake, calculating the future, 
Trying to unweave, unwind, unravel 
And piece together the past and the future, 
Between midnight and dawn, when the light is all deception, 
The future futureless, before the morning watch 
When time stops and time is never ending; 
And the ground swell, that is and was from the beginning. 
Clangs 
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The bell. 16 
The bell stands as a particularly ambiguous symbol, since it evokes both the a- 
temporality of spiritual life, to which the sacred place of the church is devoted, 
and the only constant instrument of measure in country life, where otherwise the 
cycles would stretch and shrink according to nature's. 
The cyclical structure of the real, eternal in its contingency, endlessly 
becoming and ceasing to be present, corresponds to the cycles of nature. Eliot 
delights in this correspondence in the following passage as much as Nietzsche 
does in his evoking of mythic times: 
Earth feet, loam feet, lifted in country mirth 
Mirth of those long since under earth 
Nourishing the corn. Keeping time, 
Keeping the rhythm in their dancing 
As in their living in the living seasons 
The time of the seasons and the constellations 
The time of milking and the time of harvest 
The time of the coupling of man and woman 
And that of beasts. Feet rising and falling. 
Eating and drinking. Dung and death. '7 
16 Eliot, `The Dry Salvages, I', in Collected Poems, p. 206. 
17 Eliot, 'East Coker, I', in Collected Poems. p. 197. 
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Here the dark and crude tones reinforce the authenticity of an original and 
primal experience, where human life is tributary to the natural cycles, and these 
in turn become living entities. This experience puts us in touch with a 
primordial sacredness, with the celebrations of the festivals and with an eternal 
rhythm that arises from birth and death, from generation and corruption. The 
dead live on because of their mortality, not in spite of it; sacredness belongs to 
nature, to `The life of significant soil', 18 and to the everyday experience of it. 
That this passage is meant to be a contrast to the harmonic vision of divine 
order that the poems seek to attain is only confirmed by an interpretation that 
narrows considerably the scope of Eliot's poetic views. The unpleasantness 
conveyed by these lines does not necessarily imply a negative judgement of 
ancient feelings: rather, it opens our modern notions of sacredness to the crudity 
and ambiguity of their origins. '9 
The mythical resonances of cyclical time in nature are recaptured in the 
evocation of the ecstasy of laughter and generation, offering a further challenge 
to the Christian ideas of linearity and asceticism: 
The laughter in the garden, echoed ecstasy 
Not lost, but requiring, pointing to the agony 
Of death and birth., " 
18 Eliot, The Dry Salvages, V', in Collected Poems, p. 213. 
19 Yet for a view that supports a negative valuation on the part of the author, see A. D. Moody, 
Thomas Stearns Eliot Poet (Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 208-11. 
20 Eliot. 'East Coker, III', in Collected Poems, p. 201. 
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And since nature is the source of the sacred, the realm of cyclical temporality 
from which eternity springs, as well as the realm of endless generation of life 
from which transcendence arises, gods inhabit nature just as the Titanic forces 
that gave birth to the Olympian lineage. Nature retains its enchantment for 
Eliot, against the effects of secularisation, and within a literary enactment of a 
spiritual quest: 
I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river 
Is a strong brown god - sullen, untamed and intractable, 
Patient to some degree, at first recognised as a frontier; 
Useful, untrustworthy, as a conveyor of commerce; 
Then only a problem confronting the builder of bridges. 
The problem once solved, the brown god is almost forgotten 
By the dweller in cities - ever, however, implacable. 
Keeping his seasons and rages, destroyer, reminder 
Of what men choose to forget. Unhonoured, unpropitiated 
By worshippers of the machine, but waiting, watching and waiting. 21 
Through the primacy of the present, inscribed in the eternal return of the 
cyclical time of an enchanted nature, Eliot engages in a mythic mode of thought 
that once again adds a mythic character to the Christian impetus of the poems. 
Christianity appears, within Four Quartets, with the misty quality of ancient 
myths. 
21 Eliot, The Dry Salvages, I', in Collected Poems, p. 205. 
251 
In a parallel way, Joyce adds a mythical quality to the Christian 
references in A Portrait of the Artist, not least by the story's superposition to the 
ancient myth of Icarus' fall; Stephen's fall is only adumbrated within the story, 
but it is also from this perspective a religious fall: Dedalus brings as many 
mythic resonances as Saint Stephen does, and the protagonist stands in the 
convergence of both worlds. The mythic texture that pervades the novel is not 
altogether alien to Stephen's own awareness: 
it shocked him to find in the outer world a trace of what he had deemed 
till then a brutish and individual malady of his own mind. His recent 
monstrous reveries came thronging into his memory. They too had 
sprung up before him, suddenly and furiously, out of mere words. 22 
The external world follows the pattern of the imagination, just as in prophecy 
and mythic narrative the order of words prefigures and structures experience. 
In contrast with this shared and often unacknowledged awareness of the 
mythic character of religious narratives (both in A Portrait of the Artist and 
Four Quartets), other works by Joyce and Eliot display a very different attitude 
towards the aesthetic possibilities of myth. The Waste Land and Ulysses, for 
example, participate in a foregrounding of the structuring power of myth. While 
Ulysses, in one of its intelligent readings, reveals a deliberate and detailed 
mirroring of its Greek counterpart, The Waste Land integrates a plurality of 
lyric voices and traditions that through their free interaction expect to raise a 
22 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 95. 
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poetic experience in the reader. Such highly stylised and intellectualist gestures 
result in a loss of the appeal of the mythic voices themselves, which become all 
levelled and innocuous under the ordering pressure of a conscious artistic 
intellect. Eliot's sympathy for this modernist method of literary composition, 
shared with Joyce, is well known: 
In using myth, in manipulating a continuous parallel between 
contemporaneity and antiquity, Mr. Joyce is pursuing a method which 
others must pursue after him [... ]. It is simply a way of controlling, of 
ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama 
of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history. 23 
However, Eliot suspected that it was also necessary for ordering and shaping 
structures to remain implicit in order to retain their effectiveness; although in a 
different context, he declares: `what I want is a literature which should be 
unconsciously, rather than deliberately and defiantly, Christian'. 24 And yet what 
he does not seem to realise is that for a mythic narrative to remain unconscious, 
that is, full of possibilities, its narrator cannot step outside it, cannot aestheticise 
it. For this reason the mythic impetus of Four Quartets can be said to be more 
subtle and yet richer than that of The Waste Land (where Eliot stepped outside 
any commitment to the mythical voices), just as the same can be said of A 
Portrait of the Artist in relation to Ulysses. 
23 Eliot, 'L7''sses, Order and Myth', in Frank Kermode (ed. ), Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, 
(London: Faber & Faber. 1975: repr. 1987). p. 177. 
24 Eliot, `Religion and Literature', in Selected Prose, p. 100. 
253 
Thus the engagement in mythic consciousness is not properly a mode of 
consciousness, but an opening of the conscious individual, through his 
conscious choices, to a consciousness that surpasses him. Such a frame of mind 
transcends the aesthetic realm and determines attitudes towards religious belief 
and moral value. 
The mythic frame of mind that A Portrait of the Artist and Four 
Quartets share re-establishes a link with a mode of consciousness in which the 
intellect is not perverted by reason: Stephen's thinking incorporates the picture 
of an enchanted, intelligent nature, recurrent in the novel: 
then there flew hither and thither shapeless thoughts from Swedenborg 
on the correspondence of birds to things of the intellect and of how the 
creatures of the air have their knowledge and know their times and 
seasons because they, unlike man, are in the order of their life and have 
not perverted that order by reason. `5 
Also, this mythic frame of mind enters a conflict with questions about the dual 
nature of belief, whose unanswerability from this perspective is at this point 
insufficient for Stephen: 
25 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 244. For an exploitation of the associations pe °rted 
prompted by this instance of mythic consciousness in A Portrait of the Artist, see Roland Bates, 
'The Correspondence of Birds to Things of the Intellect', in James Joyce Quarterly, no. 2 
(Summer 1965). pp. 281-290. 
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Do you believe in the Eucharist? Cranly asked. 
-I do not, Stephen said. 
- Do you disbelieve, then? 
-I neither believe in it nor disbelieve in it, Stephen answered. 
26 
The fact that neither literal belief nor its negation are available to Stephen could 
have been regarded as a consequence of an aesthetic attitude towards religion. 
Eliot tells us that `if you can read poetry as poetry, you will "believe" in Dante's 
theology exactly as you believe in the physical reality of his journey; that is, you 
suspend both belief and disbelief . 27 Therefore, an aesthetic attitude that 
participates in mythic consciousness suspends the truth-value of the literal 
belief in a particular creed. And indeed the mythic frame of mind has been 
argued to be behind Eliot's surpassing of modem scepticism: 
the mythic method made possible for Eliot a kind of participation in 
Christianity in spite of the skepticism of nineteenth-century naturalism 
and the more pervasive skepticism of the early twentieth century which 
had discredited religious belief. Just as the structures of ancient myths 
and primitive rituals could serve as patterns of action and emotional 
response for poetry and drama, so the refinement of sensibility and 
organization of experience provided by the myths and rituals of modern 
21 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 260. 
" Eliot, quoted in Warner, `Philosophical Poetry: The Case of Four Quartets', Philosophy and 
Literature, 10,2,1986, p. 244 
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religion can function as an ordering of daily living and a philosophy of 
life. " 
From this, myth appears as a structural truth, as an organising pattern that yields 
to actualisation, whose original unity has now to be experienced in either 
artistic or religious manifestations. What is really important is not the 
contemporary actualisation of the myth, but the structure which subsists, and 
which corresponds to an irreducible pattern of experience. When the structure 
accumulates all importance the content becomes peripheral, and the question of 
literal belief is blurred or does not even arise: 
the nature of the mythic method, in fact, prevents the possibility of 
literal belief, of faith, in the myths and rituals that it reclaims. The 
simultaneity of past and present which must occur in the mythic 
method when the structure of ancient myth is incorporated into 
contemporary experience results in the holding of two points of view, 
past and present, simultaneously. 29 
This view of myth as structure, as a pattern of universal usefulness whose truth 
is its validity (its non-dependence on the truth of its manifestations), seems to 
resolve the paradox of Modernist mythopoeia. The third point, beyond naivity 
or scepticism, would not be a willing self-deception, an acting as if the ideals 
2 Skaff, The Philosophy of T. S. Eliot, p. 115. 
``' Skaff, The Philosophn" (? f T. S. Eliot. p. 115. 
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were true, but a conscious embracing of mythic structures in view of their 
validity: 
the third point of view that unites the mythic pattern and contemporary 
life, a past faith and a modem skepticism that finds it no longer true, is 
`mythic consciousness': a conscious living of a myth no longer a 
faith. 3o 
Since behind the myths lie structures whose validity overcomes the truth-value 
of their narratives, the aesthetically created character of the religious and moral 
values that myths present to us is not an obstacle for their abiding power: 
Modernist literature does not urge us to indulge in a self-deceptive attitude; it 
only turns our scepticism upside down, transforming the impossibility of belief 
into a privileged awareness to which different worldviews offer their structural 
truth. 
These ideas would certainly be in accord with Nietzsche's 
anti essentialism and with his relational notion of truth. Truth is for Nietzsche 
always reducible to something other than itself, ultimately to the will to power, 31 
and our experience of a world artistically created owes its consistency to this 
very act of creation: 
30 Skaff, The Philosophy of T. S. Eliot, p. 116. 
31 See Nietzsche, The U6 X11 to Poiter, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 
1967), paragraph 534. p. 290. 
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for Nietzsche, the external world we find ourselves in is literally shaped 
by us [... ]. It is only through the creation of [... ] a world of 
comparatively stable things and `identical cases' that the contents of 
our experience assume the order and regularity for prediction and 
control. 32 
However, things that are only comparatively stable and that ultimately depend 
on our own artistic creation cannot fully play the role of substantive entities 
upon which to base true statements: Nietzsche's furious antiessentialism lends 
itself to paradoxes that invalidate it, including the paradox of the impossibility 
of plurality, 33 thus denying a prerequisite for the very formulation of an 
anti essentialist statement. 
The difficulty of holding a purely relational notion of reality and a 
structural notion of truth finds a parallel in the loss of authenticity within an 
aesthetic view that lacks commitment to the myths it reproduces: the purely 
structural and external use of myth in Ulysses and The Waste Land lacks the 
force of a relationship within the realm of belief and disbelief. On the contrary, 
the tacit engagement with the mythic dimension of Christianity and its pagan 
resonances in Four Quartets and A Portrait of the Artist flows from the stability 
of a committed position: this is ultimately why Four Quartets offers the ease of 
a resting place and A Portrait of the Artist constitutes an episode of a tragic 
drama. In both cases the intention of the authors to present the lyric and the 
32 Peter Poellner. Nietzsche and Metaphysics. (Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 280. 
33 For an analysis of this paradox, see Poellner, . `ietzsche and Metaphysics, pp. 282-3. 
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narrative voices respectively assenting to, and dissenting from, a commitment to 
a Christian attitude, allows for a fluid deployment of mythic resonances that is 
lacking in a conscious, archaeological rephrasing of the mythic past. Thus the 
tragic mythic dimension of Stephen's demythologising in A Portrait of the 
Artist and the mythic resonances of religious affirmation in Four Quartets are 
two successful, though opposed, instances of Modernist mythopoeia. 
6.3. Continuity vs. Rupture: Two Attitudes before Tradition 
Eliot's favouring of an original experience does not imply a discontinuity, a 
mock re-enactment in a secluded world that dismisses a tradition other than the 
origin. It is only by appealing to his respect for tradition that we can 
accommodate the mythopoeic impetus of Eliot's poetry, its commitment to an 
original experience, within a work that thinks of itself as fundamentally 
Christian: 
And what there is to conquer 
By strength and submission, has already been discovered 
Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope 
To emulate - but there is no competition - 
There is only the fight to recover what has been lost 
And found and lost again; and now, under conditions 
259 
That seem unpropitious. 34 
Thus our present is not essentially removed from the truth that tradition 
incompletely states over and over again. Through our understanding of 
tradition, including a Christian tradition that does not dismiss the aesthetic 
power of its own myths, we can engage in a view of reality that, by keeping the 
memory of the ineffable, of what Nietzsche called the `Dionysiac wisdom', is 
aware both of the need, and of the precariousness, of its own mechanisms of 
representation, thus maintaining a tension that renders reality as both sacred and 
object of aesthetic contemplation: 
I have said before 
That the past experience revived in the meaning 
Is not the experience of one life only 
But of many generations - not forgetting 
Something that is probably quite ineffable: 
The backward look behind the assurance 
Of recorded history, the backward half-look 
Over the shoulder, towards the primitive terror. 35 
The primitive terror is the original experience of the unbearableness of reality, 
encapsulated by Nietzsche in the `wisdom of Silenus', the `Dionysiac wisdom' 
that tells us that the best of all things is [... ] not to be born, not to be, to be 
34 Eliot, 'East Coker. V', in Collected Poems, p. 203. 
`s Eliot, The Dry Salvages II'. in Collected Poems, pp. 208-9. 
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nothing'. 36 This primordial negative experience of life has its roots in the 
original fear that nature inspires, `behind the assurance / Of recorded history', 
and that places man at the mercy of an overwhelming power of destruction that 
he feels to be threatening for his own experience. Within the double nature 
inherent to sacredness, the dark side of boundless power remained for the 
Greeks linked to the ancient realm of the Titans, whose sombre qualities were 
surpassed by the radiance of the Olympian deities; for Christianity, the dark 
side of the divine, the awe-inspiring power of the wrath of God, is linked to the 
fallenness of the created world, which has to be redeemed through Christ's 
Incarnation and Passion. The memory of this unredeemed world, of frightful 
sacredness in a boundless nature, can be revived through a continuity in the 
experience of many generation, to which Eliot appeals in his engagement with a 
tradition that presupposes experience in its meaning. The past experience is not 
only remembered, but experienced again through the meaning of a continuous 
handing over between generations. 
Yet tradition is not by itself a warrantor of wisdom, and the past does 
not attain its authority just through a sequential priority: the continuity with the 
past has to be sanctioned by a certain selflessness: 
Do not let me hear 
Of the wisdom of old men, but rather of their folly, 
Their fear of fear and frenzy, their fear of possession, 
36 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 22. 
261 
Of belonging to another, or to others, or to God. 37 
Thus the notions of community, belonging and selflessness are attached to an 
authentic experience that the ancients did not always have. Here again those 
who forgot an original fear seem to have lost touch with an essential continuity. 
In their `fear of fear' they forgot not only `the primitive terror', but also the 
fundamental experience of community, which for the Greeks took precisely the 
form of Dionysiac `frenzy' and `possession'. Humility, the Christian virtue that 
in the Quartets appears as a resting place in the individual experience of time, is 
traced back in view of this passage to the ancient religious states from which the 
renouncement of the self thus appears linked to the rapture of the ancient cults. 
There is an unquestionable value in the abandonment of self-concern in order to 
be one with the deity and with our fellow men, but this belonging, this inter- 
penetration, is not here approached through references to Christian humility, 
charity of communion: rather, with these references in the background, `fear', 
`frenzy' and `possession' bring us back to the world of the ancient rituals, as a 
test for our valuation of tradition and for our own understanding of the 
continuity that is to be searched for. 
Such a continuity, grounded on the pervasiveness of Christianity in 
Western culture, incorporates for Eliot its own critics: 
37 Eliot. Collected Poems. p. 199. 
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an individual may not believe that the Christian faith is true, and yet 
what he says, and makes, and does, will all spring out of his heritage of 
Christian culture and depend upon that culture for its meaning. Only a 
Christian culture could have produced a Voltaire or a Nietzsche. 38 
Thus Voltaire's or Nietzsche's criticism of their inherited traditions can often be 
seen as a striving for greater faithfulness to those traditio themselves. If a 
continuity is granted, their criticisms are incorporated a movement that 
encompasses the quest for the always-elusive origin that Christianity both 
displaces and re-assumes. In this sense, Nietzsche's quest for the original 
authenticity of experience, away from the secularising power that Christianity 
contains within itself, restates an essential continuity with the past which is 
corroborated by Christianity's own mythopoeic force. It does not then come as a 
surprise that fundamental notions about `cultural health' and the nature of 
collective experience present close similarities in Eliot's and Nietzsche's views 
on cultural history. 
Both Nietzsche and Eliot conceive of culture as an organic being that 
cannot be fully detached from the material conditions of its birth and growth. 
For Eliot 
3ý T. S. Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (London: Faber & Faber. 1948; repr. 
1965), p. 122. 
Sý 
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what is wanted is not to restore a vanished, or to revive a vanishing 
culture under modern conditions which make it impossible, but to grow 
a contemporary culture from the old roots. 39 
Similarly, for Nietzsche, 
in the weary exhaustion of contemporary culture, [... ] we seek in vain 
for a single vigorously branching root, a patch of fertile and healthy 
soil: nowhere is there anything but dust, sand, petrification, drought. 40 
It is not accidental the we find here a resort to images taken from the organic 
world to characterise culture in opposition to the barrenness of the inorganic. In 
both cases there is an awareness of the specificity of cultural constructs, of the 
irreducibility of their structure and of their ineluctable relationship to the realm 
of nature. The `old roots' are for Nietzsche classic antiquity, but for Eliot also 
include our Christian past. Nietzsche seems to ignore at a certain point the 
fluidity of mythical representation, and its dynamic of fertile intercourse. Thus 
Nietzsche does not emphasise the mythopoeic aspects of Christianity, but its 
alignment with the Socratic secularising force of which it is an instance: 
let us imagine a culture without a secure and sacred primal site, 
condemned to exhaust every possibility and feed wretchedly on all 
39 Eliot, Notes..., p. 53. 
40 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 98. 
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other cultures - there we have our present age, the product of that 
Socratism bent on the destruction of Myth. 4' 
However, the organic imagery persists, and culture is still seen as a living 
organism that has to be nourished and is dependent on natural conditions of 
existence. Against references to planning, engineering or conscious structuring, 
Eliot also returns to this field of characterisation: 
culture is something that must grow; you cannot build a tree, you can 
only plant it, and care for it, and wait for it to mature in its due time. 42 
The unfolding of this imagery goes in Nietzsche along very similar lines, even 
though the fundamental divergence is found again in what counts as native or 
alien in a myth: 
it seems hardly possible to graft an alien myth on to a native tree 
without damaging the tree beyond repair. The tree may perhaps be 
strong and healthy enough to reject the foreign element after a terrible 
struggle, but it is generally consumed, becoming ailing and atrophied or 
exhausting itself in morbid growth. 43 
From t sýwords it seems clear that Nietzsches position rejects a mythical &v ýi. 
continuity between Antiquity and Christianity, and yet the meaningfulness of 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 110. 
42 Eliot, Notes..., p. 119. 
43 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy. p. 112. 
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his attacks and his reversals implicitly assumes such a continuity. Perhaps the 
aesthetic talent of Wagner was sharper than Nietzsche's when he had no 
difficulty in eventually passing on from Tristan und Isolde to Parsifal. 
In any case, it is significant that both Eliot and Nietzsche resort to an 
organic conception of culture, in the image of a growing tree, and that by doing 
so they both distance themselves from rationalist conceptions of social 
organisation. In fact, there is in both cases an underlying conservative social 
view, since the members of the organic community that they envisage stand in 
essential and asymmetrical relationship to each other, and their links are not of a 
contractual nature. Externally this is manifested in Nietzsche's nostalgia for the 
aristocratic past and in Eliot's conservative political views. 
In a further parallel way, if Nietzsche extends his aesthetic concern up to 
reclaiming for art the lost sacredness of ancient myths, Eliot arrives at a similar 
point through his call for a blend of religious and aesthetic sensibility: 
aesthetic sensibility must be extended into spiritual perception, and 
spiritual perception must be extended into aesthetic sensibility and 
disciplined taste before we are qualified to pass judgement upon 
decadence or diabolism or nihilism in art. To judge a work of art by 
artistic or by religious standards, to judge a religion by religious or 
artistic standards should come in the end to the same thing. 44 
44 Eliot, Notes..., p. 30. 
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This convergence of judgements reinforces the idea of a continuity between art 
and religion based on historical continuity: the continuous thread that links us 
to the past allows for the re-experiencing of a unity that from contemporary 
perspectives appears to be only an anachronism. But `the historical sense 
involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence'; `' 
our relationship with our past history is not only defined by distance, but also 
by immediacy, and our present valuations necessarily incorporate a 
consideration of the tradition to which they belong: 
no poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His 
significance, his appreciation, is the appreciation of his relation to the 
dead poets and artists. 46 
As a consequence of the logical priority of the context of tradition (the 
inescapable continuity where we always find ourselves), the features of 
individuality, originality and personal imprint are relativised and regarded as 
only secondarily artistic. The individual author has in some sense to disappear 
behind his work in order for artistic value to arise: the affirmation of 
individuality and the value of artistic products are incompatible ? t(/he face of ; ,l 
the inescapable context that artistic tradition constitutes. Therefore, the 
individual has to be sacrificed: 
45 T. S. Eliot, `Tradition and the Individual Talent', in The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetriy and 
Criticism (London: Methuen, 1920; repr. 1960). p. 44. 
"' Eliot, 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', p. 44. 
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what happens [to an artist in artistic creation] is a continual surrender 
of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable. 
The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual 
extinction of personality. 47 
Once again, we find here the opposition between the positing of individuality 
and the artistic insight into the boundlessness of reality, mediated by the 
structure of sacrifice. This opposition was used by Nietzsche in The Birth of 
Tragedy in his discussion of lyric poetry, where the personal character of the 
lyric voice was taken to be part of an illusory mechanism of representation that 
allowed the poet to express the ultimate truths of non-individuated reality. 48 
This theory is even corroborated by Joyce, although in the words of a Stephen 
still tributary to some Romantic notions: 
the lyrical form is in fact the simplest verbal vesture of an instant of 
emotion, a rhythmical cry such as ages ago cheered on the man who 
pulled at the oar or dragged stones up a slope. He who utters it is more 
conscious of the instant of emotion than of himself as feeling 
emotion. 49 
The self-forgetfulness of the lyric poet is then emphasised, even if the concept 
of emotion is hard to detach from the notion of a personal, Romantic self whose 
unity of inner world is ultimately the source of poetic value; yet the lyrical cry 
47 Eliot, `Tradition and the Individual Talent', p. 47. 
" See Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy. pp. 29-30. 
49 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist. p. 232. 
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has to be uttered in a state in which consciousness of the emotion-experiencing 
self is lost, emotion thus being something that escapes the boundaries of the 
personal individual. 
The continuity with the past that results in the impersonality of artistic 
creation is for Eliot part of a complex temporal structure, in which the 
dynamicity of the temporal flux is irreducible to the instants of its apprehension, 
while the present moment retains its paradoxical privilege in the midst of a web 
of interconnections: 
Time past and time future 
What might has been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. 50 
The sequences of both past and future share the same end (not a point of 
intersection, but an end, the final stage of a progression), and this end is their 
own impossibility, a perpetual moment that is more than `the present' in its 
being `always present'; moreover, the non-actualised possibilities of `what 
might have been', which could open the unfulfilled past to the unpredictable 
future, are aligned with the immobility of recorded past, of `what has been', 
adding to the fluidity of the distinctions. 
50 Eliot, 'Burnt Norton, I', in Collected Poems, p. 190. 
269 
The temporality of Stephen's experience also requires a reflection on the 
elusive boundaries of memory, actuality and expectation: 
[... ]she remembers the time of her childhood - and mine if I was ever 
a child. The past is consumed in the present and the present is living 
only because it brings forth the future. 5' 
Nevertheless, Stephen constantly rebels against a continuous temporality (he 
does not reappropriate his childhood, but forgets it). Stephen's artistic vocation 
requires a rupture: he has to create the yet uncreated, and he cannot rely on the 
continuity of his own experience or in that of an authoritative tradition. In 
Stephen Hero, Stephen declares: `No esthetic theory [... ] is of any value which 
investigates with the aid of the lantern of tradition'. 52 The context talks of the 
irreconcilability of diverse cultural traditions in relation to beauty, although it 
does not conclude with a relativist position: on the contrary, Stephen finds in 
the act of aesthetic apprehension the element that escapes the disconcerting 
plurality of aesthetic traditions. The mistrust for the illuminating force of the 
content of an artistic legacy is here clearly stated in aid of a theoretical enquiry 
that looks for the essence of art, but it is also endorsed by the general attitude of 
Stephen in regard to his own artistic aspirations. The artistic realm is the 
alternative for Stephen's dissatisfaction with his inherited country, family and 
religion. Only by conceiving of art as a detached and independent realm could 
51 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist. p. 273. 
52 James Joyce, Stephen Hero: Part of the First Draft of `A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Ahm ', ed. by Theodor Spencer (London: Jonathan Cape, 1944: repr. 1969), p. 217. 
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he devote all his enthusiasm to a life-project that would counterbalance the 
sterility of what he perceived to be his past experience. 
At this point the autobiographical parallels seem to reach a particular 
accuracy, pointing to Joyce's own voluntary exile, but they also throw light on 
how literary distance allowed Joyce perhaps more ambiguity th the inevitable h 
definiteness of his personal decisions. The boldness of Stephen in the Portrait, 
and his relentless desire a decisive rupture, are submerged in a narrative that 
11-or 
r'ý 
questions them in a way that the earlier text of Stephen Hero does not. Not only 
is the protagonist in the Portrait closer to an understandable humanity, but also 
the signs of rebellion and dismissal are structured in a more significant manner. 
Stephen in the form of an unsympathetic figure that rejects his past in favour of 
a rebellious aesthetic priesthood appears only towards the end of the novel, 
when the weight of the complexity of his earlier experiences already prompts a 
negative judgement on his attitudes of detachment. The entries in his diary 
contribute to a dramatic effect, that reaches its peak in the very lack of 
conclusion of its movement. Stephen's gesture rendered mistaken is left outside 
the plot of the story to retain all its tragic force and its ambiguity, but it is then 
associated with the unfortunate destiny of the son of the mythic Dedalus, the 
bold Icarus whom Ovid recounts and with whom Stephen identifies at the very 
beginning of his flight. Thus at the end of the novel the mythic story that 
remained either in the background or condensed in the exteriority of an 
epigraph suggests itself as the narrative that disambiguates Stephen's relation to 
tradition. Only along this path can we account differently for a rupture that 
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otherwise stands in clear contrast with Eliot's immersion in the nurturing flow 
of a continuous past. 
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6.4. Narrativity vs. Selflessness in Music 
An insistence on the recognition of the illusoriness of identity as an insight into 
the depth of reality, is kept by the pervasion of the musical throughout the 
poems, since in Four Quartets, as in The Birth of Tragedy, music is the realm 
of the loss of the individual will. This musical pervasion goes from the 
connotations of the general title to the structure of the poems, in which the 
themes are recurrent and developed as if in a musical exposition: 
the themes are both stated, as themes are in music, and asked as 
questions, as themes are in philosophy: questions about time and 
eternity, history and the Incarnation, sanctity and poetry, the whole and 
the new, the opaqueness and the transparency of personal experience. 
The musical themes receive a philosophical extension, and the 
philosophical questions receive a musical elaboration. 53 
Music is also present in the complex allusions to the relationship between 
movement and stillness, and presupposed in the constant references to the dance 
that the stillness becomes and to the dance that the ancients perform in 
communion with nature and with each other. Music is, finally, characterised as 
a Dionysiac experience of possession when associated with the will-less state of 
the intersection of time and timelessness: 
53 Buckley, Poeti-v and the Sacred, p. 222. 
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music heard so deeply 
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music 
While the music lasts. 54 
The loss of the boundaries of individuality as a result of musical experience was 
already thematised in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche also being aware that the 
loss of the self inevitably prompted a general questioning of the notion of 
identity, and therefore recalling the essentially ambiguous thought of Heraclitus. 
In relation to his own national musical tradition, Nietzsche says that 
the liar and hypocrite should take care with German music, for in the 
whole of our culture it is the only pure, clear and cleansing fire-spirit 
from which and towards which, as in the teachings of the great 
Heraclitus of Ephesus, all things move in a double orbit. 55 
And if music is the Dionysiac force that defies self and identity, and Four 
Quartets are pervaded by a musical spirit, it makes perfect sense that Eliot 
should also refer to the Heraclitean contradictory discourse. Two of its 
fragments open the text as epigraphs, and the second, 
öbö äv(, ) xätiuo pia xai (, )vtiTj ('the way up and the way down are one and 
the same'), is reformulated later in the text: 
And the way up is the way down, the way forward the way back, 56 
54 Eliot, The Dry Salvages, III', in Collected Poems, p. 213. 
55 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 95. 
'" Eliot, The Dry Salvages, III', in Collected Poems, p. 210. 
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thus inscribing the thought of non-identity and non-linearity in a text that has 
already proved its commitment to a musical rhythm and to a recognition of the 
enchantment of nature and the sacredness of its cycles of change. Four 
Quartets, without renouncing its Christian vocation, engages in a thought of 
contingency, showing the present, the cyclical and the mutable as the realms 
with which transcendence intermingles. Eliot takes the challenge that such a 
thought posits, and constructs within his text a positive rendering of change and 
mutability, in so far as through his poetry we are acquainted with the sacred 
force that contingency as contingency implies, in so far as his text is itself part 
of that music that lives and dies, that reaches a stillness through the pattern but 
does not renounce its temporal nature, and thus makes us be `the music/ While 
the music lasts'. 
To take this Heraclitean acknowledgement of contingency and 
temporality as pointing to a lack of achievement is to enclose Eliot's Christian 
views in an orthodoxy that his aesthetic talent does not contradict, but rather 
enlarges and problematises by reference to its ancient sacred sources. There is 
no need to say that Heraclitus' epigraph becomes for Eliot `a dismissing 
judgement on life', that `inescapably confined to a `sphere of being' where there 
is no direction and no pattern, it is meaningless': 57 the aesthetic quality of the 
texts, as Leavis himself suggests, already rules out a negative judgement, that 
57 Leavis, The Living Principle, p. 241. 
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could be based only on a failure to acknowledge the life-affirming character of 
artistic creation. 
Within this artistic realm, the mutability of reality cannot be dissociated 
from a transcendent pattern, just as the contingency of everyday experience is 
illuminated by its reference to a set of fixed meanings. The way up and the way 
down of Heraclitus are thus in `Burnt Norton' incorporated into an apparently 
meaningless personal experience: 
This is the one way, and the other 
Is the same, not in movement 
But abstention from movement. 58 
The immediate experience behind these lines is the double choice that Eliot had 
of descending to Gloucester Road Tube Station: by using the stairs or by using 
the lift. 59 However, his daily experience is not only a camouflaged anecdote 
behind a text that unfolds an impersonal speculation on the nature of time and 
movement: his experience is part of a continuum that incorporates prosaic and 
58 Eliot, `Burnt Norton, IV', in Collected Poems, p. 193. 
59 `The setting of section III is the London Tube. Eliot travelled daily from Gloucester Road 
Station, whose two means of descent, by the stairs or by the lift, suggested to him the movement 
down and the "abstention from movement"' (Helen Gardner, The Composition of 'Four 
Quartets', London: Faber & Faber, 1978, p. 86. ). For a study (though not an exhaustive one) of 
the influence of Heraclitus 's thought on Four Quartets, see Merrel D. Clubb, 'The Heraclitean 
Element in Eliot's Four Quartets', in Philological Quarterly, 40 (January 1961), pp. 19-33. 
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exclusively personal details together with the deep meanings that articulate 
them. The plane of the ultimate significance of experience is then continuous 
with the ever-changing contents that constitute it: the text of Heraclitus is thus 
appropriate to be the basis of the recovered continuity between everyday life 
and the persistent pattern of meaning. 
Superimposed on the reducibility of one way to the other (of the way up 
to the way down, but also of stillness to movement, of the lift to the stairs, and 
vice versa) is the ultimate identity between positive and negative spiritual 
experience. The asceticism of renunciation, of a purification of the soul through 
a series of denials, corresponds to the sudden movement of illumination and 
abandonment to the divine grace. The movement of self-denial that `Burnt 
Norton, III' evokes, and that is present in some form in the spiritual voyages of 
all the third sections of the poems, is taken again explicitly in the paraphrasing 
of St John of the Cross that `East Coker' includes. Yet `Burnt Norton' has told 
us before that this negative path is essentially the same as its opposite, that 
asceticism equals a kind of erotic abandonment, and that the denial of selfhood 
and experience is one with divine grace; emptiness, whether encountered (as the 
discouraging emptiness of the tube station) or sought for (as in the disciplined 
denials of `East Coker') is the other side of fulfilment: 
Christianity has always found room in itself for both types of spiritual 
experience: that which finds all nature a theophany, and that which 
feels the truth of Pascal's favourite text: 'Vere tu es Deus absconditus'. 
This deliberate descent into darkness out of twilight is 'one way'. It is 
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the same, the poet tells us, as the other: the undeliberate ascent into the 
world of light [... J! ° 
The reconciliation of these fundamental opposites takes place against the 
background of Heraclitus' thought, as a thought that tries to account for the 
elusiveness of experience through participation in the very movement that 
generates such an elusiveness. The dynamicity of a flow of reality pervades the 
thought of Heraclitus as a result of its resistance to enter the illusory realm of 
ordered structure. 
Faithfulness to reality conceived in dynamic terms is one of the 
imperatives in Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy. Hence the sustained praise of 
music throughout his exposition, since music is undeniably the art most closely 
involved with the dynamic, most truly Dionysiac. Other art forms acquire their 
value in relation to their proximity to music, and tragedy in particular is the 
expression of a perfect balance, in its dramatic opposition of heroic narratives to 
musical choruses. However, Nietzsche's understanding of the Dionysiac nature 
of music does not include all the elements that we would expect: the frenzy and 
rapture that we tend to associate with music that we would call `Dionysiac', as 
an effect of the intense and hypnotising power of pervasive and repetitive 
rhythms, is not emphasised by him. Rather, for Nietzsche these effects arise 
from musical qualities that are more difficult to reproduce in other arts, such as 
melody. Therefore, the emphasis is on that which is not reducible to any 
Helen Gardner. The Art of T. S. Eliot, (London: Cresset Press, 1940; repr. 1968), p. 162. 
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structure: on melody rather than rhythm or harmony. This is perfectly consistent 
with a firm division between music and the visual arts, that Nietzsche wants to 
endorse, for the notions of harmony, order, rhythm and beauty are all essentially 
Apolline features which music resists; paraphrasing Wagner, Nietzsche says 
that `music obeys quite different aesthetic principles from the visual arts, and 
cannot be measured according to the category of beauty'. 61 
Nevertheless, just as Wagnerian music (the main object of praise in The 
Birth of Tragedy) relies heavily on its association with visual display and 
narrative, the very core of music composition involves commitment to order, 
repetition and structure, even if only to render them illusory, when subjected to 
the contingency imposed on them by the dynamicity of the performance. 
Melody itself presupposes a series of relationships between its components that 
are often accounted for in the form of recognisable structures of contrast, 
repetition, reduplication and inversion. Yet what in all instances remains 
constant is the subordination of all compositional devices to an overall effect 
that is only perceivable in the temporality of the performance and that cannot be 
reduced to any fixed structure. To this element, that is most visible in the 
`inspirational' character of melody (for which compositional rules are few), 
Nietzsche appeals in his praise of music and his declared admiration for 
Wagnerian music in particular. 
61 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 76. 
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This is why the musical examples offered in The Birth of Tragedy, do not 
always accommodate to our modern concept of musical rapture, largely 
associated with rhythmic effects rather than with the irreducibility of music to 
fixed patterns. This is also why the notion of the Dionysiac gains some 
complexity, in its being continuous with an experience of selflessness that 
resists being encapsulated in a particular, recognisable mindless act. Thus 
attending to Nietzsche's notion of the Dionysiac, we can perceive an essential 
kinship between Palestrina's motets and Stravinsky's Le Sacre du Printemps, 
the latter offering the same fundamental musical experience as the former, by 
using an intensification of what in the former is lacking: the insistent 
superposition of sharply defined rhythmic structures. In both cases we attain a 
similar enrapturing experience, in the first through a music that escapes the 
fixity of a clearly defined rhythmic pattern, in the second through a music that 
over-states the recognisability of rhythmic patterns up to the point of their 
dissolution in superposition and interplay. Our notions of Dionysiac music, and 
musical examples that are closer to us, only confirm an essential continui y to 
which Nietzsche's examples already open, in their presupposing an altogether 
different aesthetic component in the temporality of musical art. Nietzsche's own 
words already suggest the link between the sacred music of the past and the 
profane rites, celebrating nature's awakening, which inspired Stravinsky's 
composition: 
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the Lutheran chorale is as profound, courageous and soulful, as 
exuberantly good and delicate, as the first luring Dionysiac call that 
rings out from the undergrowth at the approach of spring. 62 
What The Birth of Tragedy clearly dismisses is the surrender of music to a 
structure other than its own all-dissolving dynamicity: music at the service of a 
descriptive or narrative structure of events, or music at the service of the 
expression of individual emotion. Narrative and portrayal of individual emotion 
are found in the operatic recitative, which is, together with the stilo 
rappresentativo that it engenders, one of the aims of Nietzsche's attacks: 
the recitative might be defined as a mixture of epic and lyrical 
declamation; not a profoundly stable mixture, which could not be 
achieved from such thoroughly diverse components, but a highly 
external, mosaic-like configuration [... 1 
63 
The selflessness inherent in music, as well as its essential dynamicity, cannot be 
reconciled with a sequential order of events or a personal unity of emotion. 
Even more clearly than for Schopenhauer, for Nietzsche the willing that music 
directly represents is not that of the individual, but of the universal will, the 
universal state of flux and becoming in relation to which individuation is 
rendered illusory. Therefore the operatic style that he attacks is presented as a 
`'2 Nietzsche, The Birth of Trageddy, p. 110. 
03 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 90. 
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necessary aesthetic failure in which music's dependence on the text already 
speaks the unworthiness of the final product: 
because he [the man who is incapable of art] has no notion of the 
Dionysiac depths of music, he transforms musical enjoyment into a 
rationalistic words-and-music rhetoric of passion in the stilo 
rappresentativo [... ]. Opera is based on a fallacious belief concerning 
the artistic process, the idyllic belief that anyone capable of emotions is 
an artist. 64 
Music degraded to servitude to a text that does not go beyond the boundaries of 
individuality necessarily betrays its own essence, which is for Nietzsche the 
unmediated mirroring of an impersonal flux of becoming. 
By contrast, music involved in a text that explicitly surpasses the 
boundaries of individual experience through lyrical impersonality could well 
have received the approval of the aesthetic judgements in The Birth of Tragedy; 
we have in mind not the drama of Wagner's operas, nor the Dionysiac quality of 
Greek tragedy, but the musical character of Modernist poetry, and of Four 
Quartets in particular. In Four Quartets, the structure of a sequential 
accumulation of images leaves way to the musical structure that the poetic word 
requires. Four Quartets revolves around the musical essence of poetry, in a 
movement of whose importance T. S. Eliot is also aware: 
"' Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragediy, p. 92. 
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I know that a poem, or a passage of a poem, may tend to realize itself 
first as a particular rhythm before it reaches expression in words, and 
that this rhythm may bring to birth the idea and the image; and I do not 
believe that this is an experience peculiar to myself. 65 
Certainly this is not an experience peculiar to a particular poet, but one that 
points to the pervasion of the musical character right down to the core of poetic 
expression. Of Schiller Nietzsche tells us that 
in the state prior to the act of writing, he does not claim to have had 
before or within him an ordered causality of ideas, but rather a musical 
mood. 66 
Drawing on this indebtedness of poetry to its musical origin, Four Quartets 
openly declares its borrowing from the form of musical composition in the very 
title of the series of poems. The recurrent structure that the title suggests (four 
pieces, each of them for four instruments) announces a structure in which 
symmetries, re-elaborations and repetitions are going to follow the fluid pattern 
of a musical composition. 
In fact the arrangement of all four poems closely follows an analogy with 
the divisions of a musical quartet in the several movements of the sonata form. 
65 T. S. Eliot, The Music of Poetry', in On Poetry and Poets (London: Faber & Faber, 1957: 
repr. 1969), p. 38. 
66Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragecho, p. 29. 
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If we take the third movement of each of the Quartets as a central transitional 
moment, then the correspondence with the fourfold division of the classic 
sonata form is almost perfect, adding a further recurrence of the structure in 
four parts. Helen Gardner supports the view of the third movement as a 
transition: 
at the close of these centre movements [... ] the ear is prepared for the 
lyric fourth movement. The repetitive circling passage in East Coker, in 
particular, where we seem to be standing still, waiting for something to 
happen, for a rhythm to break out, reminds one of the bridge passages 
and leading passages between two movements which Beethoven 
loved. 67 
The lyric that follows would then correspond to the scherzo or scherzo-like 
movement, essentially different in character from the other movements in the 
sonata form (as it is here), and in turn an addition to the originally contrasting 
series of three movements in a sequence of fast-slow-fast. Following Gardner's 
analysis, we can see that the correspondences are quite strict, and do not go 
beyond the liberty that a musical composition itself is allowed in following the 
pattern of the sonata. The first movement of each quartet is built on a contrast 
of subject, as it is rigorously fixed for the sonata, and even for its symphonic 
descendants. There is a distinction between subject and counter-subject, 
identified as different thematic materials, and introduced one after the other to 
be restated again: speculation and the experience in the garden; the cycles of 
67 Gardner, The Ar"t of T S. Eliot, p. 41. 
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change and the silent point of the recurrent beginning; the time of the river and 
the time of the sea; strangeness and recognition. On these themes the first 
movement of `Burnt Norton', `East Coker', `The Dry Salvages' and `Little 
Gidding' are respectively built, always keeping a contrast that is restated or re- 
elaborated towards the end of the movement. The second movement is based on 
the musical technique of variation, in which the subject remains the same, and 
it is the formal treatment that changes. After the transition of the third 
movement we arrive at the brief lyric, which is always felt as a radical change of 
tone and form, before we conclude with the final movement. Here the wider 
scope, characteristic of the first movements, is taken up again in order to bring 
the different threads of meaning to a close, with a formal complexity that is 
again a parallel to the concluding movements of the sonata form, which also 
aim at counterbalancing the expectations created by the opening movement. 
In a less fixed manner, the use of images also involves a treatment that is 
musical in nature: 
one is constantly reminded of music by the treatment of images, which 
recur with constant modifications, form their context, or from their 
combination with other recurrent images, as a phrase recurs with 
modifications in music. 68 
"' Gardner, The Art col T. S. Eliot, p. 48. 
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The constant modifications to which the images are subjected contribute to 
create a dynamic experience of meaning in the reader, for whom the 
connotations of the words are never stable but always highly allusive: 
this musical treatment of the image, the phrase and the word, to bring 
out latent meanings and different significances, should prevent any 
reader from trying to fix the symbols in Four Quartets. 69 
Thus the meaning itself arises from the music, from the fluid system of 
relationships that results after the words have been put in motion. Formal 
qualities and reliance on interaction of meanings are not an added component to 
the solidity of a preconceived structure, but the very structure from which the 
significance of the poems arises. 
Therefore meaning becomes a function of a dynamic systems of 
relationships, rather than an independent element to be elicited from its 
expression. In a similar way, musical notes acquire their value only as a result of 
the relationships that they hold with the other notes in the scale, and the same 
sound can appear to us to be totally different if we hear it as part of another 
hierarchy (of another musical key). The relational value of musical notes allows 
us, then, to understand the appropriateness of the analogy on which Four 
Quartets rests: 
69 Gardner, The Art of T. S. Eliot, p. 54. 
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the word itself, like the note in music, has meaning only in relation to 
other words. It exists in time and in usage; and since contexts and 
usages change, the life of a word is a continual death. Yet within a 
pattern, in a poem, the word's life is preserved almost miraculously by 
art [... ]"70 
The perpetual death of an entity that can only be said to be in its relation to 
other entities echoes the perpetual mutability of the Heraclitean world, but also 
the paradoxes associated with Nietzsche's attempt to conceive of a purely 
relational reality, totally devoid of essences. In any case, it does justice to the 
fundamentally non-referential nature of music, and it makes us wonder whether 
the musical qualities of our verbal language do not themselves render more 
accurately than its referential qualities the dynamicity that both for Heraclitus 
and Nietzsche was to be identified with ultimate reality. 
The self-reflexivity and relationality proper to music take us beyond the 
representational illusoriness of verbal language: 
music is a plainly self-reflective language, as, indeed, it is the most 
plainly self-reflective of all the arts. [... ] It can elaborate massive 
designs from small items of thematic material, using itself to fabricate 
itself; it can unfold inexhaustibly from variation to variation. The 
threshold into the transforming world of music, which hints at the 
70 Gardner, The Art of T. S. Eliot, p. 7. 
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sounds of another world, is therefore the most sudden, mysterious and 
amazing. 71 
Agreeing with these views, we can say that the form of Four Quartets is truly 
and deliberately musical, and that its self-reflexivity is evidenced by the high 
degree of complexity and subtlety that is contained in the elaborations of the 
thematic materials, in themselves lacking complexity: 
the form is inspired by the composer's power to explore and define, by 
continual departures from, and returns to, very simple thematic 
material. The `thematic material' of the poem is not an idea or a myth, 
but partly certain common symbols. The basic symbols are the four 
elements, taken as the material of mortal life [... ]. 'Z 
The four elements, present in much of pre-Socratic philosophy as part of an 
understanding of (pucng, are used by Eliot as the primary notions around which 
the poems are built. Air, earth, water and fire correspond in this order to the 
basic symbol of each of the four poems. This is another fourfold division that 
can be added to the series of analogical planes that always seem to replicate 
within one another: four musical pieces, four instruments, four movements. 
Moreover, apart from the clear assigning of one element to each of the quartets, 
the question of their relationship, the question of qvcic itself, is addressed 
towards the close of the work, in the second movement of `Little Gidding'. Here 
" Michael Edwards. Towards a Christian Poetics (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 194. 
72 Gardner, The Art of ' T. S. Eliot, p. 44. 
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the four elements are described in their death, recalling images from all the 
quartets. The water of `The Dry Salvages' and the fire of `Little Gidding' are 
joined in the last stanza of the lyric, just before the colloquy with the `dead 
master': 
Water and fire succeed 
The town, the pasture and the weed. 
Water and fire deride 
The sacrifice that we denied. 
Water and fire shall rot 
The marred foundations we forgot 
Of sanctuary and choir. 
This is the death of water and fire. 73 
Although the lyric seems to concentrate only on decay and death, a celebratory 
feeling of inevitability is conveyed, as in the crude passages of `East Coker, I'. 
This links the lyric to the text that it paraphrases: one of Heraclitus' fragments, 
in which the death of one element involves the life of the following in a never 
ending cycle: `Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water 
lives the death of air; earth that of water'. 74 Once again, the structure of Four 
73 Eliot, `Little Gidding, II', in Collected Poems, p. 216. 
74 Free man,. lnc"illa..., p. 30. Diels's edition reads: 
ý nüp toy yý; 66CvaTOV Kai äýp (ýt Töv nvpOS 66Cvatov, i&cop ýýt Töv ä#o; Oavatcov, yý 
toy vöaTo; (Diels, Fraginente..., p. 168). However, the sources differ considerably from this 
, II reL trd to the coiiiiectiOfls 
between the elements, as Diels's account ot*variants shows. 
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Quartets is intermingled with the dynamicity of Heraclitus' thought as much as 
with the process of musical composition. 
In contrast, the narrative structure of A Portrait of the Artist is 
essentially removed from the modes of composition that music and poetry 
allow. However, the explicit musical references in the novel (apart from the 
musical qualities that the flow of the prose often bears, as well as the lyrics 
inserted), significantly appear at moments of intense spiritual revelation. When 
the prospect of the university opens the possibilities of a new world for Stephen, 
it seemed to him that he heard notes of fitful music leaping upwards a 
tone and downwards a diminished fourth, upwards a tone and 
downwards a major third, like triplebranching flames leaping fitfully, 
flame after flame, out of a midnight wood. 75 
Towards the end of the novel, Stephen scrutinises the sky searching for signs of 
his final departure. Seeking to interpret the flight of birds, he hears their cries: 
a shrill twofold note. But the notes were long and shrill and whirring, 
unlike the cry of vermin, falling a third or a fourth and trilled as the 
flying beaks clove the air. 76 
75 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 179. 
76 Joyce. 4 Portrait of the . -artist, p. 
243. 
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The revelations that accompany the experience of music even involve a state of 
selflessness, of weakening of the mind's power to control and assert 
individuality. Stephen receives the revelation of his unfitness for the priestly 
office in the form of this dissolving music: 
a quartet of young men were striding along with linked arms, swaying 
their heads and stepping to the agile melody of their leader's 
concertina. The music passed in an instant, as the first bars of sudden 
music always did, over the fantastic fabrics of his mind, dissolving 
them painlessly and noiselessly as a sudden wave dissolves the 
sandbuilt turrets of children. 77 
The dissolution of the fabrics of the mind by music echoes the destruction of 
human purposes by nature, in an image whose history points to the inescapable 
Quality of the cycles of change, again in the account of mutability offered by 
Heraclitus' thought: 
dark Heraclitus compares the force that builds worlds to a child placing 
stones here and there, and building sandcastles and knocking them 
down again. 
78 
Thus an exploration of the musical references within the narrative structure of A 
Portrait of the Artist brings us back to the acknowledgement of the eternal 
77 Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 173. 
" Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy, p. 115. See also Diels, Fragmente..., fr. 124. p. 178. 
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mutability of the ultimate reality which Heraclitus' mobile thought endorses, 
and which stands as a threshold to the text of Four Quartets. Yet the first of the 
Heraclitean fragments that Eliot chooses as epigraphs introduces a point of 
tension: against the dynamic quality of reality, in perpetual state of becoming, 
the logosoffers a guiding point and a reliable unity to us: 
iou Xoyou b'EOVtoq 4UVOU 4(OoU61V of TCOXXot ()g t6t(XV ExoVtcq (ppoV1'I61V. 
79 Against the inapprehensible mutability of the turning world, the Aoyog is the 
still point that offers us light. But what the reference to Heraclitus suggests is 
that this central point is not entirely outside nature, outside the realm of cyclical 
change: if the epigraph has any force, it is surely to invalidate the view that `this 
light at the still point is a reality of a different order from the rest of the lyric: 
metaphysical, mystical, beyond the order of nature'. 80 In pre-Socratic thinking, 
logos is not outside physis it is the ordering principle of cpvrns, but remaining 
in continuity with it. The idea of an essential split between the order of nature 
and the order of the intellect is a modern idea that Four Quartets challenges in 
its appeal to an original experience of the sacredness of reality, not altogether 
incompatible with Christian views. Our translation of the notion of Aoyos to our 
own modem understanding will involve a circumscription that with great 
difficulty will avoid the charge of simplification: whether we render it as 
`word', `law', `centre' or `end', we will be missing the essential unity that 
79 Diels, Fragmente.... fr. 2, p. 15 1. Freeman's translation reads: `although the Law is universal, 
the majority lives as if they had understanding peculiar to themselves' (Freeman, Ancilla.... pp. 
24-5). 
"" Moody, T. S. Eliot Poet, p. 193. 
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Aoyog presupposes, a unity of mutability and meaning, nature and intellect, 
dynamic change and ordering principle. Eliot's interpretation of this Aoyog as 
the Christian Word would be in accord with a line of thought that incorporates 
the pre-modern view of the world into Christian theology, appealing to the 
beginning of the Gospel of St John: 
we are reminded that the Evangelist adopted from Greek philosophy 
the conception of the Word or Logos, as the origin and root of all 
things, and that Christians believe that this Word became flesh and was 
subject to the tension of life in time, which words suffer. 8' 
Eliot's recovering of this continuity between the Greek logos and the Christian 
Word accounts for the fact that in Four Quartets the experience of the `still 
point' arises from the experience of time: the contingency of mutable reality is 
continuous with the centre of its movement, and the universal pattern springs 
from the realm of change. The musical character of the poetic word points to 
this insight into the nature of reality, whereas the flow of the prose in A Portrait 
of the Artist only secondarily renounces its servitude to a narrative pattern. 
" Gardner, The . Art of 
T S. Eliot, p. 63. 
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6.5. Individuation vs. Baptism and Epiphany 
Joyce's privileging of art as a detached realm in A Portrait of the Artist 
epitomises the nature of the modern condition, for which the sacred spirit (to 
whose original undifferentiated nature Eliot returns) has undergone a historical 
process of individuation up to the point of becoming confined to the isolated 
individual: sacredness is now found nowhere else but in the space of 
incommunicable personal experience. Nevertheless, Stephen's efforts to devote 
himself to the sacred artistic enterprise find that the very notion of aesthetic 
creation involves a certain abandonment of his cherished artistic selfhood, and 
leads him to acknowledge a space of sacredness broader than his own 
interiority, ultimately reconciling him with the communal and traditional bonds 
against which he struggles. 
First we are revealed the futility of Stephen's struggle to confine his 
artistic enterprise to the expression of his own inwardness, for Stephen is always 
puzzled by the enchanted quality of a reality that does not simply stand in 
opposition to his inner world: the realm of nature reveals itself as a spiritual 
realm, thus questioning the conscious detachment of the artist's soul: 
[... ] the trees in Stephen's Green were fragrant of rain and the 
rainsodden earth gave forth its mortal odour, a faint incense rising 
upward through the mould from many hearts. The soul of the gallant 
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venal city which his elders had told him of had shrunk with time to a 
faint mortal odour rising from the earth [... ]. 82 
Even if the soul of the city is no longer powerful, the earth retains a life of its 
own, and communicates with Stephen without mediation. The boldness of the 
young artist is constantly confronted by the meaningfulness of an external 
world, dissolving the frontiers between personal experience and flow of 
meaning, and ultimately rendering illusory the independence of the individual 
self. This constant, though paradoxical, openness of Stephen's individuality 
adds a further significance to the irony that is conveyed by the episode of his 
repentance: the extreme and morbid piety that comes over him is not only 
grotesque in the context of the novel, but also expressive of a predisposition, 
always present, against the affirmation of individuality: 
the world for all its solid substance and complexity no longer existed 
for his soul save as a theorem of divine power and love and 
universality. So entire and unquestionable was his sense of the divine 
meaning in all nature granted to his soul that he could scarcely 
understand why it was in any way necessary that he should continue to 
live. 83 
Even if this pseudo-mystic formulation is intended by Joyce as a parody of 
Stephen's inexperience, the ideas of the meaningfulness of the external world 
M2 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 199. 
Sz Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist. p. 162. 
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and the renouncement of individuality are always present in the moments of 
Stephen's spiritual awakening, in contrast with those moments of reflection and 
conscious pursuit. Among the childhood recollections of Stephen we find that 
he remembered the summer evening he had been there to be dressed as 
boatbearer, the evening of the procession to the little altar in the wood. 
A strange and holy place. 84 
The holiness of nature is going to be experience in later years as well, and is 
going to constitute the basis of his artistic revelations: reality would go to 
encounter him charged with the enchanted quality of the imagination, and his 
will would disappear in a transfigurative fusion. The unsubstantial female image 
of Stephen's readings exemplifies the way in which reality is going to dissolve 
the boundaries of his inwardness: 
[... ] a premonition which led him on told him that this image would, 
without any overt act of his, encounter him. [... ] They would be alone, 
surrounded by darkness and silence: and in that moment of supreme 
tenderness he would be transfigured. He would fade into something 
impalpable under her eyes and then in a moment, he would be 
transfigured. 85 
S4 Joyce.. 4 Portrait of'the. -artist, pp. 40-1 
S5 Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the . 4rtist, p. 
67. 
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Contrasting with this recurrent movement of abandonment is Stephen's attitude 
of detachment, entertaining the solitary visions of an artistic soul doomed to 
remain in isolation. His perception of his sinful longings also applies to his 
artistic visions: 
he burned to appease the fierce longings of his heart before which 
everything else was idle and alien. [... ] Beside the savage desire within 
him to realise the enormities which he brooded on nothing was 
sacred. 
86 
The tension between these two attitudes is never fully resolved in the novel. We 
get the impression that the moments of revelation of the outer world overpower 
Stephen's painful isolation, but the image of the solitary artist who feels 
essentially removed from his surroundings and from others persists throughout 
the novel. 
Why this is so, or to what purpose this tension serves, seems difficult to 
answer. We can say, following the suggestions made by Hugh Kenner, that this 
contrast adds a dramatic character to A Portrait of the Artist, which is to be 
taken as the episode of a drama rather than a completed story. 87 The dramatic 
effect seems to be purposefully enhanced by Joyce's suppression of the aesthetic 
86 Joyce, 
. -1 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 105. 
87 See Hugh Kenner. `The Portrait in Perspective', in Thomas Connolly (ed. ). Joyce 's 
'Portrait': Criticisins and Critiques (New York: Meredith, 1962; r. London: Owen. 1964). pp. 
41-44. 
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theory of epiphanies, that remains in the earlier version of the novel, Stephen 
He sed ro. Indeed the centrality of the concept of epiphany would have legitimi 
an interpretative line showing the peripheral character of Stephen's willingness 
to preserve his isolation. Joyce tells us of the Stephen of Stephen Hero that 
by epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the 
vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind 
itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these 
epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most 
delicate and evanescent of moments. 88 
The epiphanic moment is the phase that completes the aesthetic theory of 
Stephen: in these moments objects reveal their essence to us in the final state of 
aesthetic apprehension: 
[... ] when the relation of the parts [of the object] is exquisite, when the 
parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognise that it is that thing 
which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its 
appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which 
is so adjusted, achieves its epiphany. 89 
But even if this theory is absent in the Portrait, the rhythm of the narrative is 
clearly based on these epiphanic moments. The explicit formulation of the 
theory is not made available to Stephen in order to create a dramatic tension that 
" Joyce, Stephen Hero. p. 216. 
89 Joyce. Stephen Hero. p. 218. 
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persists until the very end, but the points of sudden illumination are presented 
both to Stephen and to the reader as privileged resting places. 
It is in these crucial moments that Stephen's awareness of his artistic 
destiny becomes more intense, and it is significant that these moments are best 
characterised precisely by a resort to concepts that recall sacred rites or else a 
sacred communion with reality at large: they are the epiphanies that reveal the 
aesthetic core of reality to Stephen, but together with them is also his own 
baptism as an artist, in the form of a refusal of unity that is only the prelude to 
his surrender before the outer world: 
Stephen's baptism as artist takes the form of a refusal to enter the 
water. Always different from his fellows, Stephen becomes reconciled 
to his otherness when he stands aloof from his schoolmates swimming 
in the mouth of the Liffey 90 
Shortly after this ritual resistance, Stephen being still by the river, Joyce allows 
him to foresee his mission through a sustained epiphany in which reality speaks 
directly to him: 
in Joyce's description of Stephen's moment of transcendent dedication, 
images of flight and immersion, the eternal and the mortal, art and life, 
90 Beebe, Ivory Towers and Sacred Founts, p. 281. 
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are fused into a unity. Accepting the totality, Stephen finds his mission 
as the life-creating artist. 91 
Therefore, Stephen's acceptance of unity, of a sacred primordial space without 
difference, comes at the time when his artistic consciousness proves most acute, 
and through experiences that are best qualified by the religious concepts of 
baptism and epiphany. His own individual spirit is not distinguishable from his 
body under the influence of this profound insight: 
his soul was soaring in an air beyond the world and the body he knew 
was purified in a breath and delivered of incertitude and made radiant 
and commingled with the element of the spirit. An ecstasy of flight 
made radiant his eyes and wild his breath and tremulous and wild and 
radiant his windswept limbs. 92 
The religious images are at the service of an artistic celebration of mortality and 
contingency: 
a wild angel had appeared to him, the angel of mortal youth and beauty, 
an envoy from the fair courts of life, to throw open before him in an 
instant of ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory. 93 
91 Beebe, Ivory Toºiers and Sacred Founts, p. 282. 
92 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 183. 
1'3 Joyce.. 4 Portrait of the Artist. p. 186. 
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The sensuous reality that Stephen had found among the ritual of the sacraments 
and the depth of his childhood experience unfolds now with the fascinating 
quality of eternal mutability: 
glimmering and trembling, trembling and unfolding, a breaking light, 
an opening flower, it spread in endless succession to itself, breaking in 
full crimson and unfolding and fading to palest rose, leaf by leaf and 
wave of light by wave of light, flooding all the heavens with its soft 
flushes, every flush deeper than the other. 94 
It is precisely in this epiphanic moment of intensified awareness that Stephen 
introduces elements that transcend his general attitude throughout the novel. 
Such elements have found an echo in other episodes and references, and testify 
to Stephen's own divining of the need to enlarge his narrow views in order to 
embrace an aesthetic attitude in all its width: the need, in other words, to 
transcend the sacredness of selfhood and identity in order to be open to the 
significant speech of significant reality, ultimately including the mythical 
speech of community, tradition and religion. 
In the epiphanic moments of A Portrait of the Artist, of which the 
clearest is this series of visions of Stephen by the river, Joyce tackles the 
question of the mythopoeic nature of literature, by resorting to the notion of a 
spontaneous opening of reality. Similar moments can be found in Dubliners, in 
which the revelatory experience constitutes the climax of each of the stories. 
Joyce.. - Portrait of the Artist, p. 187. 
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The state of awareness involved produces a change both in the perception of 
reality and in the nature of reality: 
Joyce at this time can speak of writing and literary method in terms of 
analogies with sacramental language. Images, words and characters are 
to be transformed into meaning and truth. His language suggests that 
the writer brings to light what is true in an expressive way. but also that 
by doing so, change can occur. 95 
Therefore, in this context, the criteria of literary creation and perception are 
continuous with the criteria for the elucidation of reality. The sudden moment of 
awareness is not reflective, but continuous with the reality that is being 
manifested: there is no clear distinction between the process of constitution of 
the myth and the unfolding of the events upon which this myth is based. 
The experience of the reading is, then, in itself an epiphany, not just a 
recalling or a reference: 
the incidents take place in situations that enable the reader to enter into 
an understanding of the experience so that the revelation takes place 
with something of the force with which it engages the characters. 96 
95 Brian Russell, 'James Joyce: Prospects for Epiphany', Theology, 96 (796). Jan Feb 1993. p. 
37. 
96 Russell, `Prospects for Epiphany'. p. 36. 
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The epiphanic moments are re-enacted for the reader, for their linguistic quality 
identifies them with the very experience that characters undergo: 
language can be a sacrament in an instrumental sense - by creating 
awareness that causes change in the characters and in the reader, 9 
in the same manner as the re-enactment of a rite does not only recall a past 
experience but also allows us to re-live that experience. 
However, despite his reliance on an epiphanic notion of reality, even to 
an extent in his later works, Joyce's position is essentially different from Eliot's 
in that the meaningfulness of external reality has to be associated either with 
dismemberment (in Ulysses) or dramatic tension (in the Portrait). While Eliot 
finds support in a stable vision of external sacredness by his commitment to 
Anglo-Catholicism, 
Joyce does not believe he is inhabiting a secure metaphysical order of 
objective divine reality. He is eclectic in his framework for reality and 
certainly ambiguous or paradoxical in his relation to Roman 
Catholicism. 98 
For this reason the aestheticist individualism of Stephen cannot be fully 
redeemed within the novel, not even after a series of epiphanic manifestations, 
97 Russell, 'Prospects for Epiphany'. p. 37. 
Russell, `Prospects for Epiphany', p. 39. 
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and constantly creates a dramatic tension that is to be resolved by other stories: 
those of Icarus' fall or St Stephen's martyrdom; two sacrificial figures that 
reproduce once more the denial of selfhood that Nietzsche found on the Greek 
tragic stage and that he regarded as the necessary condition of aesthetic 
excellence. 
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7. Two Arrivals at the Aesthetic as the End of a Structured Spiritual 
Voyage 
The impossibility of the experiencing of sacredness through contact with the 
outer world, perceived as the loss of meaning of a crucial dimension of reality, 
is thematised in different ways by Modernist writers, but it occupies in most 
cases the same central role in the configuration of the ideological background of 
their literary works. Whether in parallel with the social impact of twentieth- 
century industrialisation, the moral preoccupations arising from the World War, 
or just the awareness of an accentuation in the conditions of Modernity, 
Modernism displays through literature the absence of ultimate meaning in the 
contemporary Western world as a spiritual crisis (the same crisis that Nietzsche 
diagnoses as resulting from the long Socratic disease of the West). Modernism 
then opts for recreating a past meaningfulness, or a meaningfulness other than 
Western, or for simply presenting the spectacle of barrenness in a literary form, 
or even, it tries to extract meaning precisely out of the lack of meaning of 
modern times. James Joyce and T. S. Eliot privilege some of these approaches 
over others in each of their works. 
Each in its own way, Ulysses and The Waste Land depict a world where 
naivity is no longer possible, but where the archaeological nostalgia for 
meaning is itself a meaningful movement in the middle of an apparently barren 
landscape. In contrast, A Portrait of the Artist and Four Quartets present a 
structure analogous to the very meaning-bestowing structure that Modernity 
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seemed to be unable to re-enact other than in nostalgia, archaeology or 
anthropological research. The structure and structures (patterns, recurrent 
symbolism, plot) of A Portrait of the Artist and Four Quartets restore the 
possibility of external sacredness by being, at several levels, a discursive 
rendering of the ritual: a spiritual quest that is also a mythic voyage. 
7.1. The Re-enchantment of a Desacralised World: Sacredness of Nature and 
the Every 
Stephen confesses to the dean of studies in chapter V of A Portrait of the Artist: 
`I am sure I could not light a fire'. ' Yet what he takes his mission to be is 
precisely the rekindling of the modern world through art: Stephen's judgement 
on the emptiness and lack of sanctity of the representative of the religious order 
responsible for his education, is also a judgement on the Modern condition, for 
which the temples are empty and the rituals meaningless: 
kneeling thus on the flagstone to kindle the fire and busied with the 
disposition of his wisps of paper and candlebutts he [the dean] seemed 
more than ever a humble server making ready the place of sacrifice in 
an empty temple [... ]. ' 
1 Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist, p. 200. 
2 Joyce, . -1 Portrait of the 
Artist. p. 200. 
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Stephen's assumption of his role as a `priest of the eternal imagination' has 
come after a series of stages, such as this realisation of surrounding emptiness 
which finally prompt him to take action to restore the world to its lost 
sacredness. In his childhood he could still inhabit a world that could enter a 
dialogue with the intensity of his experience: 
a faint sickness of awe made him feel weak. How could they have done 
that? He thought of the dark silent sacristy. There were dark wooden 
presses there where the crimped surplices lay quietly folded. It was not 
the chapel but still you had to speak under your breath. It was a holy 
place. He remembered the summer evening he had been there to be 
dressed as boatbearer, the evening of the procession to the little altar in 
the wood. 3 
The profanation of the sacristy, which Stephen's classmates are thought to have 
carried out, has a profound impact on him, and is immediately associated with 
the experience of the surrounding world as sacred: the wood was, as the 
sacristy, also a holy place. How could this relationship be broken? How could 
his fellow pupils have breached the ultimate respect for the world? Their act is a 
sacrilege, and is qualified as such in the midst of plastic references to the Pagan 
sensuousness of Catholic ritual: 
Joyce, .4 Portrait of the 
Artist, pp. 40-41. 
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that must have been a terrible sin. to go in there quietly at night, to 
open the dark press and steal the flashing gold thing into which God 
was put on the altar in the middle of flowers and candles at benediction 
while the incense went up in clouds at both sides as the fellow swung 
the censer and Dominic Kelly sang the first part by himself in the 
choir. 4 
Yet this is still a sacrilege, a transgression which doesn't alter the sacredness of 
the law - which belongs to a larger structure of meaningfulness that on the 
whole is not threatened. As the narrative progresses, Stephen finds it more 
difficult to believe in this world of external sacredness: all of chapter II 
constitutes Stephen's realisation of the emptiness of what he is supposed to 
inherit as a legacy: respect for his country, for his family history, for his church. 
Signalling a contrast with the enchanted world of childhood, in chapter II we 
find not a sacrilege, but a desecration of a holy place. In the moments of 
preparation for the school play in which he is to take part, Stephen 
thought he saw a likeness between his father's mind and that of this 
smiling well-dressed priest: and he was aware of some desecration of 
the priest's office or the vestry itself, whose silence was now routed by 
loud talk and joking and its air pungent with the smells of the gasjets 
and the greases 
Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist. p. 47. 
5 Joyce, A Portrait of the. 4 rtist, p. 89. 
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Sacred silence and sacred smell are now replaced by a disrespectful mundanity. 
Also, there is an essential similitude between his father's mind and that of the 
priest, as if both wanted to participate in the same spreading of emptiness over 
his life. Stephen will feel, later in this chapter, that a distinct abyss opens 
between him and his father: the trip to Cork shows with sadness how Stephen 
cannot possibly take over a legacy of dead symbols. When with his father and 
his father's friends, 
an abyss of fortune or of temperament sundered him from them. His 
mind seemed older than theirs: it shone coldly on their strifes and 
happiness and regrets like a moon upon a younger earth. 6 
Thus Stephen does not seem to have lost an unexplored future, but a well- 
known past: his mind is older, and indeed he already recalls his childhood as an 
experience of outer meaningfulness. What is more, his childhood is the world's 
own childhood, an earth which was once young, naive and transparent as he 
was, and which he can now only look coldly upon. 
Stephen's country, `the old sow that eats her farrow'7, cannot offer him 
what he seeks either. Through his encounters with Davin, Stephen distances 
himself from his national past too. It saddens him that there is no life in his 
country any longer (in the same way that he feels a paternal, reciprocated, 
affection for Davin), but he is not willing to assume responsibility for this 
6 Joyce.. 4 Portrait of the . 
Artist, pp. 101-102. 
7 Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 220, and Ulysses, p. 552. 
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death. In Ulti'sses, where the emptiness of national symbols is part of the 
meaningful attempt to play with vacuities, we read: 
STEPHEN [... ]. You die for your country, suppose. (He places his arm on 
Private Carr's sleeve. ) Not that I wish it for you. But I say: Let my 
country die for me. Up to the present it has done so. I don't want it to 
die. Damn death. Long live life! 8 
And after the death of meanings displayed through chapter II, where even the 
punishment episode is `desacralised' and made fun of, 9 Stephen's re-enchanting 
mission begins to take shape, and shifts progressively from the bounds of 
religion (chapter III) to the artistic priesthood. If the world seems to recover his 
past splendour in the form of `a theorem of divine power', 10 it is only after the 
epiphanies of chapter IV that Stephen will be ready again for the call of a 
significant world. In his visions by the river, it is before a worldly image that he 
reaches a holy ecstasy: `her image had passed into his soul for ever and no word 
had broken the holy silence of his ecstasy"'; 
and as a result of the revelation of a future artistic mission in a profane world, 
nature itself re-awakens and embraces him: 
R Joyce, Ulysses, p. 549. 
See Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 76. 
10 Joyce, . -1 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 162. 
Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 186. 
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he felt above him the vast indifferent dome and the calm processes of 
the heavenly bodies; and the earth beneath him, the earth that had 
borne him, had taken him to her breast. '' 
The structure of Four Quartets, on the contrary, may seem to run against a view 
of a natural world inhabited by sacredness. This is C. K. Stead's view: 
the poet's feeling takes form in experiencing the visible world, where it 
is content to rest; only the imposed plan, not the feeling, insist that 
such experience is unsatisfying, and presses towards abstraction. 13 
This line of argument maintains that the affirmation of a meaningful experience 
of this world is made in Four Quartets in spite of the imposed structure, not 
thanks to it. If `it is in the world, in the love of created things, that poetry is 
generated and takes life', 14 then the structure that Eliot imposes on his own 
poetic genius points towards an otherworldly experience, and tries to silence the 
life-affirming transcendence of the impetus of his poetry. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that such an antagonism, although at 
work, is resolved within the poems themselves. They are a reflection on the 
nature of artistic form, pattern and structure, and they also answer the tensions 
that they enact. Ultimately, it is precisely the notion of artistic form that 
12 Joyce. 4 Portrait of the Artist, p. 187. 
13 C. K. Stead, The New Poetic (London: Hutchinson, 1964). p. 180. 
14 Stead, The New Poetic, p. 179. 
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resolves the conflict between transcendence and temporality: each of the 
quartets stages a tension between the affirmation of the meaningfulness of 
temporality and the need for a transcendent pattern, and finally resolves this 
tension resorting to a notion of a sacred nature under the eyes of artistic form. 
The possibility of this resolution is already prefigured in the first of the two 
epigraphs: 15 the logos is all-pervading, not dissociable: proportion, analogy and 
reckoning (structure) do not necessarily entail the positing of a transcendent 
source; rather, we can reconcile transcendence and the affirmation of this world, 
we can integrate sacredness into this world, through the pattern of art. 
The first section of each quartet is already a successful achievement of 
this integration. In each of them eternity is hinted at in privileged moments of 
temporal engagement. The garden and the children of `Burnt Norton', the 
country imagery and cyclic nature of `East Coker' (even though with crude 
overtones), the superhuman power of destruction of sea and river in `The Dry 
Salvages', and the moment of atemporality of midwinter spring in `Little 
Gidding'; all of them succeed in intertwining a poetic impulse that relies on 
sensuous imagery with a transcendent meaning. It is true that this achievement 
is presented only to be undermined by the structured stage which follows: the 
second sections push the equilibrium of the first up to the point of almost 
making it break in the formal lyric passages, in order to then introduce a 
15 TOU %. OYOU F'£OVTOC EUVOU CWOU6lV OIL iro? )Al (og t6tav £xovT£S ýpovi nv (in Eliot. 
Four Quartets. in Collected Poems, p. 189, from Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der 
l'arsokratiker, ol. 1, (Zürich, Berlin: Weidmannsche, 1952 [rpt 1954] ), fr. 2, p. 151). 
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discursive passage which states the lack of adequacy of a correspondence that 
has been pressed too far: the attempt to reach the still point is not wholly 
satisfactory; the pattern understood as knowledge is not valid; illumination is 
forgotten while agony remembered; and the gifts of old age prove to be empty. 
However, after the ascesis of section III and the acknowledgement of the need 
for intercession in section N, the last section of each of the quartets restates the 
possibility of a world of grace, precisely on the condition of artistic pattern: 
form and pattern are the means to reach the still point in `Burnt Norton'; as it is 
the precision of pattern in `East Coker'; musical pattern provides hints of an 
otherwise saintly occupation in `The Dry Salvages'; and finally, in `Little 
Gidding', the complete consort dancing together re-unites the dispersed 
elements in the perfection of the work of art. 
Therefore, the structure of Four Quartets, in a self-reflective gesture, 
enacts the structural movement which it thematises: it offers itself as an answer 
to the questioning that it itself constitutes. We must not forget that the negative 
tone of sections II and III is transitional, and a necessary stage of a journey that 
starts off with a relatively unproblematic presentation of sacred nature, and 
which points to the need of a restatement of this sacredness (together with 
individual spiritual health) in terms of artistic form, finding at last a self- 
grounding exposition in section V of `Little Gidding'. 
The emphasis on negativity, disenchantment, ascesis and otherworldly 
experience comes as a stage that follows a not wholly satisfactory understanding 
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of immanence (we could say, the understanding that Modernity no longer 
believes in), and comes also as a stage that precedes the final exposition of this 
understanding in terms of art. There is then an articulation between what C. K. 
Stead regards as the more clearly achieved `poetic passages' and the discursive 
ones, in which he thinks that `if the feeling of failure is truly there, it is there 
unused; it has not been transmuted by imagination into something larger than 
itself. 16 The failure and the departure from `anything that refuses to be anything 
but poetry' 17 are there in order to affirm the need for an art that can no longer be 
naive, and yet must exist; for a terrestrial sacredness that can no longer be 
natural, and yet must exist, even if it stands in need of intercession. The first 
sections by themselves wouldn't have acknowledged the modern, secularised 
condition of our world, and the final sections by themselves would not have 
acknowledged that the Modernist re-enchantment of the world through art does 
not simply follow from the lost charm of a primordial age, but implies a series 
of negative stages. 
The way in which Eliot finds a successful formulation for the 
affirmation of the sacredness of nature isn't anywhere clearer than in the 
structure of Four Quartets, which the identification of `the fire and the rose' 
closes. At opposite extremes, while in The Waste Land the poetry refuses to be 
anything else but poetry, therefore remaining a myth that takes itself as such, 
16 Stead, The New Poetic. p. 178. 
17 Stead, The New Poetic, p. 176. 
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Murder in the Cathedral presents us a midwinter spring that seems to want to 
lead us to the same resting place as that of `Little Gidding': 
Spring has come in winter. Snow in the branches 
Shall float as sweet as blossoms. Ice along the ditches 
Mirror the sunlight. Love in the orchard 
Send the sap shooting. Mirth matches melancholy. '8 
But to the words of the tempter, Thomas can only answer: 
Leave - well alone -, the springtime fancy. 19 
Equally, the chorus acknowledges that 
Even in us the voice of seasons, the snuffle of winter, the song of 
spring, the drone of summer, the voices of beasts and birds, praise 
Thee, 2° 
but they are also aware 
That the sin of the world is upon our heads. 21 
" T. S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, in The Complete Poems and Plays (London & Boston: 
Faber & Faber, 1969 [rpt 1978]), p. 247. 
19 Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, ibid., p. 248. 
1" Eliot. Murder in the Cathedral. ibid., p. 281. 
21 Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, ibid., p. 282. 
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Even the `spiritual flesh of nature'22 that so much seems to pervade the play, is 
understood in negative terms: there is `death in the rose, death in the hollyhock, 
sweet pea, hyacinth, primrose and cowslip'. 23 
By contrast, integrated in the structure of Four Quartets, even the 
everyday is liable to be charged with sacredness. If in Murder in the Cathedral 
" the holy ground ' enaced by sightseers armed with guide-books, 
24 
the lift of vý J 
Gloucester Road Tube Station that is referred to in `Burnt Norton' III can carry 
all the allusions to a central question in the poems, encapsulated in the second 
of Heraclitus' epigraphs: the equal validity of ascending and descending 
spiritual movements. And it is not only a fanciful random sign, but the provider 
of a meaningful private experience for Eliot, since in that lift, like Julia in The 
Cocktail Party, he could engage in meditation: 
JULIA: No, you stop and talk to Edward. I'm not helpless yet 
And besides, I like to manage the machine myself 
In a lift I can meditate. 25 
Likewise, in the context of Four Quartets the significance of characters like the 
Agatha of The Family Reunion appears in full clarity: otherwise her appeal to 
the meaningfulness of natural signs might appear misplaced or anachronistic: 
22 Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, ibid., p. 271. 
23 Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, ibid.. p. 270. 
24 See Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, ibid., p. 282. 
25T. S. Eliot, The Cocktail Pam, ibid., p. 366. 
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Men tighten the knot of confusion 
Into perfect misunderstanding, 
Reflecting a pocket-torch of observation 
Upon each other's opacity 
Neglecting all the admonitions 
From the world around the corner 
The wind's talk in the dry holly tree 
The inclination of the moon 
The attraction of the dark passage 
The paw under the door. 26 
And against the `world without God'27 to which The Waste Land is a first 
answer, and Colby's secret garden without divine grace in The Confidential 
Clerk, 28 the rose-garden of Four Quartets acquires an enchanted quality that 
endures the whole spiritual voyage and still has children in its trees by the time 
`Little Gidding' ends. 
The artistic pattern of Four Quartets seems to be the realisation of Sir 
Claude's desire, when in The Confidential Clerk he states: 
I want a world where the form is the reality 
ý`' T. S. Eliot, The Family Reunion, ibid., p. 290. 
I See Eliot. a1urde'r in the Cathedral, ibid., p. 280. 
21 See Eliot, The Confidential Clerk. ibid., pp. 473-474. 
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Of which the substantial is only a shadow. `` 
Thus the self-legitimising structure of Four Quartets provides for Eliot the 
pattern that allows for the enchantment of the external world to take place. 
7.2. A Ritual Structure of Sacrificial Selflessness 
Against a desacralised world, where rites do not take place any longer, the 
structure of A Portrait of the Artist offers the pattern of a young man's initiation 
rite. Stephen is aware of his sacred destiny, and first looks at the Catholic 
church (presented to him as endowed not only with God's grace, but also `with 
sacraments and sacrifice'30), realising that `it was partly the absence of an 
appointed rite which had always constrained him to inaction'. 31 Nevertheless, 
the appointed rites of the Catholic church will provide him with an only 
temporary comfort. Soon Stephen begins to find that the selflessness he seeks 
does not come to him through religious rites, and even the Eucharist begins to 
lose its sacrificial meaning: 
his actual reception of the eucharist did not bring him the same 
dissolving moments of virginal self-surrender as did those spiritual 
"' Eliot. The Confidential Clerk, ibid., p. 464. 
30 Joyce, .A 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 128. 
31 Joyce -1 Portrait of the Artist, p. 172. 
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communions made by him sometimes at the close of some visit to the 
Blessed Sacrament. 32 
What then is the role of the Eucharist in A Portrait of the Artist; what kind of 
communion does it offer, if its meaningfulness already seems to fade at the 
beginning of chapter IV? The pervasiveness of references to the Eucharist 
suggests that this is not just a ritual structure to be replaced or to be overcome: 
the pattern of communion through sacrifice must then continue throughout the 
rest of A Portrait of the Artist. In what form then? Following Karl Beckson's 
remarks, 33 we can say that it continues in the form of an inverted Eucharist. An 
inverted chalice-shaped carmen figuratum prefigures, at the beginning of the 
novel34, Stephen's rejection of communion towards the end of it. But 
contrariwise to what happens in Dubliners with the manipulation of Eucharistic 
32 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 164 
33 See Karl Beckson, `Stephen Dedalus and the Emblematic Cosmos', in James Joyce Quarterly 
6 (Fall 1968), pp. 85-96. 
34 In Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 12, we read: 
Stephen Dedalus 
Class of Elements 
Clongowes Wood College 
Sallins 
Countri' Kildare 
Ireland 
Europe 
The World 
The Universe 
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symbols, Stephen's inverted chalice in A Portrait of the Artist is a conveyor of 
grace: it is precisely in his voyage from religion to art, in his turning of the 
chalice upside down, that Stephen's world acquires meaning. Before this novel, 
the chalice had provided no spiritual fulfilment: in `The Sisters' we are from the 
beginning prepared to attend `something uncanny', 35 and the chalice that the 
priest breaks there turns into the chalice empty of meaning in his deathbed: 
the old priest was lying still in his coffin as we had seen him, solemn 
and truculent in death, an idle chalice on his breast. 36 
Moreover, the mock eucharist that the protagonist is offered (the sherry that he 
tastes and the cream-crackers that he rejects) do not provide a meaningful 
substitute for the idle chalice. Similarly, the chalice that the protagonist of 
`Araby' bears leads only to disappointment and lack of achievement, even 
though at first he states: `I imagined that I bore my chalice safely through a 
throng of foes'. 37 In contrast, the Eucharistic symbols of A Portrait of the Artist 
seem to be successfully twisted to the advantage of the affirmation of Stephen's 
artistic priesthood, and then the selflessness of ritual sacrifice seems to be 
achieved in the realm of art. At the narrative level, this degree of artistic 
selflessness is already implied in the shifts of personality of the narrative voice: 
Stephen's interior monologues spring comfortably from a third-person voice 
that often ' witches to free indirect speech, so that the voices of 
35 James Joyce, Dubliners (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1926 [rpt 1996]), p. 7. 
36 Joyce, Dubliners, p. 17. 
37 Joyce, Dubliners, p. 31. 
/2 
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personality and impersonality constantly cross their own boundaries, bringing 
for the modem self the indeterminacy of the literary voices of Turpin Hero. 
38 
And yet, the imagery that surrounds artistic self-enclosure doesn't appear to be 
liberating, but restrictive, or at least ambiguous. The `tower of ivory'39 that is 
both female beauty and the reclusion of the artist, is misunderstood by the 
Protestants according to Stephen, but is this not the case precisely because they 
fail to associate this image with an interceding power, with the interceding 
figure of Mary? 
If that holds, then the ritual structure of A Portrait of the Artist is not 
exhausted in a move from religion to art, but requires, as Four Quartets require 
the intercession of sections IV, that art go beyond itself towards something 
greater, and the artist die a death that is more than only artistic. Stephen wants 
first to die for the music of the words of his last cry, 40 and later recalls this in 
relation to another death: he had 
dreamed of being dead, of mass being said for him by the rector in a 
black and gold cope, of being buried then in the little graveyard of the 
community off the main avenue of limes. But he had not died then. 
Parnell had died. There had been no mass for the dead in the chapel 
38 See Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist. p. 233. 
39 See Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist. pp. 35,43. 
40 See Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 22. 
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and no procession. He had not died but he had faded out like a film in 
the sun. " 
Parnell's non-mourned death is also Icarus', a silent coming out of existence by 
the destructive power of the sun. Stephen foresees once more his own death, not 
as a child's death for the musicality of the words, but as the silent price to be 
paid by artistic boldness. And if his surname joins him to a form of death, his 
name joins it to another: to the sacrificial death of St Stephen, inaugurating the 
series of the Christian martyrs. 
All this points to a death that is more than the impersonality of art, and 
that at the same time is indissolubly mingled with it. Stephen's death is, at least, 
a ritual death, a stage in the process of fundamental change. Doreen M. E. 
Gillam has brought to the surface the close correspondence between chapter IV 
of A Portrait of the Artist and the stages of the ritual of youth initiation in 
Greek religion, in particular as described in a work by Jane Harrison to which 
Joyce could have had access. 42 Rather than textual correspondences, it is 
interesting to note that the progression of stages that closes chapter IV and that 
mirrors the structure of an ancient rite of initiation, necessarily includes the idea 
of ritual death, both real (the sacrifice of the bull which Stephen becomes) and 
symbolic (the detachment from the female sphere of mother and church). At the 
end of the chapter we are in fact 
41 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist. pp. 98-99. 
42 See Doreen M. E. Gillam, `Stephen Kouros', in James Joyce Quartcrli, 8 (Spring 1971), pp. 
221-23,21. 
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in a `midnight wood' where music and flame, intoxicants of hunter and 
hunted alike in the Bacchae, symbolise that `wayward instinct' that 
seduces Stephen from the path of ordination, leading him instead to 
initiation into the service of Dionysos. 43 
Yet the ambiguity of Stephen's own name is present even in this movement of 
initiation, as the initiation into the mysteries of art plays with Stephen himself 
as the sacrificial victim: `an ecstasy of flight made radiant his eyes', 44 but as 
well as a flyer he is the `stephaneforos', the bull bearing the sacrificial garland. 
Thus Stephen's sacrifice is constantly signalled, but never takes place within the 
text: if it had, Stephen would have become the mature artist who doesn't appear 
in A Portrait of the Artist. According to Stephen's own restricted views, and 
against a text which clearly surpasses him, Stephen fails to die the sacrificial 
death that would have redeemed the text which gave birth to him: instead, he 
dies the aestheticist death of Icarus, and he dies it without the text, in order to 
preserve the artistic integrity of which Joyce is nearer than Stephen. Stephen in 
A Portrait of the Artist has even ceased to be a heroic figure as he could have 
been in Stephen Hero, for the death of a hero, even if placed outside the text, 
would have had the same sacrificial value that it had on the ancient Greek stage 
according to Nietzsche's views, to which value the artistic stature of Stephen 
does not here stand. 
Gillam, `Stephen Kouros'. p. 224. 
44 Joyce, 
.4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 183. 
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The voice of the artistic self is much closer to the voice of the text in 
Four Quartets, even though claims are made that artistic impersonality in Four 
Quartets is achieved in spite of a personal voice that takes artistic value away 
from the poems. Such, as already pointed out, is the view of C. K. Stead in his 
discussion of the structure of Four Quartets. Against the more strictly poetic 
achievements of Eliot's earlier poetry, including The Waste Land, Four 
Quartets is said to suffer from an imposed structure that instils too much of the 
personality of the author: 
The Waste Land has a quality that calls forth organic metaphors when 
we attempt to describe it. It achieves `impersonality' of a kind which 
Four Quartets, with its many discursive passages and its consciously 
controlled plan, does not attempt. [... ] However wise and admirable the 
man it displays, the poem [Four Quartets] remains [... ] imperfectly 
achieved, with large portions of abstraction untransmuted into the 
living matter of poetry. 45 
However, are not the discursive passages (those which express a `personal' 
voice and `impose' a `consciously controlled plan')precisely the passages in 
which the search for impersonality is most obvious? And is this even a 
`personal' search for impersonality? 
5 Stead, The New Poetic, pp. 177-178. 
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Those speculative passages, most notably the discursive passages that 
follow the formal lyrics in II, and the call for ascesis that section II in each poem 
constitutes, explicitly state a movement of self-sacrifice and self-negation that 
transcends the boundaries of the personal. And this impersonality, in view of 
the sequence of stages that the quartets follow, can only be finally achieved in 
accordance with an impersonality that is also that of art. Therefore the structure 
of Four Quartets, viewed as a whole and a progression, provides a more 
elaborate and self-reflective impersonality than that of The Waste Land, 
although equally intertwined with notions of artistic excellence. If section III in 
each poem dwells in the negative character of personal experience as a form of 
self-sacrifice, it is only as part of a structured process in which, after the 
intercession of section N, they lead to a mystic union hinted at or achieved in 
terms of art in section V. The negative ascetic movements of St John of the 
Cross in `East Coker' III are already explained at the end of `Burnt Norton' as 
part of a pattern: 
The detail of the pattern is movement, 
As in the figure of the ten stairs. 
Desire itself is movement 
Not in itself desirable; 
Love is itself unmoving, 
Only the cause and end of movement, 
Timeless, and undesiring 
Except in the aspect of time 
Caught in the form of limitation 
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Between un-being and being. 46 
Whereas the detail of the pattern is movement (a desire to free itself from 
desire), through this patterned movement the stillness of love is reached. 
Sacrifice is thus in Four Quartets understood as self-sacrifice: the self 
which dies or is lost in the ecstasy of love is both the victim and the 
executioner. What makes this selflessness different from that of mere religious 
or moral poetry is that within Four Quartets ascetic selflessness is to be 
resolved in the context of art. The death of the self had a strictly religious set-up 
in Murder in the Cathedral, where sacrifice can only be understood in relation 
to Christ's Passion: 
whenever Mass is said, we re-enact the Passion and Death of Our Lord; 
and on this Christmas Day we do this in celebration of His Birth. So 
that at the same moment we rejoice in His coming for the salvation of 
men, and offer again to God His Body and Blood in sacrifice [... ]. 47 
Any other sacrificial death, including that of St Stephen, is only understood by 
reference to Christ's sacrifice: 
not only do we at the feast of Christmas celebrate at once Our Lord's 
Birth and His Death: but on the next day we celebrate the martyrdom 
46 Eliot, 'Burnt Norton' V, in Collected Poems, p. 195 
4' Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, in The Complete Poems and Plays. ed. cit., p. 260. 
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of His first martyr, the blessed Stephen. Is it an accident. do you think, 
that the day of the first martyr follows immediately the day of the Birth 
of Christ? By no means. Just as we rejoice and mourn at once, in the 
Birth and in the Passion of Our Lord; so also in a smaller figure, we 
both rejoice and mourn in the death of martyrs. 48 
In The Confidential Clerk, sacrifice is set up in the context of a moral dilemma, 
and understood only in moral terms: 
MRS. GUZZARD. [... ] in telling you the truth 
I am sacrificing my ambitions for Colby. 
I am sacrificing also my previous sacrifice. 
This is even greater than the sacrifice I made 
When I let you claim him [... ]. 
Don't you understand that this revelation 
Drives the knife deeper and twists it in the wound? 49 
Sacrifice within Four Quartets cannot be understood as only a religious rite or a 
moral act: it is also an artistic structure, and it is only by incorporating the realm 
of art that it can achieve its efficacy. Thus, whereas the different sections of 
Four Quartets offer hints and guesses, partial understanding and paths to 
follow, the final section of `Little Gidding' reaches the stillness of a perfected 
sacrifice, the union of `the fire and the rose'. Before, the sacrificial fire had been 
lit by the formal lyric of section IV, which had been preceded, in its turn, by the 
Eliot, Afurder in the Cathedral, ibid., p. 261. 
49 Eliot, The Confidential Clerk, ibid., p. 515. 
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extreme problematisation of the self that runs through the colloquium with the 
dead master. He is someone `known, forgotten, half recalled / Both one and 
many, 50 a `familiar compound ghost / Both intimate and unidentifiable' which 
is the poetic voice itself assuming a double part in its conversation. This ghost 
is not only the wise stranger, the unidentified cold psychoanalyst of The 
Cocktail Party, who places on others his own phantasmal nature: 
[... ] it is perhaps still more difficult 
To keep up the pretence that you are not strangers. 
The affectionate ghosts: the grandmother, 
The lively bachelor uncle at the Christmas party, 
The beloved nursemaid-those who enfolded 
Your childhood years in comfort, mirth, security- 
If they returned, would it not be embarrassing? s' 
The ghost of `Little Gidding' doesn't come as a tempter either, as did the known 
and unknown character who offers Thomas the gift of spiritual power: 
TEMPTER. As you do not know me, I do not need a name 
And, as you know me, that is why I come. 
You know me, but have never seen my face. 
To meet before was never time or place. 52 
50 Eliot, `Little Gidding', in Collected Poems, p. 217. 
51 Eliot, The Cocktail Party, in The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 385. 
52 Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral, ibid., p. 253. 
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The ghost of `Little Gidding' is the poetic voice's own double, embarked in a 
process of liberation from personality that commences in this inner dialogue and 
finishes in the moment of rest that the artistic impersonality of section V 
achieves. There the ritual to be performed in that unreal season, midwinter 
spring, seems to find `every phrase / And sentence that is right', and accomplish 
that sacred moment of stillness prefigured in the disturbing sacrificial imagery 
of The Family Reunion: 
Spring is an issue of blood 
A season of sacrifice 
And the wail of the new full tide 
Returning the ghosts of the dead 
Those whom the winter drowned 
Do not the ghosts of the drowned 
Return to land in the spring? 
Do the dead want to return? 
I believe the moment of birth 
Is when we have knowledge of death 
I believe the season of birth 
Is the season of sacrifice 
For the tree and the beast, and the fish 
Thrashing itself upstream: 
And what of the terrified spirit 
Compelled to be reborn 
To rise toward the violent sun 
Wet wings into the rain cloud 
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Harefoot over the moon ! 53 
Now, in `Little Gidding', the moment which is announced at the end of each of 
the previous quartets is reached, and `the moment of the rose and the moment of 
the yew-tree / Are of equal duration'. 54 The sacrificial freedom from desire and 
movement, the emptying from personality, is achieved `in the stillness / 
Between two waves of the sea'. 55 But this only makes sense as a point in a 
journey, as a part of a structure that is all, as a whole, directed towards this still 
moment of sacrificial selflessness. 
7.3. A Mythical Narrative Progression 
7.3.1. Mythical modes of narrativity in A Portrait of the Artist 
A Portrait of the Artist reverses the procedure found in Turpin Hero, the 
folkloric ballad which Stephen recalls, in that it starts as a third person narrative 
and ends in the first person, with the diary entries of Stephen. This progression 
may want to indicate the progressive control of Stephen over his own voice as 
an artist, but above all it is, rather than a clearly defined pattern, a framework in 
which a fluid exchange of narrative voices is allowed to occur. Ultimately, the 
53 Eliot. The Family Reunion, ibid., p. 310. 
54 Eliot, 'Little Gidding', in Collected Poems, p. 222. 
Eliot, 'Little Gidding', ibid., p. 222. 
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fluidity of voices within A Portrait of the Artist relies on the interchangeability 
of the first and the third person, aligning itself with a not-yet-distinct notion of 
objectivity which is constitutive of a mythic narrative and which the Turpin 
Hero tales rescue. 
Together with the instability of the location of the narrating focus, the 
multi directionality of narrative time transports us to a conception of story- 
telling which finds its clearest expression in mythic stories. Linear progression 
is challenged, in that, cutting across the chronological sequence of events, there 
appear recursivity and interdependence of actions: actions are reproduced, 
recalled, re-described, reinterpreted, in order to throw light upon one another 
relatively apart from their chronological order of appearance. 
An example of the effects created by the shifts of narrative voice can be 
found in the episode of the marshall ghost that Stephen describes as a child. 56 
The paragraph begins with a rendering of Stephen's train of thought in what 
formally comes closest to free indirect speech: 
The prefect's shoes went away, 
placing us in a standpoint that is neither the reporter's position of objectivity 
(`He heard the noise of the prefect's shoes go away') nor Stephen's interiority 
speaking for itself ('I hear the noise of the prefect's shoes go away'). The 
56 See Joyce, . -1 
Portrait of the Artist. pp. 16-17. 
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objects are detached from the noise they produce, and their going away 
presented as an objective fact, but it is only in relation to Stephen's perception 
that this fact can be such at all; therefore the objectivity of `he heard' and the 
subjectivity of `I hear' are both implied and surpassed in this third position, 
which is further maintained by a series of voice shifts: 
Where`? Down the staircase and along the corridors or to his room at 
the end? He saw the dark. Was it true about the black dog that walked 
there at night with eyes as big as carriagelamps? 57 
After the direct rendering of Stephen's questions ('Where? Down the staircase 
[... ]? ), we are placed again outside Stephen's mind ('He saw the dark'), only in 
order to recover a position of ambiguity in the fusion of his inner wonder 
(question mark, interrogative word order) with the objectivity of the reporter 
(past tense, deictic shifted to `there'). 
In this particular passage, the ambiguity of a child-like style contributes 
to the indeterminacy of the states of inner though, in what is already an 
exploration of interior monologue techniques. Sentences are short and syntax is 
simple, conveying the free succession of events without ordering principle 
which corresponds to the flow of consciousness. References shift: from `he' 
referring to Stephen we move to `he as the marshall ghost, in a context in which 
this move is not fully expected, and in a parallel to the totally unsignalled 
57 Joyce, .a 
Portrait of the . -artist, p. 
16. 
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passage from the actuality of Stephen's surroundings to theý6 te world of his 0c 
imagination: we are only given evidence of the imaginary status of the scene 
after it has concluded: 
0 how cold and strange it was to think of all that! 58 
Another example of the fluidity of the narrative voices is Stephen's 
brooding on the initial session of the retreat sermon. The narrator remains this 
time for the most part in the third person, but is closer to free indirect speech 
than to an omniscient observer: exhortations and changes of style betray this 
passage as another instance of Stephen's stream of consciousness, occupying an 
indefinite place between incommunicable personal experience and the voices of 
others: this interior monologue is constructed on the basis of the preacher's 
rhetoric, and yet it characterises Stephen's inner states, from anguish to despair: 
The faint glimmer of fear became a terror of spirit as the 
hoarse voice of the preacher blew death into his soul. He 
suffered its agony. He felt the deathchill touch the 
extremities and creep onwards towards the heart, the film 
of death veiling the eyes, the bright centres of the brain 
extinguished one by one like lamps, the last sweat oozing 
upon the skin, the powerlessness of the dying limbs [... ] 59 
Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 17, my emphasis. 
59 Joyce, .4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 120. 
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In what follows the complexity of the style continues to grow, and its 
copiousness parallels Stephen's growing despair through a display of long 
periods, exhortations, rhetorical questions, and appeal to the authority of 
quotations. 
Similarly, Stephen's brooding over his own sins acquires an elaborate 
tone punctuated with theological references: 
His days and works and thoughts could make no atonement 
for him, the fountains of sanctifying grace having ceased to 
refresh his soul. At most, by an alms given to a beggar 
whose blessing he fled from, he might hope wearily to win 
for himself some measure of actual grace. 60 
Thus, the space of the interiority of the hero is indissolubly tied to an external 
discourse which shapes it: the intensification of Stephen's experience is brought 
to us by stylistic shifts which themselves configure his inner world; Stephen's 
own individuality exceeds the boundaries of a self-contained subject, and arises 
only in relation to the shaping force of a shared language, just as the deeds of 
the mythic hero are a product of the consciousness of the community that 
produces them. 
60 Joyce, 
. -1 
Portrait of the . 4rtist, pp. 
110-111. 
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Individual actions and text are constantly intertwined throughout A 
Portrait of the Artist, to the extent that actions are prefigured, interpreted and 
understood in terms of previously existent texts: many passages revolve around 
a quotation against whose meaning and connotations the narrative seems to 
stand as a commentary as well as a necessary consequence. The episode by the 
river Liffey is captured in a quotation: 
-A day of dappled sea-borne clouds. 
The phrase and the day and the scene harmonised in a 
chord. 61 
And this harmony of life and words, this fluidity between reality and its 
representation, belongs to a landscape where myths are possible and where the 
modern interpretation of reality is not: to a world where the world itself speaks 
beyond notions of authorship, and where words find themselves sharing a soil 
of meaning with non-linguistic objects. 
In such a world the evil spirits that inhabit darkness can have a voice, 
and a voice of their own: 
He waited still at the threshold as at the entrance to some 
dark cave. Faces were there; eyes: they waited and watched. 
61 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 180. 
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We knew perfectly well of course that although it was 
bound to come to the light he would find considerable 
difficulty in endeavouring to try to induce himself to try to 
endeavour to ascertain the spiritual plenipotentiary and so 
we knew perfectly well-62 
According to their evil nature, these spirits utter a meaningless speech which 
only frightens Stephen, but they are still able to talk, independently of any other 
narrative voice, in a context in which Stephen's world has the meaningful 
quality of a mythic land. 
It is therefore not surprising that the laws of association in the narrative 
are often textual: in a world understood as a text, a text becomes a world, and its 
passages events that relate to one another by reminiscence. Therefore, Stephen's 
recalling of Emma is not only tied to the poems that he wrote and writes for her, 
but to the very quality of A Portrait of the Artist as an event, and thus after ten 
years in the narrative (and 169 pages in the Penguin edition) the description of 
the tram episode63 is repeated in part with ritual precision. 
It is around another ritual enunciation, that of the Confiteor, that we find 
a clear instance of the intersection of temporalities in A Portrait of the Artist. 
02 Joyce, 
.4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 147. 
63 The episode of the tram appears on pp. 72 and 241. See 5.4, where this episode is presented 
as an example of Modernist mythopeia. 
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While Stephen is waiting to take part in the school play, Heron demands a 
confession from him, and as Stephen recites the Confiteor in response, two 
associated incidents come to his mind and are also introduced in the story: the 
first one is Stephen's English master making him admit that there was a heretic 
remark in his essay; the second, a very similar incident to the one belonging to 
the main story-line, in which Heron brings Stephen to tears asking him to deny 
the poetic excellence of Byron. After these reminiscences have unfolded, 
Stephen is still reciting the Confiteor, closing a subversion of the main story's 
temporality that has not accidentally happened against the background of ritual 
words: if we follow the outlined genealogy of mythic discourse, 64 we can 
explain its ambiguities, including its challenge of linear temporality, as a 
narrative development of the sacred character of the ritual word. The connection 
between the ritual words and these reminiscences is openly stated in the story: 
The confession came only from Stephen's lips and while they spoke the 
words, a sudden memory had carried him to another scene called up, as 
if by magic, at the moment when he had noted the faint cruel dimples at 
the corners of Heron's smiling lips and had felt the familiar stroke of 
the cane against his calf and had heard the familiar word of 
admonition: -Admit. 
65 
It is also the evocative power of words that is at the root of another chain of 
reminiscences in Stephen's conversation with the director, who invites him to 
"' See above, chapters 3 and 4. 
65 Joyce, 
. -4 
Portrait of the Artist, p. 82. 
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join the order. 66 Upon the words `Les Jupes' Stephen's mind starts to unfold a 
chain of associations full of sensuous details, up to the point when 
the echoes of certain expressions used in Clongowes sounded in remote 
caves of his mind. 67 
Sometimes the shifts of narrative time are abrupt, and lack the 
connecting element of an utterance. The story that Davin tells Stephen resounds 
in Stephen's mind as a mythic tale that characterises his own folk: 
The last words of Davin's story sang in his memory and the figure of 
the woman in the story stood forth [... ] as a type of her race and of his 
own, a batlike soul waking to the consciousness of itself in darkness 
and secrecy and loneliness [... ]. 68 
After this reverie, and without transition, the hand of the flower-girl brings 
Stephen and the reader back to the main narrative. A similar sudden shift occurs 
after Stephen's recalling of the performance of Yeat's The Countess Cathleen, 69 
but it had been again the power of words that had initiated the recalling of this 
episode: 
66 See Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, pp. 168-170. 
67 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 170. 
"' Joyce. .4 
Portrait of the . -irtist. p. 
198. 
"" See Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 246. 
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The verses crooned in the ear of his memory composed slowly before 
his remembering eyes the scene of the hall on the night of the opening 
of the national theatre. 70 
Contrasting with these instances of intersecting lines of time, but adding 
no less ambiguity to the flow of Stephen's mind, which is the flow of the 
novel's action, dream and actuality mix in the episode of Stephen's communion 
after his confession: 
In a dream he fell asleep. In a dream he rose and saw that it was 
morning. In a waking dream he went through the quiet morning 
towards the college. 71 
What follows has therefore an ambiguous status, epitomising the enchanted 
quality of an unstable space between subjectivity and actuality in which the 
whole of the novel moves. 
7.3.2. Mythical Narrativity in Four Quartets. 
There is also an underlying narrative in Four Quartets: here the quest is 
not that of the hero, but that of the poet, or the religious man; yet it remains a 
spiritual voyage, a series of attempts of which each of the quartets is an 
instance, to finally find repose in the closure that `Little Gidding' provides. The 
70 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist. p. 245. 
71 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist, p. 158. 
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search for the timeless moment is itself a progression: a progressive exploration 
of the nature of temporality and succession. In `East Coker', a poem about 
origins and ancestors, this quest is thematised in terms of end and beginning, 
with a constant resort to their paradoxical identification. The poem opens with 
`In my beginning is my end'72 and closes with `In my end is my beginning'; 73 it 
sets off to find the moment of significance (and of personal identity) at the very 
origin: 
Dawn points, and another day 
Prepares for heat and silence. Out at sea the dawn wind 
Wrinkles and slides. I am here 
Or there, or elsewhere. In my beginning. 74 
Nevertheless, in each of the first three quartets, the exploration does not render 
full satisfaction, and thus the journey backwards of `East Coker' fails to offer an 
answer to the author's quest. Only at the place of rest that `Little Gidding' 
provides does the futility of this search for origins get incorporated into a 
significant pattern: 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
', Eliot, `East Coker' I. in Collected Poems, p. 196. 
73 Eliot, `East Coker' V. ibid., p. 204. 
74 Eliot, `East Coker' I, ibid., p. 197. 
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And know the place for the first time. 75 
To the extent to which Four Quartets describe this exploration, they participate 
in a narrative structure, but this narrativity is also endowed with a mythic 
quality, since it is again a sequence with a sacrifice at its centre: the turning into 
a sequence of a sacrificial experience. Throughout the poems, the personal voice 
gets joined to the death of the sacrificial victim, to the death of Christ. The 
sacrificial event of Christ's passion and death constitutes a centre for the text, 
the timeless moment out of which the text emerges after the application of 
discursivity; and as a turning into discourse of a ritual, the text cannot but retain 
the mythic traits that point to a sacred origin, of which the sacrifice of the 
author is only an instance. 
Likewise, the references to the Eucharist in A Portrait of the Artist and 
the description of the rites of communion had assigned to Stephen, Joyce's 
projection, the roles of Christ, his patron saint and Icarus, and it is in this 
decreasing order that they bring about their sacrificial connotations. 
7.3.3. A Heroic Spiritual Journey: A Myth of Rebirth 
The five chapters of A Portrait of the Artist, as five stages in the forging 
of Stephen heroic identity, correspond to the five sections of Eliot's Four S 
75 Eliot, 'Little Gidding' V. ibid., p. 222. 
I 
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Quartets, in that they constitute a progression easily associable with a myth of 
rebirth which is also a myth of grace lost and regained. 
Chapter I of A Portrait of the Artist depicts the world of childhood 
innocence of Stephen, as a world with which he can have a meaningful 
relationship; in this sense Stephen's childhood innocence is a state of grace 
from which he will feel progressively detached, as when later, reflecting on his 
own past, 
the memory of his childhood suddenly grew dim. He tried to call forth 
some of its vivid moments but could not. He recalled only names [... ]. 76 
Even though the episodes of Stephen's childhood are often moments of 
estrangement, prompting feelings of inadequacy, there remains in the general 
pattern an essential sense of belonging, testified to by the successful resolution 
of the punishment incident that closes the first chapter: Stephen succeeds in 
asserting his innocence before the rector. 
Chapter II brings disillusion and disenchantment. The world grows 
increasingly vacuous, in parallel to the growth of Stephen's feeling of 
inadequacy. The episodes of the race-training and the trip to Cork display the 
grotesque quality of an environment that has ceased to be meaningful. It is then 
only consequent that Stephen seeks refuge in a breach of his surrounding 
Joyce, . -4 Portrait of the 
Artist, p. 98. 
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squalor, and is driven to visit the prostitute, as the ultimate sign of fallenness. 
Yet soon in the narrative Stephen realises that baseness of his state, and chapter 
III constitutes a first attempt at redemption. Here grace is to be regained thanks 
to a passage through negativity: the retreat sermons, dwelling on darkness and 
self-denial, eventually lead to Stephen's confession and penitence; even more, 
Stephen's half-dreamt communion will be followed by his own voluntary 
exercises in ascesis. 
However, in chapter IV the power of asceticism is revealed insufficient. 
When, after the amendment of his life, Stephen is confronted with the invitation 
to join the Jesuit order, his life of negative piety is already crumbling down, and 
before the director he finally realises that his change of attitude is leading him 
to positions for which he is not destined. The situation of squalor at home adds 
another element pointing to the need of something more than a passage through 
negativity to recover the lost grace. Finally, in Stephen's visions by the river 
Liffey, an outer figure makes itself present, and by this very occurrence 
Stephen's life takes a new turn along a course of meaning. 
After the intercession of this extraneous figure, chapter V concentrates 
on learning and the discussion of aesthetic ideas: the scenes take place now at 
the university and the library. It is as if Stephen had found in aesthetic theory 
and practice the means to return to the lost meaningful world of his childhood, 
and it is reliance on these means, including his own verse compositions, that 
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grants Stephen a positive and optimistic attitude towards his future. He seems to 
be prepared at this point to be born again. 
Yet the restoration of grace or the new birth is only announced, and does 
not actually take place. We could say, according to the dramatic pattern that 
was found in ancient Greek tragedy by Nietzsche, that the heroic quality of the 
main character does not complete its cycle, and thus he is not denied before the 
eyes of the gods, as the necessary move for the continuation of the ancient 
world order. In contrast to this, the mythic structure of Four Quartets goes 
beyond the end of the tragic scheme, and concludes with the presentation of a 
world fully restored to its primordial grace. Let us see the stages that lead to this 
restoration. 
In section I of each of the quartets the initial state of grace is shown as 
the presence of eternity within time: the privileging of present time in `Burnt 
Norton'; the cyclical temporality of `East Coker'; the a-temporal time of the 
tolling bell in `The Dry Salvages'; and the `never and always' of midwinter 
spring's `suspended time' in `Little Gidding'. But worldly experience soon 
leads to dissatisfaction: the timeless moment appears elusive and yearned for 
rather than attained in `Burnt Norton' II; the past renders no wisdom in `East 
Coker' II; accumulation of experience is meaningless in `The Dry Salvages' II; 
all worldly landscapes are deadly in `Little Gidding' II. 
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Section III offers an attempt to regain the original moment through self- 
denial: descending lower into the dark; exploring the paths of negation; 
voyaging forward into indifference towards a `love beyond desire'. Again this 
ascetic moment is not sufficient, and section IV introduces the need for 
intercession: through a longing for enchanted nature in `Burnt Norton'; a not 
fully accomplished sacrifice in `East Coker'; and a prayer to the Virgin Mary in 
`The Dry Salvages'. Somewhat differently, section N of `Little Gidding' 
already constitutes a closure, since the sacrificial rite of communication is here 
successfully performed, in the roundness of the two stanzas, against the 
background of a war fire that is also a purgatorial fire, a Pentecostal fire and a 
sacrificial fire. 
Accordingly, there is also a contrast between the final sections of each of 
the first three quartets and that of `Little Gidding': whereas in the former an 
analogy is drawn between spiritual health and artistic wholeness and accuracy 
(as Joyce did in the final chapter of A Portrait of the Artist), `Little Gidding' 
actually enacts this analogy, and presents a new birth, or an attained state of 
grace, through the poetic closure that it performs. It is in this sense that Four 
Quartets goes beyond the suggested tragic pattern, creating in artistic terms the 
mythic world-order that follows a successful sacrifice. 
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Conclusion 
The pervasiveness of Nietzsche's aesthetic ideas has been shown to go beyond 
the explicit textual or ideological influences on literary Modernism which are 
often argued for. In particular, the points at which the sacred and the aesthetic 
are thought together within The Birth of Tragedy, corroborated by Nietzsche's 
earlier notes (Christianity as a Dionysiac religion) and by his later works (his 
first bood as a sacrifice in Beyond Good and Evil), have found a parallel in the 
aesthetic practice of James Joyce and T. S. Eliot. 
Having taken The Birth of Tragedy as a theory of the relationship 
between the sacred and the aesthetic, we have been able to envisage the broad 
lines of a general theory of representation which, out of rhetorical notions, has 
established the origin of representation in the opposition between the 
metonymyc and the metaphoric drives, ascribing, in a Nietzschean fashion, a 
foundational character to contiguity (as the lack of differences or similarities, as 
the Dionysiac boundlessness). Thus a genealogy of philosophical representation 
(Vorstellung) appears, if we see it in the context of an aesthetic theory, ' as 
grounded in the ultimate sacred act: the ritual of sacrifice, from which an 
already internal process of secularisation produces the discoursive rendering of 
myth, still retaining the respectability of sacred speech, of hieroi logoi. It would 
be only when mythic representation disavows itself from its ritual source 
(arguably when the ritual killings of Socrates and Christ enter the history of 
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theory) that modern secularisation proper begins, and the possibility of doing 
philosophy according to myth (Nietzsche's nostalgic yearning for the pre- 
Socratic world) disappears. 
I have shown that this is not entirely the case, and that the very logic of 
sacrifice, even in its 'modern' form, necessarily entails a compromise with the 
sacred and can not just survive amidst the prevalence of secular representation 
only (just as representation itself is also inherent to its logic). I have tried to 
prove this by discrediting the discourses that presuppose an original mimesis 
and by dwelling on the ambiguous position of the so-called first metaphysical 
thinker (Plato) and that of the first of the last anti-metaphysical ones 
(Nietzsche): surprisingly, both of them are philosophers and myth-makers. 
Moreover, the aesthetic practice of James Joyce and T. S. Eliot has 
revealed that the points of intersection of the sacred and the aesthetic are 
recovered precisely in response to a modem tradition of secularisation that 
devoids art of all sacred value, and the external world of all enchantment; using 
mainly the living force of the mythic aspect of Christianity, one of the main 
shaping discourses of our Western tradition, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man and Four Quartets re-enact the uttering of sacred speech within literature, 
and by doing so, they in their turn throw light on the genealogy of our modern 
philosophical notions (individuation, identity, selfhood, reflection), showing 
their ineluctable link to an ever-elusive origin in the representational character 
already implicit in ritual sacredness. 
1 have tried to suggest, however, that there is no theory which is not aesthetic: it wo be a ,ý 
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contradiction in terms. 
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